
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Transnational
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to U.S.
Foreign Policy
Edited by
Hugh Liebert,
John Griswold
& Isaiah Wilson III

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Thinking beyond Boundaries

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Thinking beyond Boundaries

Transnational Challenges to U.S. Foreign Policy

Edited by
HUGH LIEBERT, JOHN GRISWOLD & ISAIAH WILSON III

Johns Hopkins University Press
BALTIMORE

The views expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Military Academy, the United States Army, or the Department of Defense.

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Contents

List of Contributors ix
Foreword Rajiv Shah xvii
Acknowledgments xxi

Introduction 1
John Griswold

PART I: TRACING DOMESTIC ISSUES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

INSTITUTIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

1 **Politics along the Water's Edge** 13
Adam Scher and Rachel Sondheimer

U.S. FOREIGN POLICYMAKING

2 **Challenges to Achieving Whole-of-Government Solutions** 21
John Griswold

FEDERALISM AND EDUCATION POLICY

3 **E Pluribus Unum?** Education and Foreign Policy 29
Hugh Liebert

FEDERALISM AND IMMIGRATION POLICY

4 **Disorder at the Border?** Immigration and Homeland Security 43
Hugh Liebert and Lee Robinson

THINKING BEYOND CIVIL-MILITARY BOUNDARIES

5 **American Society and Its Military** 55
Jim Golby

AMERICA'S WARS

6 **Thinking beyond Terrorism and Insurgency** 65
Jeanne Godfroy and Bryan Price

PART II: DISTINGUISHING REGIONAL DYNAMICS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

CHINA

7 **Challenges and Opportunities in Sino-American Relations** 79
William Taylor and William Parsons

MIDDLE EAST

8 **U.S. Policy Challenges in the Contemporary Middle East** 90
Robert Chamberlain and Luke Schumacher

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

9 **Promoting Security and Prosperity after Afghanistan** 104
Sukhdev Purewal

EUROPE

10 **Whither Europe?** Economic Crisis and the Future of NATO 115
Jordan Becker

AFRICA

11 **Aid, Development, and Human Security** 125
Irvin Oliver

THE AMERICAS

12 **Drugs, Crime, and State Fracture** 138
David Fagergren and Vijay Gallardo

PART III: TURNING GLOBAL CHALLENGES INTO FOREIGN-POLICY OPPORTUNITIES

CYBERSPACE

13 **Governing the Electronic Commons** 149
Heidi Brockmann and Scott Handler

FOREIGN AID

14 **Foreign-Policy Challenges in 3D:** Diplomacy, Democracy, and Development 157
Raven Bukowski

PROLIFERATION

15 **Securing Peace and Stability** 167
Paul Larson and Andrew Gallo

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

16 **Trade, Globalization, and the International Economy** 181
Todd Hertling

THE ENVIRONMENT

17 **Resources and Energy** 191
John Hagen

STRATEGIC RESOURCES

18 **Thinking beyond Oil** 201
Anne Pope

Conclusion 219
Hugh Liebert, John Griswold, and Isaiah Wilson III

Epilogue: The Student Conference on United States Affairs 221

Index 223

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Foreword

Rajiv Shah
USAID Administrator

On November 8, 2013, Typhoon Haiyan swept ashore in the Philippines, one of the most powerful storms ever to hit land. More than 5,000 people perished in the storm, and millions of people were cut off from clean water, food, or shelter.

Even before the typhoon made landfall, the U.S. government swung into action. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) positioned our disaster experts in the Philippines and readied relief supplies for shipment. In the earliest days of the disaster, we worked closely with our military colleagues at U.S. Pacific Command to set up an air bridge to move life-saving aid twenty-four hours a day from Manila to the hardest-hit areas. All told, the Department of Defense completed more than 1,300 flights, helping us deliver almost 2,500 tons of relief supplies and evacuate more than 21,000 people.

The swift action and seamless coordination of U.S. civilian and military response teams not only saved many lives but also demonstrated the important partnership that has evolved between America's defense and development agencies. From the Philippines to the Sahel to Afghanistan, this partnership reflects the fundamental fact that national security and human security are inextricably linked. In recognition of this essential relationship, in 2010 President Barack Obama elevated development alongside diplomacy and defense as a core pillar of U.S. foreign policy and national security. Ultimately, long-term peace and stability require not only the reassurance of security, but also the promise of a good education, the hope of a steady job, and the confidence that your children will survive and thrive.

Americans have not always thought this way.

Fifteen years ago, development experts often criticized the nexus of security and development. Some argued that development should be independent

of efforts to improve security or that development projects should only be implemented in countries with good policy environments.

Fifteen years from now, the effort to end extreme poverty will largely depend on whether development and security can serve alongside each other in fragile countries to help usher in lasting peace and prosperity. Even as there have been extraordinary development gains in some countries, the needle has hardly moved in many fragile, conflict-affected countries. As development expert Paul Collier has explained, conflict is essentially development in reverse. It destroys capital, scares away investment, displaces families from their livelihoods, and unravels the fabric of society.

But it is precisely in these environments that our work to end extreme poverty and advance U.S. national security matters most—where America's commitment to do what is smart meets the nation's desire to do what is right. That is why President Obama called upon the United States in his 2013 State of the Union address to join the world in ending extreme poverty in the next two decades. In his remarks, the president drew a road map out of extreme poverty that is driven by broad-based economic growth and democratic governance.

There are real reasons to be cautious. The overlap of extreme poverty, extreme ideology, and extreme corruption makes for a very difficult and dangerous operating environment—for aid workers and service members alike. But there are also reasons to be hopeful, and U.S. experiences working with the military around the world have lessons Americans can learn and adapt.

In Afghanistan, our work over the past ten years has transformed both the country and our organization. Several years ago, we began to implement a series of ambitious reforms to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of our assistance. We began by more than tripling our staff in Afghanistan, building local partnerships, and utilizing new technologies, including satellite-mapping assets to monitor our programs. This approach reflects a new model of development that has come to define our work across the world—bringing forth new partnerships, a greater emphasis on innovation, and a relentless focus on results.

Despite the challenges of working on the front lines of conflict in Afghanistan, we have remained focused on building the foundation of long-term, sustainable development through investments in education and health. As a result, we have seen significant progress in a country that many consider one of the most difficult places in the world in which to achieve results in development.

In 2001, girls in Afghanistan were not permitted to attend primary school. Today, they account for more than a third of all enrolled school children. We have helped build more than 550 new schools and equip them with 69 million textbooks in Dari and Pashto. In one town in eastern Afghanistan, we helped establish the first school since 2007. When a father prevented his nine-year-old daughter from attending it, the school council visited the family and convinced him to change his mind.

At the same time, over the last decade Afghanistan has experienced the largest increase in life expectancy and the greatest decreases in maternal and child mortality of any country in the world. Working closely with our agency, the Afghan Ministry of Public Health expanded health services by nearly 60 percent and created a legion of 22,000 community health-care workers.

In 2013, we launched our agency's single largest investment in women and girls to help build a new generation of Afghan women leaders in everything from business to academia to politics. Most importantly, we have clear targets to ensure that this long-term effort sustains and builds on the track record of progress in Afghanistan.

Today, we are applying this same approach to partnership in the Sahel, where we are working closely with Admiral William McRaven's Special Operations Command to develop a shared conflict assessment of a region that is home to more than 18 million hungry people and growing pockets of insecurity. In addition to focusing on emergency assistance, we are also helping vulnerable populations strengthen their resilience in the face of a changing climate, which also, in turn, helps prevent the spread of extremism. In Burkina Faso, for instance, in the heart of the Sahel, the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition is simultaneously encouraging market-oriented government reforms and private investment in agriculture to help lift 1.6 million people out of poverty.

In November 2011, Admiral James Stavridis spoke at a conference of all USAID mission directors. "Security is tied intrinsically to poverty, to health, and all the challenges you undertake," he said. "In the end, in all the chaotic situations around the world, we are not going to fight our way to success. We are going to develop our way to success. In the 21st century, security is not about building walls. It is about building bridges."

In many ways, this framework has become the perfect blueprint for civilian-military engagement. Whether in the uniform of a solider in Kabul or the

khakis of an aid worker in Mogadishu, Americans stand together on the front lines of the fight against poverty and conflict, because they believe they are strongest as a nation when they build ladders of opportunity for the least fortunate among them.

In 1962, President John F. Kennedy told the graduating class of the United States Military Academy that they "have a responsibility to deter war, as well as to fight it." Today, Americans know that the work of development—boosting crop yields, monitoring elections, and empowering health workers—is one of the smartest and most cost-effective investments the U.S can make in a more peaceful, prosperous world. As the United States continues to strengthen the partnership between defense and development communities, it recognizes that perhaps America's best gesture of partnership is keeping U.S. soldiers off the battlefield.

Thank you to the West Point faculty who contributed to this volume, as well as the students, cadets, advisors, and leadership who came together to make the 2011 Student Conference on U.S. Affairs a productive and meaningful experience.

Acknowledgments

In November of 2011, the United States Military Academy hosted the sixty-third Student Conference on U.S. Affairs. This annual conference—affectionately known as "SCUSA"—brings together undergraduates, professors, and policymakers from around the world to discuss U.S. foreign policy. To set the stage for these discussions, faculty write short papers outlining the major questions and alternatives facing policymakers in a range of areas. Each paper is both an *amuse-bouche* and a menu, stimulating and structuring the conversations that make up the conference.

Most of the papers in this volume were written for the conference and were improved by feedback from participants. The editors would like to thank Rajiv Shah for delivering the conference's keynote address; Dell Dailey, Mary Legere, Gideon Rose, and Kori Schake, for speaking on the opening panel; and those who led roundtables on specific policy areas: Jay Apperson, Amir Asmar, Terry Babcock-Lumish, Keith Benedict, Jen Buckner, Nicholas Christianson, Patricia Degennaro, Jennifer Easterly, Maureen Farrell, Sonya Finley, Marie Johnson, Christopher Jones, Matthias Matthijs, Tom McNaugher, Mark Miloscia, Joanne Moore, Carl Abdou Rahmann, Ray Raymond, Mark Rosen, Gilbert Sanborn, James Smith, Chad Serena, Margaret Sloane, Abby Steele, Judith Stiehm, Marybeth Ulrich, T. J. White, and Al Willner. All of these individuals contributed to an excellent conference, and their comments and insights improved the chapters collected here.

The conference itself was funded by grants from the West Point Class of 1971, the George and Carol Olmsted Foundation, and the U.S. Military Academy's Association of Graduates. We cannot thank them enough for their support of the Student Conference on U.S. Affairs.

We are also grateful to Tim Trainor, Dean of the U.S. Military Academy, and the leadership of the Social Sciences Department, especially Mike Meese and Cindy Jebb, for their support of the conference and this volume. Cadet Joshua Miller served as the SCUSA 63 Commander, and he deserves special mention for making the conference happen.

A number of people helped prepare this volume for publication. Thom Sherlock and Scott Silverstone provided sage advice as this project was first being developed. Michael Hendricks and Steven Fleming produced the volume's maps; they were exceptionally generous with their time and expertise. The editors would also like to thank the editorial team at Johns Hopkins University Press—especially Suzanne Flinchbaugh, Catherine Goldstead, and Kathleen Capels—and the anonymous reviewers. Suzanne Flinchbaugh, in particular, has been wonderfully supportive of the project from the beginning.

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Thinking beyond Boundaries

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Introduction

JOHN GRISWOLD

The problems we as a nation are grappling with are well-known: steep fiscal imbalances and mounting debt, which could develop into a deep crisis for our country. At the same time, we face a complex and unpredictable international security environment that includes a major war in Afghanistan, winding up the war in Iraq, revolution throughout the Middle East, new rising powers, nuclear proliferation in Iran and Korea, the continued threat of terrorism, and more. ROBERT GATES

The world faces dramatic, sweeping change amid uncertainty. Nations are throwing off the chains of autocracy. Human rights and national self-determination have emerged as critical topics of international discourse. Revolutionary changes in computing and information technology appear at a breakneck pace. Economic growth is halting and the prospects for prosperity are hazy. Conflicts over territory, environmental resources, and energy persist. The state monopoly over nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is a constant concern. After over a decade of heavy military spending, the United States is projected to slash its defense budget, raising questions about its influence and future participation in world affairs.

The preceding paragraph could just as easily have been written sixty years ago as today. What has changed is that the relationship between these global problems and their potential solutions has grown increasingly complex. New issues and actors rapidly emerge; others recede, only to be revisited again at unexpected times. Despite these changing patterns and the varying degrees of attention these issues receive, they share a common thread: all defy any single state's attempts to solve them. In its first-ever *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, the U.S. Department of State recognized that "today's threats and opportunities are often global, interconnected, and beyond the power of any one state to resolve."[1]

This volume challenges its readers to consider how the United States can best think and act beyond traditional boundaries. This is an important and timely task, since U.S. involvement in world affairs increasingly requires the negotiation of intersecting and overlapping boundaries. These boundaries can take both physical and ideational forms. Physically, boundaries provide the state with its identity and integrity. Their shape helps to define a state's available resources and, as a consequence, fashion its interests. Foreign-policy problems that were once manageable within the confines of physical boundaries now require broader solutions. Diverse forces—such as social networks, globalization, and environmental hazards—transcend physical boundaries, influencing populations, politics, and policymaking across states, regions, and oceans. Individually, these problems may be considered *transnational*—that is, requiring agreement between multiple states regarding the nature of a policy problem and some consensus leading to coordinated action. Ideationally, boundaries connote a more malleable and permeable reality. Transnational problems frequently cross ideational boundaries as issues such as environmental policy interact with demographic, ideological, economic, or security concerns. Matters of this sort exceed the typical conceptual bins into which policy problems are divided. To confront them, U.S. policymakers must become accustomed to thinking beyond both physical and ideational boundaries.

Consider water-rights issues that span national boundaries, such as those surrounding the Euphrates River, running from Turkey through Syria and into Iraq. On one level, rights to the Euphrates represent a transnational resource-management issue. On a different level, the issue is economic. Another facet involves maintaining the health of an ecosystem and the downstream population that depends on clean water. Finally, the absence of clean water may spark interstate conflict over this dwindling resource. This brief example illustrates just one challenge that exceeds the scope of traditional physical and ideational boundaries.

How do these physical and ideational boundaries affect U.S. policymaking, both foreign and domestic? What should America's role be in governance beyond boundaries? Given its halting economic growth following the 2008 recession, should the United States husband its declining wealth and power? To what extent can the United States promote legitimate, effective global governance? What form should these efforts at governance take?

Boundary-Spanning Problems

The United States must devise policy solutions to problems that span multiple boundaries. This is particularly true in an era that lacks a singular threat or organizing principle. Competing domestic actors with diverse and conflicting interests may devise not one coherent strategy, but multiple, competing policies. As Walter Russell Mead writes, "Foreign policy doesn't go away in the absence of strategic consensus; it proliferates."[2] As a result, foreign policy may become disjointed and even, at times, myopic.

As diverse and chaotic as U.S. foreign policy may be, global concerns are equally disparate. Consider climate change and the environment. Devising comprehensive and sustainable approaches to complex problems ranging from pollution abatement to fallout from nuclear accidents requires agreement over the technical and normative aspects of both the problems and solutions. The broad transnational umbrella of "the environment" may not adequately capture the impacts that environmental problems have on economic, security, and demographic issues. Some states are disproportionally affected by pollution and climate change, compelling them to seek solutions more aggressively than other states. These challenges may influence both their domestic and foreign policies.[3] Consensus between states can easily fracture at multiple breakpoints: wealthy states versus poor ones; autocratic states versus democratic ones; subsistence economies versus information-based ones. Multinational corporations play a critical role in influencing state behavior through their domestic political activity, favoring one component of a broader policy over another. Policy entrepreneurs are also especially influential in organizing attention toward an issue and calling for new initiatives, though not always as states may like. The competition for resources can drive state action as forcefully as environmental concerns. Setting environmental policy requires policymakers to address each of these dimensions of the problem simultaneously.

International institutions may offer some promise in reducing conflict and fostering cooperation. At their best, they promote transparency and enhance information sharing between states while broadening opportunities for collective action.[4] Yet the failures of these institutions are also well documented.[5] International institutions are difficult to create and maintain, and equally difficult to reform; their efficacy at times is questionable. Robert Keohane and David Victor note that international regimes "should be viewed not as ideal

constructions but outcomes that emerge from real-world political, organizational, and information constraints."[6] Further, international institutions may represent multiple components of a broader understanding of a policy. In the example above, environmental policy may have elements related to agriculture, water, public health, and manufacturing policies. Privileging one factor over another may impact policy outcomes in unpredictable ways.[7]

This brief discussion of boundary-spanning problems and their solutions raises several questions. How can the United States promote collective action, given the limitations of an uncoordinated international system? When it comes to advancing its interests, does "might make right"? When do the needs of one state or region become more pressing than those of another? Can the United States realize its foreign-policy goals through existing international regimes and institutions, as currently conceived and constructed, or is a different approach necessary?

Local and Regional Roots, Global Interactions, and Impacts

The chapters in this volume address a range of boundary-spanning problems. Many of the boundary-spanning issues that America faces have regional and local roots but global impacts. In these cases one must consider not only the immediate triage necessary to staunch an international crisis, but longer-term palliative policies. As of this writing, the crisis in Syria crosses multiple boundaries. The conflict is both a civil war and a humanitarian crisis, while Syria itself is a looming terrorist threat, a potential user and unwitting chemical weapons proliferator, and a cyber adversary—all at once. The revolutions throughout the greater Middle East, known collectively as the *Arab Spring*, exemplify this trend more broadly. Although many of the causes for the revolts are local in nature, their impacts are boundary spanning.[8] The Arab Spring illustrates the state's inability to prevent ideas from penetrating its boundaries. The Internet and the nearly limitless proliferation of social media circumvent many barriers to social change.[9] Yet the impact of these changes affects policies worldwide. U.S. policymakers responded by encouraging self-determination and democratization; the Chinese government rejected such changes just as strongly. How should America devise its foreign policy in light of these dynamics? Should the United States vocally encourage democracy, while its chief trade partner and global competitor takes the opposite approach?

Each of these chapters examines a similar marriage of a region and a policy problem, encouraging readers to think beyond the geographic and disciplin-

ary boundaries that typify U.S. foreign policy. In Latin America, immigration, drug trafficking, and border security challenge the U.S. federal government, as well as the governments of the nation's border states (California, Arizona, and Texas). These challenges also affect U.S. relations with Mexico. Yet crime and drug trafficking alone do not define American policy in the Western Hemisphere; President Barack Obama's 2011 trip to Brazil highlighted the critical role the region plays in America's economic future.[10] How should the United States advance its security interests and improve its access to Latin American markets and resources? What are the prospects for future relations between the United States and its rapidly growing neighbors to the south?

In Africa, international aid and development organizations work to solve complex problems falling under the broad rubric of human security. There is considerable debate over how to solve problems and the role that foreign aid plays in promoting or stunting the growth of governing capacity. The inability of many African states to provide basic services and infrastructures discourages foreign investment from Western states, making an escape from poverty exceedingly difficult. Basic sanitation and health conditions further detract from potential investment.[11] In addition, aid and development efforts may enhance dependency rather than build self-sufficiency.[12] Chinese investment in Africa, which does not mirror Western practices, confounds international efforts that emphasize transparency and accountability; Chinese policymakers are primarily (though not exclusively) concerned with resource extraction.[13] How can the United States best act to improve human security in Africa? Is there a better way to promote development and limit dependency while improving governance?

Old Allies and New Challenges: Europe, Asia, and Boundary-Spanning Problems

On the surface, European concerns seem completely independent of African, Asian, and American ones. Yet many related challenges loom ahead. Europe, once hailed as a model of supranational institutionalism, is at a crossroads.[14] The maintenance and, arguably, the very survival of the European Union and the Eurozone are inextricably linked to the issues of debt, demographics, and immigration. As Europeans age, questions arise as to how European countries can sustain economic growth and prosperity without lowering the barriers to permanent immigration. At the same time, European prosperity is being eroded by debt. The Eurozone's financial bailouts of Greece and Portugal illustrate

the challenges caused by the increased interdependence associated with a common currency.[15] Austerity measures implemented throughout the Eurozone may prevent welfare states in Europe from supporting increasingly graying populations. Refugees from recently democratizing North African countries exacerbate these problems.[16] All of these conditions lead to questions about the viability of the European monetary union and of the European Union more broadly. Are European institutions and norms strong enough to survive these challenges? What do the fiscal, monetary, and demographic challenges mean for European participation in transnational economic and security arrangements with the United States?

Transnational competition and interdependence present challenges and opportunities for U.S. foreign policy in Asia. As Robert Kaplan writes, "A non-Western world of astonishing interdependence and yet fiercely guarded sovereignty, with militaries growing alongside economies, is being tensely woven in the Greater Indian Ocean."[17] China, India, and other states compete for natural resources and market share in the West. Technological advances and market liberalization continue to benefit the region. But are these gains sustainable? What is the impact of changing demographic trends in China on its foreign policy? How quickly should the United States withdraw from Afghanistan—and what are the consequences of a U.S. departure? Can tensions between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan be resolved peacefully? How should the United States conduct its foreign policy in Asia to best promote security and prosperity?

Some international issues defy regional alignment and require a broader global commitment to solve. Osama bin Laden is gone, yet al Qaeda persists, even in the twilight of the Arab Spring. Proliferation of offensive nuclear technology remains a critical threat to the United States and its allies. Technological innovations, such as cloud computing, promise the benefits of increased access to data. These gains, however, must be balanced against the potential risk to security and the threat to privacy. Efforts to achieve global consensus on regulating, taxing, and securing access to the Internet have not succeeded. Some of these boundary-spanning issues collide with each other. Consider the challenges of maintaining freedom of access to cyberspace while combating its use for promoting radical ideology or as a coordinating mechanism for terrorist attacks. These factors go beyond the realm of transnational threats or issues, spanning ideological areas just as much as they cross territorial boundaries. How should the United States deal with the scourge of terrorism in a post–bin Laden world? What are America's interests in governing cyberspace? Can the

United States create broad enough partnerships to achieve its own policy objectives while recognizing and integrating the nuanced perspectives of other states?

All Politics *Isn't* Local: Considering American Domestic Policy beyond Boundaries

U.S. foreign policymaking is rooted in a complex web of governance arrangements that accentuate a variety of actors, institutions, and interests. Even during the Cold War, American domestic politics did not stop at the water's edge.[18] U.S. cities and states have interests that may be orthogonal to those of the United States as a whole. California's emission standards eclipse federal ones; Arizona seeks tighter immigration policies; New York City regulates health standards more stringently than the Food and Drug Administration. How do these diverse interests at different levels of government impact U.S. foreign policymaking? What responsibilities do cities, states, and the national government have in seeking the benefits of economic globalization while mitigating its negative consequences? Arguably, through its trade practices and human-rights norms, the United States helps to set standards for the rest of the world.[19] This is true across a broad range of policy areas, from environmental protection to labor practices. How best can U.S. economic and trade policies be used to bring about desirable outcomes at home and abroad?

U.S. Military Power: In What Forms, and for What Uses?

In the wake of the troop surge in Iraq, former secretary of defense Robert Gates articulated the need for the United States to develop a new vision for the U.S. military. Gates noted that the Department of Defense must carefully balance the needs of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan with preparations for future conflicts.[20] These comments were prescient. The American military faces questions about its long-term sustainability. In light of pending budget cuts, the endgame in Iraq, and an uncertain role in Afghanistan, the American military is at a crossroads of its own.[21] The military's improving competence at fighting small wars and conducting counterinsurgency measures demonstrates its ability to learn and adapt to changing conditions on the battlefield. Recognizing that not all future wars will be conducted with the same aims and against threats similar to the current ones, the military is working to improve its ability to fight under myriad conditions. But does this push for "full spectrum warfare" mean that the hard-learned lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan will

be quickly dismissed?[22] Of equal concern may be the development of a new American way of war, hardwired to counterinsurgency at the cost of readiness to meet and defeat more traditional threats. How can the United States achieve its interests in the face of tremendous fiscal pressure to reduce its global commitments?

Questions about the military's form are outgrowths of broader questions of civil-military relations. There is an inexorable link between the military's ends and means and the desires of the republic that the military serves. After a decade of persistent conflict, it is unclear if that link is as tightly coupled as it has been in the past. Admiral Mike Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has noted the increasingly disconnected nature of the U.S. military from American society. Of the American people, Mullen recently stated: "I fear they do not know us. I fear they do not comprehend the full weight of the burden we carry or the price we pay when we return from battle."[23] Can a stronger link be forged between those who develop and implement U.S. grand strategy and the electorate? What is the military's role in American society more broadly? How can the United States better bridge the civil-military divide?

What Follows: Contemporary Challenges and Enduring Debates

The balance of this volume is dedicated to contextualizing these and other transnational, boundary-spanning policy problems. It also highlights or alludes to opportunities where current and future policymakers can influence the direction of American foreign policy. Some of these challenges may seem fleeting; others, more stable—and seemingly intractable.

In considering these enduring debates, the authors of this volume invite the reader to place himself or herself in the role of a policymaker, advisor, or staffer in any agency or branch of government. Consider your own approach to these challenges. Which opportunities would you pursue? What advice would you give the cabinet secretary, the senator, or the general? This book is intended to help its readers understand the world's challenges not only as detached observers, but as active, engaged participants. Like policymakers, readers are pressed with questions and forced to discover answers among many, and perhaps imperfect, foreign and domestic policy options.

In the 2010 edition of the *National Security Strategy*, President Obama noted the importance of recognizing the international nature of American national security problems:

> We are clear-eyed about the challenge of mobilizing collective action, and the shortfalls of the international system. But America has not succeeded by stepping outside the currents of international cooperation. We have succeeded by steering those currents in the direction of liberty and justice—so that nations thrive by meeting their responsibilities and facing consequences when they don't.[24]

With President Obama's insights in mind, this volume challenges its readers to step outside of traditional disciplinary currents in order to consider how the "currents of international cooperation" can best be steered. What should U.S. foreign policy look like in light of the boundary-spanning nature of the problems facing the United States? How should policymakers address localized issues that have global consequences? What is the role of the United States, and other nations, in addressing challenges that extend beyond boundaries?

NOTES

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PART I / Tracing Domestic Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy

Perhaps no boundary seems as prominent and permanent as that separating one's own nation from another. On one side are fellow citizens, with whom one shares customs, institutions, and a historical fate; on the other are strangers, with whom one often shares little more than one's humanity. On one side, us; on the other, them.

Of course, it is the nature of a boundary to posit permanence where none exists. Although the distinction between domestic and foreign policy seems fixed, the two are intimately intertwined. As Adam Scher and Rachel Sondheimer point out, foreign policy is but one of many products of U.S. domestic institutions. How a nation acts abroad has everything to do with how its actors are arranged at home. Organizing disparate departments and experts, each with its own agendas to promote and axes to grind, is no easy task. John Griswold describes the promise of "whole-of-government" solutions—decisionmaking processes that unite voices across the boundaries dividing the U.S. government—but he cautions that these solutions are every bit as elusive as they are alluring.

The boundaries within not only the U.S. government, but the nation itself, historically have stimulated policy innovation and healthy competition among its states. Hugh Liebert considers why, in the case of U.S. education policy, this seems not to be the case today. Given the increasing foreign-policy significance of shortcomings in American education, why have policymakers found it so difficult (thus far) to take advantage of American federalism? Federalism has also come to figure prominently in debates over immigration policy, as Liebert and Lee Robinson explain. Owing to an elusive national consensus on immigration policy, heightened fears over homeland security, and economic uncertainty, a number of U.S. states have launched their own controversial initiatives to stem the tide of illegal immigration. As in education policy, so in immigration policy: America's split sovereignty influences policy outcomes and complicates the tasks facing present and future policymakers.

Part of the difficulty confronting those who would restore U.S. federalism is that differences among U.S. states and regions have given way to divides separating socioeconomic classes and walks of life. Among the most consequential of these separations is the civil-military gap. Jim Golby examines why this gap has grown since President Dwight Eisenhower famously warned of the "military-industrial complex" in 1961 and then considers what can be done about it. Finally, Jeanne Godfroy and Bryan Price discuss what happens when domestic divides run deep enough to split a polity in two. When do states dissolve into civil war, and what are the interests and responsibilities of nations considering whether or not to intervene?

Throughout these chapters, the domestic shades into the foreign, and vice-versa. What, in the final analysis, is the relationship between the two? What is the nature of the seemingly most permanent but, in fact, quite permeable boundary—the one dividing states and peoples from one another?

1

Politics along the Water's Edge

ADAM SCHER AND RACHEL SONDHEIMER

There is an old adage regarding American foreign policy: "politics ends at the water's edge." Conventional wisdom suggests that while it is acceptable for politicians to maintain strong divides on domestic issues, there is a perception that the government of the United States and its political institutions should speak with one voice when crafting U.S. international policies. This viewpoint allows many students and scholars of the global system to focus their studies on the *outputs* of American foreign policy, without addressing the influence of a *domestic* political process. Even if it is true that policymakers speak with one voice to the rest of the world, the idea that politics has to end in order for that one voice to be heard assumes that the domestic political system has a significant role to play in determining the foreign policy of the United States.[1]

This chapter introduces some of the ways the president, the executive-branch bureaucracy, and Congress interact, compete, and compromise during the creation of U.S. foreign policy. We explore how governmental structure and institutional rules influence the interactions and behavior of various actors. We also discuss whether foreign policy is the result of a top-down process in which a select group of informed and interested parties dominate, or the result of a bottom-up consensus of mass public opinion that persuades elected leaders to pursue a certain course of action. We conclude by considering whether or not the United States ought to continue to view foreign policymaking as a unique process in itself.

The Presidency

The U.S. Constitution establishes the president of the United States as both the head of government and the head of state. This means the president not only has the executive authority to enforce the laws created by the legislative branch, but he also represents the American people to the rest of the world.[2] When the international community wants to talk to America, the Constitution stipulates the point of contact as the president of the United States. The power to recognize the leaders of other countries gives the president unique control over U.S. foreign policy. In this capacity as head of state, the president is empowered to send ambassadors to serve in foreign lands and to receive ambassadors from other countries. Based on this ability to accept or deny representatives from other nations, the president determines which foreign countries the United States interacts with in the global community.

America's presidential system also ensures that the president is a unitary actor who can respond to both foreign and domestic crises more quickly than any other branch of government. The president, as a single person, not a body or an organization, often has a first-mover advantage that forces all other parts of the government to react.[3] The ability to act fast, act first, and act decisively without public debate enables the president to lead on all foreign-policy issues. Congress, by its nature, requires deliberation, rarely achieves unanimous consensus, and usually responds after the president has already set a policy in motion. Congress has a much more difficult challenge convincing the president or the public to change policy than the president has in being the first to grapple with new and changing international situations.

Matters of national security and the use of force provide the best examples for the unique advantages the president enjoys as a unitary political actor. In an emergency, the commander-in-chief is required to protect U.S. citizens, American territory, and the interests of the country. Often there is no time or any practical means to include other institutions of government in the decisionmaking process. In the 1936 *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.* case, the Supreme Court affirmed this executive advantage when it declared the president to be the "sole organ" of U.S. foreign policy.[4] The court's decision established legal precedent for the president to act unilaterally within the realm of foreign policy. Presidents continue to use the language of the Curtiss-Wright decision to justify their actions, such as returning refugees encountered on the high seas to their home countries, establishing military commis-

sions for prosecuting detainees, and engaging in military operations abroad. Does the president have too much unchecked power with respect to the creation and application of foreign policy? How does presidential authority in the realm of foreign policy contribute to the effectiveness and continuity of U.S. foreign policy? Do the American people reward presidents with reelection based on the success of their foreign policy?

The Executive-Branch Bureaucracy

The president, being only one person, exercises much of this authority through the rest of the executive-branch bureaucracy (referred to hereafter as the bureaucracy). The president could never develop expertise in all areas and does not have the time to address each aspect of every policy. The bureaucracy fills these gaps and acts in the name of the president in numerous foreign-policy areas. When a crisis is not dominating the policy arena, the various departments and organizations within the executive branch maintain a significant amount of autonomy and discretionary authority to implement policy. Some examples include the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the United States Agency for International Aid (USAID), and the Department of the Treasury.

Civil servants and political appointees are not elected, yet they hold major influence over the day-to-day functions and execution of government. These bureaucrats provide expertise and continuity in an otherwise turbulent electoral process. Being removed from the political process enables the bureaucracy to resist volatile changes in public opinion. This distancing also raises the question of whether the antidemocratic nature of the bureaucracy enhances or impedes U.S. foreign policy. Some argue that foreign policy requires a level of cultural understanding and experience that the general American public can never achieve, so enabling the bureaucracy to act in the best interests of the nation is preferable.[5] On the other hand, many believe these elites have their own agenda for U.S. foreign policy, and empowering unelected bureaucrats to shape and implement foreign policy undermines the public's ability to influence the actions of the U.S. government.[6]

Congress

The legislature is the branch of government closest to the people, and it also has a significant role to play in foreign policymaking. The power of the purse gives Congress the ability to influence all matters of government through the

funding process. Congress authorizes and appropriates the monies that the executive branch spends on foreign policy. The loss or addition of funding for any one agency has a direct impact on the president's and the bureaucracy's ability to implement policy. In the current era of slow economic growth, rising debt, and political gridlock, the United States is facing the prospect of lower defense budgets, which would limit the president's ability to influence the international environment through military means. The national budget, in and of itself, is a policy document, and Congress has the authority to set policy priorities by the manner in which it allocates funds to other governmental institutions. In one past example of Congress exerting its influence over foreign policy through the funding process, it considered stipulating that monies appropriated for foreign aid and development could not be spent on contraception. Some congressional members approved of money for aid but rejected the notion that oral contraception could help prevent the spread of AIDS. Thus, when the budget is reevaluated each year, senators and representatives have the opportunity not only to influence foreign policy by reducing or enhancing the budget of a particular program, but also to mandate the ways in which that money is actually spent.[7]

Given the broad executive powers described above, does the legislative power of the purse provide a sufficient check to keep the president from abusing the precedent of being the "sole organ" of foreign policy? Is the budget process so contentious that Congress finds it politically difficult to exercise its fiscal power to alter the foreign-policy agenda of the president, especially when it comes to the employment of force? James Lindsay argues that using legislation as a benchmark for evaluating the legislative branch's influence on foreign policy underestimates congressional power vis-à-vis the executive branch and unfairly neglects several indirect measures senators and representatives can use to manipulate the president and the bureaucracy.[8] The first indirect measure Lindsay describes centers on anticipated reaction. He argues that without actually passing any legislation, the mood, or *sentiment*, of Congress is not lost on the president. While it seems as though a president would rarely be compelled to do something simply because of the anticipated reactions of congressional members, it would also be unwise for any executive not to consider how Congress would react once a foreign-policy course is announced.[9] In this way, senators are constitutionally mandated to be part of the processes of treaty ratification and the appointment of ambassadors; they can use the threat of a filibuster to force the president to value their preferences when negotiating

a treaty or nominating an ambassador. In the end the president may still get a treaty or an ambassador of his choosing, but the lack of direct congressional action against the president does not mean that its influence was not felt.

Second, Lindsay notes that under the guise of seemingly politically neutral procedures and oversight, members of Congress are able to indirectly affect foreign-policy outcomes. The legislative branch has the power to shape and reshape the bureaucracy, and it requires reports from the president and the rest of the executive branch. The rules or procedures may seem neutral, but any change in the structure of the bureaucracy will affect its mission.[10] The creation of the Department of Homeland Security after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 is one recent example of how Congress can indirectly influence foreign policy by altering the structure and mission of the executive branch. Moving the Coast Guard, Immigration Services, and the Border Patrol from one agency to another changed their mission priorities. Additionally, the formation of the Transportation Security Agency required the president to implement new policies on foreign travel. Various committees also exercise oversight by requiring members of the executive branch to testify regularly before Congress. The timing of and schedule for their testimony, the topic of the hearing, and the types of questions asked all reflect the political ideologies or policy objectives of individual members of Congress.

Third, a potential for agenda setting exists. If foreign policy is dominated by the informed, and if the public is generally less interested in foreign policy that may not have a direct impact on their lives, then the ability of a congressperson to involve the electorate in foreign-policy discussions represents a significant indirect influence in the process. Lindsay argues that individual members of Congress can use their offices to generate interest and shape public opinion on issues of importance to them.[11] The key question is whether these indirect congressional influences actually represent a real check on presidential foreign-policy authority. Are the advantages held by the president insurmountable by a Congress defined by gridlock or focused largely on domestic issues?

Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

Lindsay's last argument assumes that the public has some latent interest in foreign policy that can be activated by a political entrepreneur. Yet the role of the electorate in the foreign-policy arena is less understood than that in the domestic political arena.[12] Is the American public concerned with U.S. foreign policy? Do U.S. international relations reflect the will of the people writ large,

or are the foreign policies of the United States more in tune with a narrow coterie of informed interest groups?

Walter Russell Mead contends that U.S. foreign policy reflects long-standing traditions in public opinion that have reverberated since America's founding. Mead identifies four schools of thought that explain U.S. foreign-policy themes over the past 200 years. *Hamiltonianism* is focused on building wealth and economic growth through international trade. This is America's version of realism. *Wilsonianism*, in contrast, centers on promoting democracies abroad and on human rights more than on simple capital markets. Wilsonians take pride in promoting America's ideology and values, not its commercial interests or security goals. *Jeffersonianism* is more internally directed, believing that America's democracy is quite fragile and that the focus of foreign policy should be extremely narrow, limited to the nation's vital interests. Jeffersonians argue that many of America's resources should be concentrated at home and that foreign policy should not be a drain on finite resources. *Jacksonianism* is based on a concept of American honor that defines domestic influences on foreign policy. Jacksonians consider themselves the community of middle-class folk in America. Mead argues that regardless of where individuals find themselves among these schools of thought, the common ground between all of them is that U.S. foreign policy is deeply rooted in the public's perception of the country's economic prosperity and its values or beliefs.[13]

The history of American foreign policy demonstrates that at different times the United States was isolationist, ideological, realist, or unilateral. Mead argues that changes in public sentiment explain the varying degrees of foreign-policy objectives in American history. Despite the constitutional authorities vested in the three branches of government, and regardless of how autonomous the bureaucracy may become, Mead believes that the public will, through the electoral process, dictates America's role in the world. Should elected leaders reflect the will of the people? Are politicians a mirror of American society, or are the elites in government able to promote their own beliefs in shaping America's international relations?

In the twenty-first century, the line between domestic and foreign policy is becoming faint. The behavior of states in the international environment developed as a separate and distinct component of political science that, in some ways, fostered a division between foreign and domestic policy. The growth of information technology, travel, and global economic interdependence transcends traditional geographic and political boundaries. Today, scholars, stu-

dents, and elected leaders face a policymaking environment that is dominated by what Lindsay calls "intermestic issues."[14] Such issues fail to fit neatly into the binary categories of international or internal politics. Contemporary concerns over the environment, terrorism, and migration are challenging neat distinctions between domestic and foreign policy, requiring policymakers, students, and scholars to reevaluate the way the public influences international relations. Given this changing dynamic, it may be worthwhile to consider what types of structural changes to the U.S. government could allow the president and Congress to work together better in dealing with new trends and threats. Overall, is the American foreign-policymaking process straightforward enough, or do complications in this process make it difficult for the United States to have a coherent strategy in dealing with other nations?

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2. Wittkopf and McCormick, *Domestic Sources*, 132. The president of the United States is not a gendered position. For ease of reading and writing in this chapter, a single gendered pronoun is used, but we recognize that the president can be either male or female.

3. Ibid., 133.

4. Michael Nelson, "Person and Office: Presidents, the Presidency, and Foreign Policy," in Wittkopf and McCormick, *Domestic Sources*, 149.

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7. James M. Lindsay, "Congress and the Politics of American Foreign Policy," in Wittkopf and McCormick, *Domestic Sources*, 185.

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2

Challenges to Achieving Whole-of-Government Solutions

JOHN GRISWOLD

The international system is not only a consequence of domestic politics and structures but a cause of them. Economic relations and military pressures constrain an entire range of domestic behaviors, from policy decisions to political forms. International relations and domestic politics are therefore so interrelated that they should be analyzed simultaneously, as wholes. PETER GOUREVITCH

A foundational concept in the debate over the use of U.S. hard and soft power overseas is the manner in which domestic politics influence foreign policy. In the 2010 *National Security Strategy of the United States*, President Barack Obama made the inextricable link between American foreign policy and domestic politics strikingly clear: "Our strategy starts by recognizing that our strength and influence abroad begins with the steps we take at home. . . . Simply put, we must see American innovation as a foundation of American power."[1] An extension of the broader debate over the role of the United States in the world revolves around how America can best organize and wield the diplomatic, economic, and military aspects of its power to exert influence in the international arena. In short, how can the United States achieve whole-of-government solutions to its national security problems? Such solutions require attention to both the desires of domestic political actors and the capabilities and intentions of foreign nations and transnational actors.

This chapter addresses two distinct—yet ultimately intertwined—sets of questions, concepts, and literatures. The first line of inquiry focuses on the domestic sources of American foreign policy. It briefly highlights the myriad political actors and formal institutions that shape the American response to the opportunities and challenges presented by the international system. The

formal institutions of U.S. government—specifically, the executive and legislative branches—are where the preponderance of action in American foreign policymaking takes place.[2] The political actors in the system include businesses and special-interest groups, political parties, the media, and the public at large. These actors and institutions generate, perpetuate, and are influenced by ideas that guide the actions of the United States abroad.

America's place in the international community—as a hegemonic state, a status-quo power, or as just one nation among many—is a constant source of debate and tension. To what extent do the American people envision or desire a dominant, influential role for the United States? Given the effects of the global recession and the halting recovery of private wealth and public resources, to what extent will political actors and formal institutions support an interventionist U.S. foreign policy in the years ahead? How do these decisions regarding the nation's foreign policy reshape its domestic politics?

The second line of inquiry shifts the chapter's focus from *who* influences foreign policy to *how* these actors arrive at policy decisions. In doing so, I focus on interagency, or *whole-of-government*, solutions to policy problems. This places cabinet-level federal agencies and the White House staff at the center of my analysis, with other institutional and political actors influencing the interagency coordination process. Ultimately, the outputs of interagency processes reflect consensuses among policymakers, policies that connect problems with their solutions, and ends leading to means. Charged with implementing policy under the constraints imposed by multiple, competing actors and institutions, what are the prospects for whole-of-government solutions to contentious policy problems?

This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, it examines the characteristics of the U.S. political system that affect American foreign-policy decisions, with particular attention paid to the mobilization of force and power. Second, the chapter considers the role of political actors, ideas, and institutions in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. Third, it examines the manner in which policy is implemented, focusing on the way in which multiple aspects of American power are brought to bear on what can be consider complex, messy, and "wicked" foreign-policy problems. The chapter concludes with some broader questions regarding the relationship between domestic politics and whole-of-government solutions to foreign-policy challenges.

Actors, Ideas, and Institutions: The Domestic Sources of U.S. Foreign Policy

Compared with most liberal democracies, the United States maintains a relatively weak central state, where multiple sources of influence place pressure on political institutions to determine policy outcomes.[3] This is deliberate. The U.S. Constitution arranged political institutions so that, in the words of James Madison in "Federalist No. 51," "ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interests of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place." The consequence of the separation of power between the president and Congress is an inherent tension between the executive branch's desire to act decisively in foreign affairs and the legislative branch's control of the resources necessary to do so.[4]

The profusion of competing ideas, or *pluralism*, has driven not only U.S. domestic policy, but its foreign policy. Consider the roots of American strategy during the Cold War. Although the containment approach represented something of a bipartisan consensus, it also illustrated the competition between actors and institutions for influence in shaping foreign policy. Benjamin O. Fordham argues that party politics played a key role in determining the composition of the U.S. military as a tool for containment. Republican presidential administrations favored expanded the nation's strategic forces, while Democrats focused on expanding conventional ground forces to support the doctrine of flexible response.[5] Julian E. Zelizer also makes a compelling case that the Cold War consensus over national-security strategy was more conflict ridden and partisan in nature than most historians have indicated.[6] Aaron Friedberg writes that the U.S. approach to the Cold War was rooted in societal factors and their influence on the institutions responsible for U.S. foreign policy: "Even in the presence of a compelling external threat, the openness of American political institutions to interest group pressures and the content of American ideology combined to place very real limits on the power of the state over society and the economy."[7] Just as they have in domestic politics, businesses and special-interest groups have sought influence over foreign-policy decisions.[8] What becomes clear from this analysis is the tension between different domestic actors as they seek to influence institutional arrangements in pursuit of a diverse array of foreign-policy interests.

Foundations of Whole-of-Government Solutions to Foreign-Policy Problems

Once committed to intervening in foreign affairs, how should the United States bring its political, economic, and military might to bear? What are the institutional arrangements that can best influence the outcome of international events in a manner favorable to American interests? Intuitively, whole-of-government (interagency) approaches to foreign-policy problems present themselves as compelling solutions. This is because, as Gabriel Marcella notes, "it is an iron rule of the interagency that *no national security or international affairs issue can be resolved by one agency alone* [emphasis in the original]."[9] Tom Christensen and Per Laegreid define a whole-of-government approach as the application of coordinated and integrative responses to policy problems that span the boundaries of more than one level of government.[10] It is these efforts at synchronization that, if successful, foster policy coherence, reduce duplication of effort among agencies, and enable governance arrangements that facilitate solutions to complex policy problems in the foreign or domestic arena.

Although it would seem clear from the discussion above that interagency coordination is desirable, it is not easily achieved. Nor is it guaranteed to be effective. There are several reasons for this. As previously noted, the competing and often conflicting goals of actors in the political system may create conditions under which a common agreement over ends and means may make interagency action exceedingly difficult. These conditions are particularly acute because of the fragmentation of power among American political institutions. As Robert Stoker notes, "When authority is fragmented, the challenge of national governance is to induce cooperation and policy coordination among independent authorities."[11] As such, the Madisonian ideal of ambition counteracting ambition greatly complicates the exercise of power.

Another difficulty in whole-of-government solutions may be the nature of the problems they are meant to solve. As noted in this volume's introduction, America's greatest challenges cross the habitual lines between cabinet-level agencies. They also transect the boundaries Americans use to visualize the world. They involve what Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber call "wicked problems":

> Planning problems are inherently wicked. As distinguished from problems in the natural sciences, which are definable and separable and may have solutions

> that are findable, the problems of governmental planning—and especially those of social or policy planning—are ill-defined; and they rely upon elusive political judgment for resolution.[12]

In this sense, it is not merely the application of resources that is problematic; rather, it is the nature of the policy problems themselves that lend complexity to the design of governance arrangements. Many of the problems that governments deal with do not require an interagency response and are viewed through common conceptual frameworks such as policy arenas, or *subsystems* (e.g., "defense" or "energy"). As Ashley Jochim and Peter May write, "the myopic nature of policymaking among policy subsystems is problematic for addressing boundary spanning problems."[13] Thinking beyond the confines of policy subsystems can be a challenge in developing appropriate solutions for "wicked" problems.

Finally, it is important to examine the issues associated with fostering cooperation among different government agencies. In his seminal work on decisionmaking during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham Allison posits a conceptual model of interagency coordination rooted in the positional power of senior government officials relative to the president. Allison's bureaucratic-politics model shows how policy decisions derive from the same tensions endemic to the American political system, writ large:

> The decisions and actions of governments are essentially intra-national political outcomes: outcomes in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, coalition, competition, and confusion among government officials who see different faces of an issue; political in the sense that the activity from which the outcomes emerge is best characterized as bargaining.[14]

Attempts at coordination may also face other bureaucratic hurdles. Eugene Bardach argues that agency leaders may lose control of an issue when a nebulous interagency becomes responsible for policy implementation: "From a narrow, constituency standpoint, collaboration is distinctly undesirable because it threatens to blur an agency's mission and the agency's political accountability in pursuing it."[15] James Q. Wilson also notes that government agencies are fearful of relinquishing responsibilty for areas that they deem as their core competencies, or of taking on new or qualitiatively different roles outside their original mandate. An agency's turf, and its autonomy over that turf, may be on the line.[16]

Domestic Politics, the Interagency, and the Limits of U.S. Force and Power

Students of U.S. foreign policy must grapple with the compound problem of how best to translate American political goals into a mechanism for policy implementation. Some of the potential solutions to these problems seem disarmingly simple. Calls for an increase in funding for interagency activities, more direct presidential leadership, and improved strategic-communication campaigns to garner popular support must be considered in terms of their practicality and efficacy. Neither money nor rhetoric alone, however, can bring about the governance structures and policy outcomes that policymakers seek to foster. This is particularly true in a time of increasingly scarce financial resources, following a global recession and more than a decade of global military engagement in the Middle East.

In keeping with this volume's theme, several questions come to the forefront. How should formal political institutions in the United States (Congress and the president) craft incentives that foster interagency cooperation? How can cooperation best be mandated between agencies with conflicting interests, cultures, and bureaucratic turf? What is the role of leadership in devising whole-of-government policy solutions, and how should these leaders be selected, trained, and empowered? How do whole-of-government approaches to foreign policy represent the desires of multiple, completing actors and American political institutions? To what extent must these approaches be acceptable to both the American electorate and the foreign nations and international organizations on which they will inevitably have an impact? Understanding the domestic influences on U.S. foreign policy enriches America's understanding of the difficult choices facing policymakers as they grapple with boundary-spanning problems.

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2. For a more detailed treatment of the role of domestic institutions in U.S. foreign policymaking, see chapter 1.

3. See Peter J. Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States," *International Organization* 30, no. 1 (winter 1976): 1–45.

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3

E Pluribus Unum?

Education and Foreign Policy

HUGH LIEBERT

The present sentiment of national decline among American statesmen and scholars glimmers dimly in a thousand points of gloomy data. The U.S. economy flatlines, while China's gross domestic product (GDP) ascends at a steady clip; New York City's Port Authority struggles to erect its Freedom Tower, while Dubai raises the world's tallest building in a mere five years; the U.S. space shuttle touches down for the last time, leaving Russian rockets to resupply the International Space Station. On every front, "the rest" rise while the "global hegemon" hovers.[1]

But among all of these indications of national decline, few data points seem quite as grim as international educational rankings. A 2009 study of sixty-five countries ranked American fifteen-year-olds seventeenth in reading, twenty-third in science, and thirty-first in math.[2] American eighth-graders fared nearly as poorly.[3] And data from earlier studies show that the situation is not improving—indeed, it seems to be getting worse.[4] When it comes to education, many observers worry that "the rest" are not on the rise so much as they have *already risen*, and America's decline seems not a worrying possibility but a fait accompli.

All of which raises an important foreign-policy question: how can the United States maintain its economic and military standing when its citizens are so poorly educated?[5] In a global economy characterized by highly mobile capital and growing demands for well-educated workers, the spoils go increasingly to the smartest; in a global-security environment that requires both rapid technological progress and sophisticated intercultural awareness, power more and

more becomes the product of brains rather than brawn. In a world of blurring boundaries, preeminence acquired over the course of centuries seems capable of slipping across the border overnight.[6] And so not only American teachers and parents, but also American strategists and patriots, might look on the educational decline in the United States with alarm.

The status of American education is something more than a strategic concern, however. It also represents a crisis in U.S. national identity—and this for two reasons. Since the nation's founding (indeed, even before its founding), Americans' allegiance to equal opportunity and ordered liberty has expressed itself in a commitment to educational excellence and inclusivity.[7] The Puritan poring over his Bible, the immigrant studying English, and the child of former slaves researching in his college's library—all, in their zeal for self-improvement, represent an essential element of what American identity entails. Also, since the country's inception, Americans have supervised primary and secondary education (grade school and high school) on the local level rather than nationally. Even as the U.S. economy nationalized and then globalized, American isolationism yielded to globalism, and political power flowed inexorably from the states toward the central government, education policy has remained largely a local concern. Today, education policy is perhaps *the* vital remnant of the robust federalism and devolved power that once characterized U.S. politics, and it still colors Americans' conceptions of their political regime's distinctiveness. When the U.S. educational system cuts such an undistinguished figure on the global stage, therefore, not only the strategic preeminence of the United States, but the very principles and structure of the American regime seem under indictment.

There is no lack of reformers eager to answer this indictment. Some suggest improving U.S. education by directing students into a vocational-instruction track at an early age, thus attenuating America's traditional commitment to equal opportunity.[8] More common, though, are proposals to improve U.S. education by relocating school oversight from cities and states to the central government, thus attenuating America's long-standing commitment to robust federalism in education. And these nationalizing reformers have a point. Matters of security affecting the country as a whole have traditionally been addressed at the national level, and the crisis in U.S. education, insofar as it imperils the nation's economic and military competitiveness, amounts to a serious threat to America's standing in the world.

The U.S. system of divided sovereignty has recently received renewed attention as movements from across the political spectrum—from Tea Party ac-

tivists to Occupy Wall Street protestors—decry the concentration of power in the hands of an insular political and business elite. Perhaps, these movements suggest, devolving power to cities and states might facilitate the development of innovative policies to address problems that have flummoxed national politicians. The results of this sort of thinking can already be seen on a wide array of issues, including gay rights and immigration.[9]

Precisely where the roots of federalism run deepest, however, is where its fruits seem the most bitter, for it is education policy that provides both the best case of devolved power and the worst instance of policy innovation and success. Is, then, the U.S. system of divided sovereignty adequate to the challenges of the contemporary world? It was once thought that the American *unum* was all the stronger for emerging *e pluribus*—is this still the case today? And if not, what is to be done?

History of American Federalism and Education

To answer this question as it applies to education, it is necessary to understand how national, state, and local governments contribute to the formulation of U.S. education policy. To start at the beginning: the word "education" does not appear in the U.S. Constitution.[10] Maintenance of schools and promotion of learning are mentioned, however, in several state constitutions at the time of the nation's founding.[11] Since the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reserves nondelegated powers to "the States respectively, or to the people," throughout U.S. history education has fallen under the control of state and local governments, rather than the national government.[12]

The federal government has, however, involved itself in the administration of primary and secondary schools when unequal education seemed to threaten national unity and undermine the equal protection of the law. In addressing racial inequalities in education, the federal government has, for the most part, received the blessing—and occasionally acted on the impetus—of the U.S. Supreme Court. During Reconstruction, for instance, agents of the Freedman's Bureau pioneered public education for African Americans in the former Confederacy.[13] Later, as the civil rights movement gathered momentum, the Supreme Court's famous decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) led to the integration of southern schools.[14] Federal intervention for the sake of redressing economic rather than racial inequalities, however, has had a more checkered constitutional history. Education was not a leading element in New Deal programs directed toward the unemployed and disadvantaged; in fact, it was

not until Lyndon Johnson's Great Society legislation that the federal government attempted to improve the primary and secondary schooling of poor children.[15] In 1965, Johnson's Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) featured federal support for low-income school districts, a striking departure from precedent.[16] Eight years later, however, the Supreme Court held that school financing based on local property taxes, even when it led to gross disparities in education, did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause.[17] Even though federal legislation might support low-income school districts, thus far severe economic inequality in education has not been considered as great a threat to constitutional rights as racial inequality.[18]

The history of spending on education at different levels of government has largely mirrored the constitutional history of education policy: state and local governments take the lead, and the federal government plays at best a supporting role. While federal funding for education has increased significantly in recent decades—from $12.5 billion (or 0.27% of GDP) in 1965 to $72.8 billion (or 0.57% of GDP) in 2008—total educational spending has increased even more dramatically.[19] In 1965, it accounted for 5.6 percent of GDP; in 2009, it rose to 7.9 percent of GDP.[20] As seen in the following two figures, increases in federal spending have not outstripped those at the state and local levels.[21]



Federal on-budget funds for education, by level or other educational purpose: selected years, 1965 through 2010



Percentage of revenue for public elementary and secondary schools, by source of funds: 1970–1971 through 2007–2008

As both a constitutional and a fiscal matter, therefore, America's traditional division of power over education policy, in which state and local governments predominate, has not fundamentally changed over the past forty years. Nor has the outcome of U.S. education altered much during that time. Despite steadily increasing expenditures on education, American students are not significantly better in reading or math than they were in 1965 (indeed, by some measures their skills have declined).[22] Meanwhile, their international peers have progressed quite rapidly.

Does the static division of power between federal and state or local governments have something to do with American students' stagnant test scores? Perhaps a federal system designed for a world where boundaries between state and local economies loomed large is simply obsolete in a world where boundaries between states—and, increasingly, nations—are weak or nonexistent. At the very least, the U.S. system of devolved power over education evidently has not given it an advantage over its more centralized peers.

American Federalism and Education Today

Today, more than ever, policymakers in the field of education must ask, what, if anything, is federalism good for? Advocates of federalism claim that powerful

state and local governments amount to "laboratories of democracy."[23] Just as markets are more efficient and innovative when a number of firms compete, so nations benefit from fostering internal competition. In a well-designed federal system, states and localities are free to tailor policy solutions to the specific challenges they face, and quite frequently the policies they design serve as models for other states—or even for the national government.[24] It is also possible, however, for competition among states to foster a *race to the bottom*.[25] Thus when a state's economic interests conflict with other important interests, it might, for instance, choose to reduce corporate tax rates or loosen environmental regulations in an effort to attract manufacturing jobs—even if doing so requires that its citizens' desire for government services and clean air be sacrificed to their desire for jobs. Whether federalism is advantageous or not, then, depends very much on the policy in question, the power of the stakeholders, and the relative strength of citizens' competing demands on government.

The paradox of education policy is that both citizens and businesses share an interest in educational excellence—citizens because they want their children to excel, and businesses because they want the best possible employees—yet neither group has been able to act effectively in pursuit of this shared goal. And it is not for want of trying. Both groups have shown themselves willing to spend significant and increasing amounts on education. Whatever else it may be, the failure of American education is not a straightforward case of federalism generating a race to the bottom.[26]

Why, then, has federalism failed in the area of education? If the fundamental problem is that states and localities lack sufficient information to evaluate their own policies, the federal government might stimulate innovation via standardized testing. This was the approach of then president George W. Bush's No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), passed in 2001, which required robust testing and tied federal aid for low-performing schools to their students' improvements on these tests.[27] It is also possible, however, that the fundamental failing of federalism in education has more to do with a shortage—on local levels—of both the will and the bargaining power required to make major reforms. President Barack Obama's Race to the Top (RTT) initiative, enacted into law as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in 2009, reflects this diagnosis.[28] The RTT established a fund $4.35 billion in federal grant monies, for which states could compete by altering their educational policies to match federal prescriptions. The virtue of the NCLB is arguably its apparent openness with respect to methods of educational improvement—it leaves room for in-

novation and experimentation; the virtue of the RTT is its greater efficiency in promoting what are currently believed to be the most effective educational reforms, without quite dictating these policies directly to the states (and thus running afoul of America's tradition of federalism in education). Nevertheless, defenders of the federalist status quo might worry that both policies threaten the advantageous competition that federalism enables: the NCLB by promoting standardized testing, which seems destined to influence the design of school curricula, and the RTT by providing strong incentives for particular education policies, thus constraining the ability of states to discover new ones.[29]

Several studies suggest that education policy is ripe for groundbreaking innovation. Although a number of reforms—ranging from reductions in class size to computers in classrooms—have been tried and found wanting over the past few decades, an emerging consensus among school reformers indicates that the quality of teaching makes the biggest difference in educational outcomes. A recent report by the consulting firm McKinsey & Company puts the point succinctly: "The quality of an education system cannot exceed the quality of its teachers."[30] If this is so, how can U.S. policymakers attract the most talented individuals into a profession traditionally considered less prestigious and remunerative than fields like medicine and law? Increasing teachers' salaries seems a straightforward step toward luring the best and brightest into the classroom. Yet scholars debate whether teachers should be compensated according to their seniority, their level of educational attainment, the value they add to a child's future earnings, or some other standard entirely.[31] While discovering the right way to pay teachers is difficult, finding out how to increase the prestige and satisfaction of the teaching profession is an even greater challenge.

How best to balance all these considerations so that teaching appears in the best possible light to the most talented potential teachers is therefore a perplexing problem indeed, and one for which there is not a clear solution as yet. The same might be said not only of teacher quality, but also of other educational inputs, such as curriculum design, the use of technology, and the structure of a school's administration. It is in this situation that states and localities, if they could be made to serve the nation as laboratories of democracy, might prove most beneficial.

Sputnik, Then and Now

What, then, can the federal government do to improve American education, given the highly decentralized system that supervises U.S. schools? Educational reformers often speak nostalgically of moments in American history when the discord of divided sovereignty quieted momentarily and the vast apparatus of American education policy seemed to submit, however fleetingly, to the firm direction of the president. The makers of American foreign policy, concerned with the long-term deterioration of U.S. power, might similarly watch for a crisis to spur reform.

Historically, one such moment stands out above the rest: October 4, 1957, when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first artificial satellite ever to orbit the Earth. At a stroke, American boundaries seemed irrelevant as Soviet eyes hovered overhead; just as suddenly, American illusions of technological superiority to their Cold War rival were shattered. Less than a year later, President Eisenhower signed the National Defense Education Act (NDEA), which significantly increased federal funding for several critical areas of instruction, along with federal support for student loans and grants for academic research. Ever since, commentators have announced myriad "Sputnik moments," times of national insecurity when America might resolve to reform its fractious educational system.[32]

But this longing for another Sputnik—some crisis to harness the nation's resources to the promotion of education—has been in vain so far. What's more, it may well be misconceived. The NDEA is often cited as a spur to research in science and technology, which it was, but it also provided substantial funding for language and area studies, and this is rarely remembered as vividly. By interpreting the original Sputnik moment exclusively in light of the technological feats (like the shuttle program) that followed on its heels, contemporary educational reformers overlook a lesson the authors of the NDEA had taken to heart: succeeding in global competition requires cultural and linguistic adaptability, in addition to mathematical and scientific expertise.

Success also requires a commitment not only to higher education, but to early education.[33] Here, too, the NDEA provides dubious guidance for present-day policymakers. The authors of the NDEA wanted the United States to counter the Soviet threat in the short term, so they directed the bulk of their resources to recipients who might produce advances within decades, rather than generations—and thus toward universities, by and large, rather than primary

and secondary schools. The NDEA invested in basic research, to be sure. But by comparison with the sort of fundamental, long-term change it might have aspired to, its horizons were narrow. Today the United States continues to fund its universities at what, by global standards, are extravagant rates, and its universities are indeed widely admired, attracting more foreign students each year than any other nation's schools.[34] But U.S. primary and secondary schools have fallen far behind those of their international peers. The NDEA, when understood as a model for federal intervention in education, bears no small measure of the blame for this emphasis on universities at the expense of early education.

This shortcoming of the NDEA points toward what is perhaps the most significant weakness in the American education policies that resulted from the first Sputnik moment—a failure to think creatively about federalism and take full advantage of the unique way in which the United States has traditionally set education policy.[35] When understood as laboratories of democracy, states and localities offer their own idiosyncratic resources to prepare students for global economic competition and for citizenship in a nation with a distinctive role in the larger world. Global cities like New York and Los Angeles bear as little resemblance to prairie towns as sparsely populated states do to Texas and California; an educational system sufficiently flexible to reflect that fact might well succeed where a more uniform system falls short. For advocates of federalism in education, the challenge of a national education policy is to aid states and localities in their efforts to set their own policies without dampening the innovation and individuality that result from these efforts.

Education policy oriented toward a revived federalism opens up many possibilities for fruitful federal involvement. Perhaps the U.S. government could turn the numbers of foreign nationals in American universities to the advantage of U.S. primary and secondary schools by developing a program resembling "Teach for America" as a path to U.S. citizenship. Perhaps national policymakers could adapt some of the programs that have propelled U.S. higher education to its current heights—such as Pell Grants and the GI Bill—to benefit primary and secondary education. Perhaps the federal government could use testing and grants to enhance the prestige of high-quality educators and thus make teaching a profession as attractive as medicine, business, and law to ambitious and enterprising young Americans.[36]

These and other reforms deserve careful consideration by those tasked with developing education policies capable of stemming the tide of the U.S. decline.

In the field of education, U.S. policymakers must find a way to turn the boundaries within America to the country's advantage in a world increasingly without boundaries.

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NOTES

1. On the "rise of the rest," see Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World*, release 2.0 (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011). On American "declinism," see, for instance, Ian Morris, "Decline, Fall, Rinse, Repeat," *New Yorker*, 12 Sep 2011, 40–47.

2. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *PISA 2009 Results: Executive Summary* (Paris: OECD, 2010), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/60/46619703.pdf. The results of the 2012 PISA [Programme for International Student Assessment] showed that the United States ranked seventeenth in reading, twenty-first in science, and twenty-sixth in math. See OECD, *PISA 2012 Results in Focus* (OECD, 2013), www.oecd.org/pisa/keyfindings/pisa-2012-results-overview.pdf.

3. Michael O. Martin, Ina V. S. Mullis, and Pierre Foy, *TIMSS [Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study] 2007 International Mathematics Report* (Chestnut

Hill, MA: TIMSS and PIRLS International Study Center, Boston College, 2008), http://timss.bc.edu/TIMSS2007/PDF/TIMSS2007_InternationalMathematicsReport.pdf; and Michael O. Martin, Ina V. S. Mullis, and Pierre Foy, *TIMSS 2007 International Science Report* (Chestnut Hill, MA: TIMSS and PIRLS International Study Center, Boston College, 2008).

4. In the first PISA study in 2000, American students ranked fifteenth in reading, twenty-first in science, and twenty-fourth in math. See OECD, *Messages from PISA 2000* (Paris: OECD, 2004), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/19/34107978.pdf.

5. The foreign-policy implications of education policy were expressed with bracing clarity in the influential 1983 report of President Ronald Reagan's National Commission on Excellence in Education ("A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform," www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/risk.html): "If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war." More recently, see Joel Klein, Condoleezza Rice, and Julia Levy, *U.S. Education Reform and National Security*, Independent Task Force Report No. 68 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2012), www.cfr.org/united-states/us-education-reform-national-security/p27618/.

6. Niall Ferguson has recently depicted great-power decline as a rapid collapse rather than a gradual descent. See Ferguson, "Complexity and Collapse," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 2 (Mar/Apr 2010), 18–32.

7. Perhaps the most famous document pertaining to education prior to the founding of America is the Massachusetts Colony's Old Deluder Act of 1647: "It being one chief project of that old deluder, Satan, to keep men from the knowledge of the Scriptures," every township of fifty or more households "shall forthwith appoint one within their town to teach all such children as shall resort to him to write and read," and every town of one hundred or more households "shall set up a grammar school, the master thereof being able to instruct youth so far as they may be fitted for the university." This law greatly impressed Alexis de Tocqueville, who quoted extensively from the act after claiming "it is by the prescriptions relative to public education that, from the beginning, one sees revealed in the full light of day the original character of American civilization." See de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. Harvey Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 41–42 (1.1.2).

8. For an eloquent lament of the displacement of vocational instruction from American education, see Matthew Crawford, "Shop Class as Soulcraft," *New Atlantis* 13 (summer 2006): 7–24, www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/shop-class-as-soulcraft/.

9. The rise of "liberal federalism" was widely noted in 2004 and 2005, owing largely, it seems, to the significance of federalism in debates over gay marriage. For a survey of the field, consider Franklin Foer, "The Joy of Federalism," *New York Times*, 6 Mar 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/03/06/books/review/006FOERL.html. For an example of the genre, see Richard Ford Thompson, "The New Blue Federalists: The Case for Liberal Federalism," *Slate*, 6 Jan 2005, www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2005/01/the_new_blue_federalists.html.

10. In article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress is given the power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," but the means for doing so are explicitly limited to "securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Accordingly, Congress is assigned the power to oversee patents but has no enumerated power pertaining to oversight of the nation's schools.

11. See, for instance, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which states that "it shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially the university at Cambridge, [and] public schools and grammar schools in the towns" (part 2, chapter 1, section 2).

12. For an introduction to education in early U.S. history, see, in particular, Lawrence A. Cremin, *American Education: The Colonial Experience, 1607–1783* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

13. See Eric Foner, *A Short History of Reconstruction* (New York: Harper and Row, 1990), 43–44.

14. *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The use of busing to end de facto segregation was later deemed constitutional in *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education*, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), which opened the door to numerous local busing programs conducted under the supervision of federal courts.

15. On education policy under the New Deal, see Harvey Kantor and Robert Lowe, "Class, Race, and the Emergence of Federal Education Policy: From the New Deal to the Great Society," *Educational Researcher* 24, no. 3 (Apr 1995): 4–11, 21. Paula Fass, *pace* Kantor and Lowe, argues that "the New Deal focused attention as never before on the federal government as an active participant in all phases of social life, including education," and thus was indispensable in blazing the trail that the Great Society would later take. See Fass, "Without Design: Education Policy in the New Deal," *American Journal of Education* 91, no. 1 (Nov 1982): 42.

16. See Paul Manna, *School's In: Federalism and the National Education Agenda* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006), 198.

17. *San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

18. Even when the federal government has involved itself in education policy, it has gone to great lengths to affirm the principle of local control. The majority opinion in *Brown v. Board of Education* acknowledged that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments" (347 U.S. 483, 493). Title 6 of the ESEA contains a section labeled "Federal Control of Education Prohibited," in which the act forcefully forswears any federal control over the curriculum, administration, or personnel of "any educational institution or school system" (Public Law 89–10, 79 Stat. 27, 20 U.S.C. ch.70).

19. Neal McCluskey, *K–12 Education Subsidies* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2009), www.downsizinggovernment.org/k-12-education-subsidies/. For these statistics, see National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), "Table 28. Expenditures of educational institutions related to the gross domestic product, by level of institution: Selected years, 1929–30 through 2009–10," *Digest of Education Statistics: 2010*, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d10/tables/dt10_028.asp?referrer=list/.

20. NCES, "Table 28."

21. The first figure appears in NCES, "Figure 18," *Digest of Education Statistics: 2010*, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d10/figures/fig_18.asp?referrer=figures/. The source includes the following note to this figure: "The increase in postsecondary expenditures in 2006 resulted primarily from an accounting adjustment. Data for research at educational institutions are estimated for 2009 and not available for 2010. Data for 2010 for elementary and secondary, postsecondary, and other education are estimated." The *Digest* cites the following sources for its figure 18 data: "U.S. Department of Education, Budget Service, unpublished tabulations. U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, unpublished tabulations. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the U.S. Government, Appendix*, fiscal years 1967 through 2011. National

Science Foundation, *Federal Funds for Research and Development*, fiscal years 1965 through 2009." The second figure is found in NCES, "Figure 9," *Digest of Education Statistics: 2010*, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d10/figures/fig_09.asp?referrer=figures/. The *Digest* cites the following sources for its figure 9 data: "U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, *Revenues and Expenditures for Public Elementary and Secondary Education*, 1970–71 through 1986–87; and Common Core of Data (CCD), 'National Public Education Financial Survey,' 1987–88 through 2007–08."

22. NCES, *NAEP [National Assessment of Educational Progress] 2008 Trends in Academic Progress* (Washington, DC: NCES, Institute for Education Statistics, 2009), http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/main2008/2009479.pdf. Also see Kathy Lohr, "SAT Reading Scores Reach Record Low," National Public Radio News, 15 Sep 2011, www.npr.org/2011/09/15/140513396/sat-reading-scores-reach-record-low/.

23. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis coined this phrase in *New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann*, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).

24. See Charles Shipan and Craig Volden, "The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion," *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 4 (Oct 2008): 840–57.

25. On the potential for federalism to favor negative policy results, see especially Paul Peterson, *The Price of Federalism* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995). Peterson suggests that redistributive programs are more likely to fail on the state rather than the national level, since citizens can "vote with their feet": the rich can abandon states with high taxes, while the poor can enter states with generous benefits. It is more difficult for individuals to leave one nation for another, however. States are thus the natural home of developmental policies, while nations are the natural home of redistributive policies.

26. Some states, considered individually, do significantly better than others in international competition. Yet even the U.S. state with the highest test scores—Massachusetts—does not compete with the best in the world (according to one study, Massachusetts would rank seventeenth in math if it were its own nation; the worst state, Mississippi, would rank below Serbia). See Amanda Ripley, "Your Child Left Behind," *Atlantic*, Dec 2010, 94–98, www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/12/your-child-left-behind/308310/.

27. For a summary of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, see the Library of Congress's THOMAS website, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR00001:@@@D&summ2=0&#/. For coverage of recent developments relating to the NCLB, see Sam Dillon, "Overriding a Key Education Law," *New York Times*, 8 Aug 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/08/08/education/08educ.html; and Dillon, "Obama Turns Some Powers of Education Back to States," *New York Times*, 23 Sept 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/09/24/education/24educ.html.

28. See U.S. Department of Education, *Race to the Top Program: Executive Summary* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 2002), www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf.

29. It should be noted, however, that the NCLB leaves states free to develop their own standardized tests and design their own curricula. According to the law, state test results would be measured against a national benchmark; however, there are no penalties if states fall short. For a thorough critique of the NCLB, see Linda Darling-Hammond, "Evaluating 'No Child Left Behind,'" *Nation*, 21 May 2007, 11–20.

30. McKinsey & Company, *How the World's Best-Performing School Systems Come Out on Top* (Sep 2007), 16, www.mckinseyonsociety.com/downloads/reports/Education/Worlds_School_Systems_Final.pdf.

31. One advocate of value-added compensation argues, on the basis of research showing that instruction in the earliest grades most influences performance later in life, that outstanding kindergarten teachers should make as much as $320,000 per year—that is, just as much as doctors and lawyers. See David Leonhardt, "The Case for $320,000 Kindergarten Teachers," *New York Times*, 27 Jul 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/business/economy/28leonhardt.html.

32. The former assistant secretary of education, Chester Finn Jr., published a model of the genre in the *Wall Street Journal*, dubbing the results of the international 2009 PISA test a "Sputnik for the 21st century." See Finn, "Sputnik for the 21st Century," *Wall Street Journal*, 7 Dec 2010, http://educationnext.org/sputnik-for-the-21st-century/. Compare Thomas Friedman, "The New Sputnik," *New York Times*, 26 Sep 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/opinion/27friedman.html.

33. As we have observed (see note 31), recent research indicates that, all else being equal, early education has a greater impact on lifetime success than later education.

34. Approximately 700,000 foreign students—or about 18 percent of all students studying outside of their native countries—enroll in U.S. universities (the United Kingdom, the next-most-popular destination, attracts about 10%). Foreign students, however, make up a significantly higher percentage of total college enrollments in Australia, the United Kingdom, Austria, Switzerland, and New Zealand than in the United States. (Note, though, that there are far more total college students in the United States than in these other countries.) See OECD, *Education at a Glance 2011: OECD Indicators* (OECD Publishing, 2011), 318–39, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/2/48631582.pdf. Also see Karin Fischer, "Number of Foreign Students in U.S. Hit a New High Last Year," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 16 Nov 2009, http://chronicle.com/article/Number-of-Foreign-Students-/49142/. Seen from one angle, the presence of foreign students in U.S. universities testifies to the success of American education; seen from another, however, the same fact points to the failure of U.S. primary and secondary schools to educate American students for U.S. universities. See Lohr, "SAT Reading Scores."

35. The NDEA pays homage to the federalist ideal in language that would be adopted almost verbatim in the ESEA less than a decade later: "Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to authorize any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States to exercise any direction, supervision, or control over the curriculum, program of instruction, administration, or personnel of any educational institution or school system" (Public Law 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580).

36. Compare the policy recommendations of Klein et al., *U.S. Education Reform*, 44–55.

4

Disorder at the Border?

Immigration and Homeland Security

HUGH LIEBERT AND LEE ROBINSON

On April 23, 2010, the governor of Arizona signed into law SB 1070, a bill intended to curtail illegal immigration, in part by requiring Arizona police to check the papers of suspected illegal aliens. National controversy followed almost immediately, with spirited protests both in favor of and in opposition to the new law. Five other states—Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah—quickly followed in Arizona's footsteps by passing similarly strict immigration laws. Both sides of the debate have since turned to the courts, but the courts have so far proven reluctant to settle the matter decisively. Supporters and detractors of Arizona's SB 1070 each framed the U.S. Supreme Court's June 2012 ruling on the Arizona law as a victory. Those who were in favor of the law hailed the justices' decision to uphold the "show me your papers" portion of the law, while opponents of Arizona's statute cited the court's rejection of provisions criminalizing other activities.[1] Following the ruling, the Obama administration announced that it would no longer deport certain illegal immigrants, activating some of the key provisions of the DREAM Act that Congress failed to pass in 2007.[2] Taken together, these events suggest that the United States is a "nation of immigrants" profoundly anxious and deeply divided about the impact of immigration on the country. As a result, formulating practically beneficial and politically feasible immigration policy is exceedingly challenging.

The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the central questions that policymakers face in the area of immigration and to suggest a framework within which these questions can be addressed. It will pay particular attention to how

immigration policy influences the power of the United States in the international system. Does immigration aid the U.S. economy and enhance its competitive edge in a global economy, or does it place burdens on American society that drain its wealth and reduce its ability to maintain a vibrant economy? How does immigration influence America's image abroad—is a nation of immigrants an inherently attractive ideal that buttresses U.S. soft power, or is it an impractical and unattractive fantasy in an age when economic challenges necessitate hard choices by American policymakers?

What Is Immigration?

What is immigration in the first place, and why does it pose significant challenges for modern states? Immigration, according to Aristide Zolberg, entails the "transfer of a person from the jurisdiction of one state to that of another and the eventuality of a change of membership in an inclusive political community."[3] This definition points toward two salient aspects of the political order within which contemporary immigration occurs. First, living under the jurisdiction of a state is linked to membership in a community. Second, political identity is understood to be transferable (at least to some degree), which is to say that there are reasons why a person might choose to leave one community for another. Both of these aspects of contemporary politics may seem obvious and undeserving of further comment; however, each distinguishes the current political order from alternative orders, and each—in its own way—shapes the problem of contemporary immigration.

The link between a state's jurisdiction (or sovereignty) and a community (or nation) is generally thought to have been forged in the mid-seventeenth century with the rise of the *Westphalian order*. In this international system, the legitimacy of a state is thought to derive from its representation of a preexisting community; this community, in turn, achieves political and historical agency by virtue of its state. The resulting political body, the *nation-state*, has been the basic unit of international politics in the modern period, and its attendant theory of legitimacy—nationalism—is still a powerful force. An alternative theory of political legitimacy, according to which a state's sovereignty derives from the consent of the individuals it governs, began to emerge in the eighteenth century, however. This theory, known as *liberalism*, found its first practical manifestation in the American and French Revolutions. Because liberalism emphasizes individuality and consent, it stands somewhat in contrast to the nationalism associated with the Westphalian system, which emphasizes

community and political membership that is not chosen so much as inherited. A liberal state is, at least in theory, open to any individual who consents to its government; a nation-state, however, is theoretically limited to the individuals who make up its prescribed national community. Virtually all Western political bodies have developed into liberal nation-states, where their claims to legitimacy rest simultaneously on the representation of a preexisting community and the consent of individuals. But these sources of legitimacy are often in tension with one another.

If individuals were so firmly ensconced in national communities that they could not or did not want to transfer their allegiances, immigration would not pose the challenge it does. The fact that individuals frequently choose to leave their native communities in hopes of joining others points toward a second salient aspect of the contemporary political order relevant to immigration: economic globalization. Since the early nineteenth century, there has been an unprecedented and ongoing (indeed, accelerating) increase in human productivity and wealth. The benefits of this radical change, however, have thus far been unevenly distributed. In fact, global inequality has increased dramatically since the early nineteenth century: in 1820 rich countries were about three times wealthier than poor countries, while today the richest countries are over fifty times wealthier than the poorest. What's more, the best-intentioned rich countries have so far proven remarkably unsuccessful at stimulating economic growth in poorer countries. There is, however, one demonstrably effective way for individuals born in poor countries to improve their fortunes drastically—to emigrate to a rich country. It is not surprising, then, that many choose to transfer their political allegiances to wealthy nations by relocating. Contemporary immigration, by and large, is a process driven by vast inequalities in the distribution of global wealth and the corollary desire of the poor to secure for themselves and their families the economic opportunities afforded the rich.

Liberalism has created both the potential for individuals to transfer their political allegiances and the economic conditions that inspire individuals to become immigrants. It does the first by deriving political legitimacy solely from individual consent, and the second by securing the property rights that are at the foundation of economic growth. Modern states, however, are not only liberal, but national; they derive their legitimacy in part from their representation of a more-or-less exclusive community. While immigration appeals to the liberal, individualistic side of the modern political order, it threatens the national, communitarian side of that same order. As a result, debates over

immigration have the potential to heighten the cognitive dissonance implicit in the imperfectly compatible theories of legitimacy at the root of modern politics, which can result in outbursts such as those that recently arose in the wake of Arizona's SB 1070.

Three Axes of Immigration Debates

With the above discussion as background, let us now turn to the three broad concerns that structure most contemporary debates over immigration: humanitarianism, economic efficiency, and national identity.

Humanitarianism

Do modern states have a moral obligation to open their borders to refugees and asylum-seekers? The United States generally has recognized the right of the persecuted to asylum; still, refugees account for a relatively small portion of annual legal immigration to the United States—historically, around 10 percent.[4] And there have been several notable cases in which the United States has been charged with failing to meet its moral obligations to those seeking asylum. With a view to these episodes and the vast number of displaced persons across the globe, many have called for economically advanced nations, including the United States, to accept a greater number of refugees than they currently do.

Granting asylum to the persecuted is not the only way in which humanitarian concerns influence immigration policy. Immigration regularly generates a form of economic assistance to poor countries via *remittances*, or the sending of money earned in one's adoptive home to family and friends in one's native country. Remittances accounted for $307 billion in revenue for developing countries in 2009, a significantly larger figure than these countries receive from official development assistance.[5] The U.S. government commits about $25 billion annually to foreign aid, but remittances from individuals residing in the United States are estimated to exceed $48 billion.[6] Aside from charitable effects of immigration, aid to the disadvantaged can promote national interests, especially when it functions as a weapon in a nation's soft-power arsenal.

Economic Efficiency

Immigration is often thought to play a vital role in spurring economic dynamism, but it is also blamed for overburdening welfare states and displacing native workers. There is little doubt that *highly skilled* immigrants improve the economic fortunes of their host countries. President Barack Obama argued

this point in a 2010 speech: "The scientific breakthroughs of Albert Einstein, the inventions of Nikola Tesla, the great ventures of Andrew Carnegie's U.S. Steel and Sergey Brin's Google, Inc.—all this was possible because of immigrants."[7] Immigrants helped start over a quarter of the American technology and engineering companies founded between 1995 and 2005, and more than a third of the U.S. doctoral degrees in the sciences and engineering are awarded to foreign-born students.[8] As a result, many policymakers on the left and right agree that the United States should increase the number of visas available to highly skilled immigrants, and that foreign-born graduates in the sciences should have green cards "stapled to their diplomas."[9]

There is considerably more debate over the economic impact of low-skilled immigrants. Some suggest that without low-skilled immigrants to the United States, several important sectors of the economy—agriculture, in particular—would be unsustainable; moreover, immigrants fill low-wage, labor-intensive positions, freeing native-born Americans to ascend into more productive and better-paid jobs.[10] Others claim that low-skilled immigrants increase the supply of labor and thereby depress wages and cause unemployment; consequently, low-skilled immigrants might decrease the labor costs for American companies, but they also might cause considerable harm to low-skilled American workers. Critics of permissive immigration policy argue that since, on average, low-skilled immigrants are poorer, have larger families, and are more likely to lack health care and use welfare programs than natives, a large population of low-skilled immigrants can strain public resources.[11] On balance, do low-skilled immigrants improve the efficiency of the U.S. economy?

National Identity

The third major concern animating debates over U.S. immigration policy has to do with national identity. What makes an American an American? Perhaps the most commonplace and comforting answer to this question is that Americans share a set of beliefs, or *creed*, consisting of respect for individual rights and government by the consent of the people, among other tenets. In a controversial book published in 2004, Samuel Huntington argues against this widespread belief. This creed is only one component of American identity, he claims, and on its own the creed is insufficient to sustain the United States as a unified nation. Huntington considers America's distinct Anglo-Protestant culture the irreplaceable foundation of the American creed, and he worries that this culture has come under threat, owing to recent waves of immigration

from Asia and, more importantly, from Latin America. Thus, according to Huntington, the United States would do well to preserve its unique national identity by enacting more stringent restrictions on immigration. Critics of Huntington's work claim that his analysis does not demonstrate how Latino immigration threatens America's distinct culture, and furthermore that America's Anglo-Protestant culture is more diverse than he claims.[12]

Cultural anxieties similar to Huntington's often animate mainstream political discourse. Both former president George W. Bush and President Barack Obama, for instance, have argued that competency in English should be a prerequisite for legal immigration. And Huntington's insistence on some degree of cultural uniformity resonates with a long tradition of political thought, stretching from antiquity to the present, claiming that republics require populations that are small, homogenous, and virtuous in order to thrive. The dominant strain of American political thought, however, has found strength in diversity rather than homogeneity. James Madison famously argued in "Federalist No. 10" that the "greater variety of parties and interests" in a large, boisterous, and heterogeneous republic provided the surest security against any one faction gaining oppressive preeminence. While there have been myriad exclusions and persecutions checkering the annals of U.S. policies toward immigrants, the United States nevertheless seems historically to have demonstrated a remarkable capacity to benefit from strangers seeking their fortunes in foreign lands. In light of this record and of concerns, like Huntington's, that contemporary immigration differs from historical cases, should U.S. policymakers act to protect the national identity of the United States?

Homeland Security and Federalism

In the preceding section we discussed three axes along which immigration policies might be considered. In this section, we will consider two additional issues that make the American debate over immigration unique: the fear that lax immigration policies will imperil homeland security, and the division of power between federal and state governments, or *federalism*.

Homeland Security

Since September 11, 2001, American immigration policy has become associated with broader concerns over homeland security. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the Bush administration tried to reassert government control

over entry into the United States. While the administration succeeded in slowing the entrance of foreign visitors, businessmen, and students, particularly those travelling from "countries of concern," the wisdom of these policies has since been disputed.[13] Remarkably few terrorists have entered the United States illegally: the nineteen 9/11 terrorists entered legally (although some used forged documents), as did the Christmas Day bomber of 2009, the Times Square bomber of 2010, and the Boston Marathon bombers of 2013. Also, the sheer scope of human and commercial traffic across U.S. borders arguably makes careful monitoring all but impossible.[14] Linking security and immigration too closely may diminish international esteem and hinder U.S. efforts to attract desirable immigrants in the future, not to mention the costs of security measures along America's lengthy borders. Furthermore, it might prove self-defeating by isolating and alienating immigrants who otherwise would assist in efforts to preempt terrorist plots. As the recent battles over Arizona's SB 1070 indicate, however, many feel that U.S. states have a responsibility to secure their own borders.

Federalism

Renewed attention to the relationship between immigration and homeland security in the wake of September 11 has also contributed to the decentralization of responsibility for enforcing immigration laws. Kris Kobach notes that in 2005, a mere 2,000 agents enforced immigration law in the U.S. interior, and he suggests that "nearly 800,000 police officers nationwide represent a massive force multiplier."[15] State and local governments also have sought to expand their involvement in immigration law, owing to their frustration with the federal government's inability to address the challenges posed by illegal immigration, which culminated in Arizona's SB 1070. The majority decision in the *Arizona v. United States* Supreme Court case, however, pushed back against this trend. Arguing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy stated that "federal law makes a single sovereign responsible for maintaining a comprehensive and unified system to keep track of aliens within the nation's borders."[16] The constitutional support for this opinion is powerful: article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization" and "to regulate commerce with foreign nations"; immigration policy also arguably falls within the purview of foreign affairs, which the Constitution entrusts to the legislative and executive branches and explicitly denies to the states in article 1, section 10.

As a matter of historical practice, however, states have played a significant role in formulating immigration policy. Until the latter part of the nineteenth century, states led the way in regulating immigration. As the nationalization of the U.S. economy and the reforms of the Progressives centralized governmental power, immigration came largely under the control of the federal government, rather than the states. A number of scholars recently have begun to question the wisdom of this arrangement. They point out that the costs of immigration are disproportionately borne by state governments, and that immigrants are concentrated in certain states and not in others. Given such disparities, defenders of "immigration federalism" ask, would it not be sensible to allow states to formulate some elements of immigration policy to meet their specific needs, and thereby function as laboratories of democracy?

Immigration and American Power

Even while taking pride in belonging to a nation of immigrants, throughout their history Americans have professed profound anxiety regarding newcomers to their nation. Irish, Italian, Polish, Japanese, and Chinese immigrants have all, at one point or another, been the target of nativist persecution and explicit legal exclusion. From the founding of the nation to the 1820s, and again from 1924 to 1965, immigration to the United States as a percentage of the native population was quite low. It was during the century running from the 1820s to 1924 that the United States earned its reputation for welcoming immigrants, perhaps whitewashing other, less welcoming periods of American history. So is the United States, in fact, a nation of immigrants?

All of the evidence above notwithstanding, the answer is yes—and now more than ever. If current trends continue, the U.S. population will rise to 438 million by 2050, and 82 percent of this increase will be attributable to immigrants arriving between 2005 and 2050.[17] Unless long-standing laws and enforcement procedures change significantly, a large portion of this new population will enter the United States illegally. Also, high levels of unemployment increase American anxieties over illegal immigration, just as surely as these levels reduce the number of immigrants entering the United States illegally. It is against this demographic and economic backdrop that current debates over immigration policy—which are heated even in relatively normal times—have started to reach a fever pitch. The humanitarian, cultural,

and economic arguments for immigration reform during an era of blurring national boundaries present an especially perplexing puzzle for U.S. policymakers.

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5

American Society and Its Military

JIM GOLBY

In his 1961 farewell address, President Dwight Eisenhower voiced concerns about the future of U.S. civil-military relations: "[The] conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. . . . [We] must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes."[1] The president worried that emerging relationships between legislators, the armed forces, and the military-industrial base that supported them created perverse incentives that could threaten American society. Although some of Eisenhower's specific apprehensions about rapid technological and industrial changes were new, his broader concerns about the relationship between a liberal society and its military were not. In fact, American statesmen have debated how to raise an armed force that is both effective in its military tasks and subordinate to its civilian political leaders ever since the founding of the American republic.

Much has changed since Eisenhower's speech more than five decades ago. The Cold War has ended, and a new security environment has emerged. The United States has abandoned its long-standing commitment to a military composed of citizen-soldiers, instead instituting an all-volunteer force (AVF) in 1973; at the same time, conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have seen immense increases in the numbers of civilian contractors supporting military operations around the world. In the face of these changes, Eisenhower's concerns

about undue military and industrial influence have persisted and possibly even increased.

Many questions remain. Is the military-industrial complex a problem today? How should the United States field an army for the republic? What are the dangers and advantages of a volunteer, professional military? Does the increasing lack of military experience among civilian political leaders present new challenges or offer opportunities? Do senior military officials have too much influence over foreign-policy decisions today? These and many other questions must be answered in order for the United States to adequately think beyond civilian and military boundaries as it responds to the many contemporary challenges in American foreign policy.

Is the Military-Industrial Complex a Problem Today?

Since the founding of the American republic, U.S. statesmen and policymakers have been concerned that differences between the nation's military and the liberal society that it served could, if left unchecked, undermine society itself. In fact, the framers of the U.S. Constitution took great care to establish a political system that would minimize the republic's reliance on standing military forces, which they thought would inevitably become "engines of despotism."[2] Along with other institutional checks, they hoped that reliance on a nonpermanent, citizen-based militia system would ensure that the nation's soldiers would roughly share "the same spirit as the people" while still providing an adequate force to meet the country's security needs.[3] In doing so, the framers sought to eliminate—or at least minimize—boundaries between the military and American society.

For much of U.S. history, the country heeded the framers' advice and maintained only a small standing military, rapidly demobilizing its forces following periods of conflict. After World War II, however, political leaders chose to maintain a larger, permanent military bureaucracy in the face of the perceived Soviet threat. It was in this context that President Eisenhower issued his concerns about the influence of the nation's standing military and its burgeoning arms industry. To Eisenhower, this unprecedented phenomenon demanded an "alert and knowledgeable citizenry" to ensure "the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense . . . so that liberty and security may prosper together."[4]

When the Cold War ended, many political leaders hoped that a new era of peace would replace the ever-present threat of large-scale nuclear war between

the two superpowers. Militarily and economically, the United States stood alone, facing no obvious peer competitor on the global stage. In this new international environment, some commentators speculated that the United States would be able to drastically reduce both its conventional military forces and its nuclear stockpiles. Nevertheless, the rise of transnational terrorist organizations, the emergence of failed states, and the increasing competition for regional political and economic influence have led to rapid military deployments around the world. In this new environment, U.S. military expenditures grew more than 119 percent in the decade after September 11, 2001. Even if the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are excluded, the U.S. defense budget grew more than 68 percent over this time period. In fact, in 2010 the U.S. government spent more in real terms on defense than at any point since World War II, with expenditures that accounted for 48 percent of the world's military spending and exceeded $700 billion.[5] Defense spending has fallen somewhat since that time, but in 2012 the United States still outspent its nearest rival by a factor of four.[6]

Many critics have argued that Eisenhower's warning is as apt today as ever. According to William Pfaff, for example, profit-seeking arms corporations and generals intent on enlarging the military and its influence now "dominate Congress, as well as an inexperienced administration."[7] Since legislators themselves often stand to benefit by bringing jobs and defense contracts home to their districts, federal budgets often include programs that benefit a legislator's reelection chances at the expense of national security. Consequently, many argue that the large U.S. defense budget does not, in fact, adequately develop military forces that are prepared to defend against authentic threats; instead, they claim that much of the defense budget is wasteful and that it threatens the nation's economic health, especially in an age of economic instability.

Others counter that the military-industrial complex is less influential and menacing than it appears at first glance. Although the $700 billion price tag for defense seems startling, military spending as a percentage of GDP has fallen from 9.4 percent in 1961 to 4.7 percent in 2010.[8] Moreover, a large portion of those expenditures cover rising personnel costs in the form of higher salaries, health-care costs, and retirement benefits; this development means that even less money goes directly to arms corporations. And although the United States spends more on its military than any other nation, no other country assumes America's global responsibilities for security.

It remains unclear, however, whether today's defense programs do, in fact, constitute the "balance in and among national programs" and the "balance between actions of the moment and the national welfare of the future" of which Eisenhower spoke.[9] Does military spending trump other domestic priorities? Is that spending targeted in such a way as to address real and emerging threats to U.S. national security? Are institutional changes necessary to restore the balance between security spending and domestic programs?

How Should the United States Field an Army for the Republic?

At the same time that the United States was reorganizing its defense industry and technology to deal with Cold War threats, it also had to determine how to recruit and retain military personnel. These dramatic postwar changes in U.S. military capacity sparked a now-venerable debate between Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz about how these changes would, and should, affect U.S. civil-military relations, military recruitment, and military effectiveness. While Eisenhower worried that the erosion of military-industrial boundaries could threaten liberal democracy, Huntington and Janowitz instead focused on the implications of emerging boundaries between the republic's warriors and the society they served.

Huntington and Janowitz agreed that, at the start of the Cold War, an ideological divide had emerged in the United States between a pragmatic, conservative military and the liberal society that it was designed to serve.[10] They disagreed, however, on whether these differences were necessary to maintain an effective military. Huntington argued that they were. He believed that attempts to change the culture and composition of the officer corps would ultimately have deleterious consequences for military effectiveness; instead, he claimed that civilian leaders must tolerate military conservatism, especially during times of conflict, while promoting military autonomy and norms of military professionalism. Janowitz, on the other hand, contended that civilian leaders should take steps to change both the composition and culture of the military so that it could better fulfill the political needs of its civilian masters. If this gap were to remain too large, the military would become unresponsive to civilian needs and political dictates. Although the U.S. armed forces might remain militarily effective, they would do so only by compromising the liberal, democratic values they were intended to defend.

The upheaval of the Vietnam War and the subsequent introduction of the AVF in 1973 have served to exacerbate this debate and have led some to voice concerns about the representativeness and diversity of the U.S. military. Although the citizen-soldier concept may have been more an ideal than a reality for much of the nineteenth century, it did play a central role in shaping the armies that the Unites States fielded in World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam. Since Vietnam, however, the U.S. military has consisted entirely of volunteers. While this method of manning the force has many obvious benefits, especially in the training and equipping of its members, many have argued that it has created a military that is less representative of American society than ever before.

Although recent research has demonstrated that the U.S. military—or at least the U.S. Army—is more representative and politically diverse than was previously thought, there still are several areas of potential concern.[11] Among all ranks, women and some minority groups are significantly underrepresented. Additionally, gays and lesbians only recently have been granted the opportunity to serve openly after almost two decades under the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. Concerns about representativeness among the senior ranks of the officer corps are more pressing. The U.S. officer corps consists primarily of white males; women and minorities again are underrepresented.[12] Moreover, U.S. officers, especially the most senior officers, predominantly identify themselves as both conservatives and Republicans, though their attitudes and political affiliations are not particularly extreme or far right.[13]

Additionally, over the last two decades, many pundits and political commentators have asserted that the U.S. military and American society are dangerously disconnected from one another. Highly public disagreements over social policy and military deployments during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations have led many to assert that the civil-military gap in the United States has grown. In other words, they argue that members of the U.S. military now hold fundamentally different attitudes about social values and foreign policy than do their civilian counterparts, either because individuals self-select into the military or because of military socialization processes. Others claim that these differences are the result of a decade at war in which only a small fraction of society has borne the sacrifice. Indeed, the American people have less direct contact with the U.S. military than ever before; less than 1 percent of American families have a family member serving on active duty.[14]

Although some argue that the existence of a civil-military gap implies that U.S. military values have moved away from those of the society the armed forces serve and others claim that society simply is apathetic and ignorant of military sacrifice, most observers concede that something is out of balance. How can the U.S. military best be connected to the society that it serves? Is the AVF the optimal way to recruit and retain American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines? Can the expansion of Reserve Officers' Training Corps programs at elite universities bridge the gap? Does society need to insist on a more representative force, or will these actions only serve to undermine military effectiveness?

Do Senior Military Officials Have Too Much Influence on Foreign-Policy Decisions?

Another area of concern for contemporary U.S. civil-military relations involves the question of what the appropriate relationship between senior civilian and military leaders should be during wartime. A number of public civil-military conflicts during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations have reignited debates about the military's proper role in the nation's policymaking process. Although some scholars, pundits, and policymakers have argued that these conflicts stemmed from the improper influence of a military that increasingly is detached from the society it serves, others claim that instead such problems have resulted from civilian ignorance of the military and its mission. President Barack Obama's immediate firing of General Stanley McChrystal over inappropriate comments that members of McChrystal's staff made about civilian leaders—including U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry and Vice President Joe Biden—once again brought these debates into sharp relief.[15]

The existing scholarly work on civil-military relations typically is divided into two groups, each prescribing a different division of labor for these relations during periods of war. *Professional supremacists* argue that effective civil-military relations during wartime depend on granting expert military leaders sufficient autonomy to accomplish their missions, while minimizing micromanagement from nonexpert civilian leaders.[16] In contrast, *civilian supremacists* maintain that successful wartime policy depends on the strict implementation of civilian strategic guidance, even if the military disapproves of those civilian decisions.[17]

In recent years, several commentators also have argued that reliance on a volunteer, professional military has led to a growing disconnect in the United

States between civilian policymakers and the military, making civil-military collaboration even more challenging. A growing chorus of military officers and pundits have argued that political leaders today do not feel the consequences of their decisions acutely enough, and that a return to a draft would lead to more responsible foreign policy choices.[18] They often are particularly concerned about the decreasing prevalence of U.S. legislators with military experience or a family connection to the military. Others argue, however, that the professionalization of the nation's armed forces resulting from the establishment of the AVF has drastically improved military effectiveness and, subsequently, increased public confidence in the military.[19] According to this line of argument, boundaries between civilians and the military may be growing, but these boundaries are necessary and enhance national security.

After more than a decade at war, U.S. policymakers again must consider important questions about the division of labor between civilian and military leaders as they prepare to face contemporary challenges to U.S. foreign policy. Are the mechanisms that have, throughout American history, ensured civilian control of the military and held political leaders responsible for decisions to use military force overseas still operating properly? How can the United States best integrate military expertise and advice into its foreign-policy decisionmaking without sacrificing civilian control and responsibility for these decisions? What are the dangers and advantages of a professional, volunteer military? Does the decreasing prevalence of military experience among U.S. civilian leaders present any challenges that must be mitigated or opportunities that can be seized?

This chapter has attempted to identify some of the most critical debates in contemporary American civil-military relations, while focusing on three broad areas: (1) the influence of the military-industrial complex, (2) concerns about the differences between the military and society, and (3) debates about the appropriate role of military advice in the policymaking process. Although there have been many developments in U.S. civil-military relations since President Eisenhower issued his warning more than fifty years ago, Eisenhower's desire that "security and liberty may prosper together" remains timeless. If the United States is to effectively meet contemporary challenges to U.S. foreign policy while working across civilian and military boundaries, it must find a way to heed the spirit of Eisenhower's warning.

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6

Thinking beyond Terrorism and Insurgency

JEANNE GODFROY AND BRYAN PRICE

What we can expect in the future is that potential adversaries—be they terrorists, insurgents, militia groups . . . will seek to frustrate America's traditional advantages, in particular our ability to shoot, move, and communicate with speed and precision. . . . The odds of repeating another Afghanistan or Iraq—invading, pacifying, and administering a large third-world country—may be low. But in what General Casey has called "an era of persistent conflict," those unconventional capabilities will still be needed at various levels and in various locations. Most critically to prevent festering problems from growing into full-blown crises, which require costly—and controversial—large-scale American military intervention. ROBERT GATES

Each anniversary of 9/11 generates reflection and commentary about the Global War on Terror and America's subsequent involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Much of this line of thought centers on the U.S. approach to domestic and international terrorist threats, as well as to other threats to national and international stability. There are also discussions and debates about nontraditional global threats and the challenges posed by civil wars that no longer remain sequestered within state borders. Contemporary commemorations of 9/11 include discussions about intervention in places like Syria, Egypt, and North Africa; the use of unmanned drones to kill suspected terrorists in Pakistan and Yemen; and the difficulties of upholding the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Responsibility to Protect resolution when it is unclear how or on which side of a conflict to intervene.

American views of the most important national and international security threats have changed since September 11, 2001. In the early 2000s—due in part to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars—the focus of the United States, its military, and the world centered largely on insurgent and terrorist activity. Asymmetric, unconventional armed groups and non-state actors waging wars of insurgency

were thought by many to be the greatest future threat. Others have since argued—and continue to argue—that transitions of power between the globe's strongest states will lead the world into another great-power war, though smaller-scale proxy wars will persist.[1] The recent pivot to Asia by the United States has reflected the ascendance of this second, great-power-oriented view over the earlier focus on terrorism and insurgency.

Still others see another shift in the nature of world conflict in which globalization has empowered armed groups and made local containment impossible.[2] As a result, local and regional conflicts are no longer confined to national or regional boundaries—they are problems that penetrate the global community. On this view, the spectrum of the persistent conflicts referenced by former secretary of defense Robert Gates in his February 2011 address to the United States Military Academy's Corps of Cadets is far broader than traditional notions of terrorism and insurgency.

Among the persistent conflicts that U.S. policymakers can expect to encounter in the future are civil wars that have national, regional, and global repercussions. This chapter outlines some of the causes and outcomes of civil wars, as well as outside intervention and the various actors involved in historical and contemporary civil wars. It aims to illuminate a number of questions facing contemporary policymakers. What are the hallmark characteristics of civil wars? Which actors play the most prominent role in civil wars, and how do they shape the duration and outcomes of these wars? At what juncture and how should the United States and/or the international community intervene to prevent their continuance? How should the United States and its partners address, harness, or counter these actors to preserve national and international security?

Civil War and the Demand for Change

By definition, *civil wars* are conflicts in which at least two "organized non-state groups" engage in armed conflict inside the borders of a state.[3] Some civil wars are conventional, force-on-force wars; others involve revolutionary forces, insurgents, terrorist organizations, organized guerilla militias, and similar armed groups. Still others are waged between the state and organized criminal elements resembling mafias and gangs. Regardless of the forces involved, all civil wars share a common theme: they generate dynamics in which citizens of the same state—sometimes neighbors who had seemingly amicable or even intimate relations beforehand—want to kill one another.[4] It is this visceral violence that makes civil wars so startling to the international community.

While civil wars are not new phenomena, there has been an increased incidence of civil war since the end of World War II, and particularly since the end of the Cold War. There are several hypotheses as to why this is the case. One prominent theory suggests that civil wars are byproducts of worldwide demands for equality, demands that have increased as nationalist, democratic, and socialist movements have spread and global income inequality has increased.[5] All of these movements share a common thread: a demand for sociopolitical and economic change.

Most civil wars emerge when segments of a state's society believe themselves to be disenfranchised socially, politically, and economically. These groups are likely to resort to violence when alternative, nonviolent means for them to address their concerns are unavailable, and when their ability to survive as individuals or as a group is threatened. Ted Robert Gurr developed a formula that explains this basic tenet of civil-war initiation: "the greater the intensity of the discontent, the more likely is violence." When citizens see a gap between what they think they should have, what they think they are capable of obtaining, and the inaccessibility of these options due to political, social, or economic discrimination, political or violent rebellion ensues.[6] At some point, the demand for change in a state reaches a tipping point, causing civil wars of varying scope and intensity.

Sometimes civil wars arise from conflict-ridden trade in a particular commodity. In Mexico and Central and South America, for instance, competition over the narcotics trade has driven civil wars.[7] At other times, civil wars arise in response to unequal access to economic resources. When weak governments compete with armed groups over scarce national resources and the revenue they provide—diamonds in Africa, for example—civil wars are likely to begin and then continue indefinitely.[8] Moreover, commodities and revenue are rarely the sole source of the discontent; rather, it is the interaction between a state's ability to govern and these "economic agendas" that propels states into civil war.[9]

Whether the violence is political or economic in its origins, civil wars seem likely to continue to arise in the future. The socioeconomic sources of civil war are particularly worrisome, since the world's growing income gap ensures that actual and perceived inequalities—and, thus, the propensity for violence and civil war—are likely to increase in the next decade. Furthermore, globalization and improvements in access to global communications mean that these wars are "waged not only on the ground but in cyberspace and on satellite

television," lending an additional dimension to the conduct and resolution of such conflicts—the court of public opinion.[10]

Actors in Today's Civil Wars: The Old, the Revisited, and the Emerging

In addition to states and international organizations, a number of other actors participate in and impact the length and outcomes of civil wars. Terrorist groups are one such actor. Groups espousing religious, apocalyptic, or identity-based militancy can be found in every corner of the world: from the jungles of the Philippines to the mountains of Peru and Columbia; in the ungoverned regions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border; and, sadly, even in the United States. Although the United States has avoided large-scale attacks on its home soil since 2001, terrorist groups have conducted devastating attacks against several key U.S. allies, such as the United Kingdom, India, and Spain. Several terrorist plots were uncovered and foiled in New York City, Denver, and Dallas in the past three years, and other incidents—including the 2009 Christmas Day attempted bombing on Northwest Airlines flight 283 and the attack by a Muslim U.S. Army officer at Fort Hood in Texas, the failed bombing in May 2010 in New York City's Times Square, and the Boston Marathon bombings in April 2013—serve as tangible proof that the terrorist threat abroad and at home is still very real.[11]

The U.S. campaign against international terrorist organizations will remain one of the persistent conflicts that Gates highlighted in his 2011 speech. Although U.S. counterterrorism efforts have severely diminished al Qaida's ability to conduct another attack on the scale of 9/11 and decimated large portions of the group's leadership in Pakistan and other parts of the Arab world, al Qaida and its affiliates still pose a serious security risk to the United States and its interests abroad.[12] While the United States has applied relentless pressure on al Qaida elements throughout Pakistan since 2001, a number of al Qaida affiliate organizations have emerged in failed or failing states throughout the Middle East and Africa. Numerous terrorist groups continue to be prominent threats to the United States: al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen; al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb in Algeria; al-Shabaab in Somalia; and Jabhat al-Nusra and al Qaida in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (AQI/ISIL) in Syria. Most of these organizations are active participants in civil wars, which adds another layer of complexity to U.S. decisionmaking about intervening in these internal conflicts.

Syria serves as an illustrative case in point. As of this writing, the United States has publically called for President Bashar Assad to step down,[13] and it has given military aid to rebel groups championing the same goal.[14] Two of these groups, Jabhat al-Nusra and AQI/ISIL, are jihadist terrorist organizations that reject democracy and justify violence as the only means to remove what they deem to be apostate regimes like President Assad's and replace them with Islamic law. As a result, one of the arguments against aiding the "big umbrella" of the Syrian opposition is based on the fear that this aid might directly or indirectly enhance the capability of these terrorist organizations.[15] The United States, therefore, is put into a difficult policy position. In Syria and other similar internal conflicts, it faces a dilemma—to what extent does the United States go to promote democracy and work to remove dictatorial regimes, when doing so runs the risk of strengthening or emboldening terrorist groups in the process?

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are another prominent actor in today's civil wars. The internecine violence inherent in civil wars drastically impacts local civilian populations, whose suffering evokes a response from myriad international aid and relief organizations. These organizations respond with a combination of humanitarian relief supplies and, later on, personnel and materials to support long-term development goals. Unfortunately, the aid packages do not always reach their targeted recipient audiences—a serious problem, since inadequate or inappropriate application of aid can prolong civil wars. For example, Serb militias and Somali warlords profited from the sale of relief supplies flowing in from the international community and then used the proceeds to support their forces. This practice persists in the world's other civil wars. Because armed groups can benefit from stealing and selling relief supplies, they sometimes attack civilian populations with the specific intent of encouraging NGOs to send *additional* aid. In this way the efforts of NGOs to alleviate civil wars can sometimes prolong them.[16]

The need to monitor and secure aid packages, the logistical lines of intervention forces, and senior-ranking military and civilian personnel has reintroduced another actor onto the civil war battlefield: the private military contractor. Previously known as "mercenaries" in the annals of interstate war, the role of private contractors in current conflicts—particularly after the Blackwater incident in Baghdad in 2007, where numerous Iraqi civilians were wounded by indiscriminate fire—has been a hot topic of debate in recent years. Proponents of contractor involvement contend that these actors have always been present

on the battlefield and that their continued involvement there is a matter of acceptance rather than decision. In addition, private military contractors often deliver security services more efficiently and effectively than state militaries and international intervention forces. [17] Detractors respond that such contractors sap the legitimacy of an intervention and, absent proper legal controls, might work to further civil wars in order to keep themselves in business.[18]

Globalization has increased the number and types of actors who involve themselves in civil wars. Improvements in communication, for example, have made social media a particularly powerful actor in today's conflicts. Twitter, Facebook, and other social-networking sites figured prominently in news reports about civil unrest and revolution in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Iran, China, and Libya. The Syrian Electronic Army also introduced cyber warfare into Syria's civil war by targeting and hacking *international* media outlets and political opposition groups aligned against the Syrian government. As with so many other spheres of life, civil wars are now available in mainstream and real time: the consequent increase in transparency can preclude repression, but it might also work to spread and worsen civil conflicts. Social media can serve as a powerful recruitment tool, expanding a civil war well beyond the confines of national borders.

NGOs, private military companies, and social media are established instruments of modern-day conflicts. Which of these actors play the most critical and prominent roles in civil wars? What is the true nature of the relationship between NGOs, private contractors, and social media and the conduct, duration, and outcome of civil wars? Have these actors become permanent fixtures in civil wars? If so, how should intervention forces and their state sponsors relate to and interact with them?

Intervention and Civil War

Civil wars frequently invite outside intervention. The only points on which discussants of this topic agree is that the presence of intervention forces directly impacts the duration and outcome of civil wars, and that intervention forces face a number of difficulties in civil wars that are generally absent in conventional interstate war. If, when, how, and on which side to intervene remain persistent sources of contention among key players in the international community.

There are two primary arguments that nations and the international community use to justify violating a state's sovereignty to intervene in civil wars:

the presence of a direct threat to national or international security, or the violation of humanitarian norms. The former is the more traditional justification—states intervene in civil wars to serve their own security interests. Classic cases of this type of intervention include the Vietnam War; U.S. intervention—at the invitation of the Columbian government—against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia; and, of course, the U.S.-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unmanned aerial vehicle, or *drone*, attacks by the United States against terrorist targets in other countries represent a newer modification of this type of intervention—one with a small or nonexistent ground-force footprint.

Intervention for humanitarian purposes was codified much more recently with "The Responsibility to Protect"—a recognized set of international norms and principles that supports preemptive intervention by states or a community of states to protect civilian populations from annihilation. By adopting the Responsibility to Protect resolution in 2009, the United Nations and the international community affirmed that sovereignty entails a government's responsibility to protect its people.[19] Failing that, the international community has just cause to violate that sovereignty and intervene. The United States used that justification to spearhead an intervention in Libya in 2011; more recently, France's intervention in Mali was conducted under the auspices of protecting the civilian population from the chaos and violence perpetuated by rebel forces.

Justified or not, intervention in a civil war is a messy business. Most prominent among the difficulties intervention forces face is the reality of the occupation after the initial shock and awe of combat. Apart from the challenges associated with operating in an alien land and culture, intervention forces are subject to the whims and, more importantly, the impatience of their domestic constituencies as conflicts become more prolonged. As a result, the armed groups fighting with the intervention force on behalf of the incumbent government can wage war with only *limited* objectives. Their adversaries, on the other hand, are usually mobilized to wage *total war*, because failure for them translates to annihilation.[20] It is this imbalance in objectives—which favors the armed groups fighting against an intervention force—that seriously complicates intervention operations.

The U.S. record of success with intervention is mixed. In the early twentieth century, U.S. forces—in partnership with the Philippine government—achieved some success in the Philippines against a communist uprising. The United States was less successful in Vietnam, however.[21] Operations in Somalia in the

early 1990s proved disastrous in the long run, despite some short-term successes. Civil wars in Somalia, Mali, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and other states in the African continent persist to this day and feed threats to U.S. national security. In Bosnia and Kosovo, however, the efforts of U.S.- and NATO-led coalitions ultimately prospered. [22] As of this writing, efforts of the United States and NATO in Afghanistan appear to be undergoing significant and varied difficulties, with seemingly dim prospects for attaining their goals. Although the United States experienced some seemingly positive results in Iraq, those achievements appear to have been short lived; the departure of intervention forces left the country mired in political, religious, and ethnic divides currently being resolved through widespread violence. The question of how or why the United States was successful or unsuccessful in these particular conflicts remains a matter of debate, the outcome of which casts a long shadow over present-day discussions about military intervention in Syria's bloody civil war.

International organizations also have a mixed record when it comes to intervention in civil wars. NATO had some success restoring stability to Bosnia and Kosovo. The outcome of NATO operations in Afghanistan—particularly as the United States and Great Britain scale back their troop commitments—remains to be seen. The United Nations' record of intervention in civil wars has been even less sanguine. Some contend that UN peacekeeping forces have been, at best, "passive spectators to outrages and massacres, as in Bosnia and Rwanda; at worst they collaborate with it, as Dutch UN troops did in the fall of Srebrenica by helping the Bosnian Serbs separate men of military age from the rest of the population."[23] The UN peace-monitoring force in the Sinai has been less destructive, but no more capable of stopping either side from continuing the conflict.

NATO's involvement in Libya and its aftermath may have set a new precedent for more interventions, including that of France in Mali. Since the intervention in Libya was conducted ostensibly for humanitarian purposes against a known dictator who had previously threatened international security, condemnation of Western actions was more muted than the protests that hounded the U.S. intervention in Iraq. NATO's involvement in Libya also differed from some previous interventions, because even with limited objectives, NATO allied itself with a rebel force whose objectives in the conflict were total. NATO concentrated on selective bombing of military and logistical targets, while the rebel force conducted the bulk of the hard fighting.[24] Like other twenty-first-

century interventions, however, "success" in Libya appears to have been mostly military; attempts to build a democratic government have proven difficult, and commitments to continued efforts there faltered after U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens was killed by local militants in September 2012.

Syria's two-year-old civil war—in addition to perpetuating a significant regional humanitarian crisis—has reinvigorated debates about the criteria for justifying international involvement in a national conflict. As of this writing, the world's great powers (in particular the United States and Russia) remain polarized on the topic of military intervention in Syria, even though it is now clear that the Chemical Weapons Convention was violated. In late 2013, U.S. public opinion appeared to favor *no intervention*, especially given allegations that the rebel forces are at least partially controlled or guided by a recognized terrorist organization.

In light of these historical and more recent experiences, should the United States, international organizations, and the international community more broadly continue to justify intervention in civil wars? If so, what is the appropriate justification for that intervention? What are the criteria the international community should use to decide which side to support? If intervention does occur, how should reconstruction responsibilities be allocated among the actors directly involved in the conflict, the state's recognized or emerging government, and others in the international community?

The U.S. Role in Contemporary Civil Wars

More than a decade after 9/11, the United States and its allies continue to orient their foreign policy toward the prevention of similar incidents. As a result, civil wars, intervention, and the new actors emerging on the globalized battlefield will remain prominent issues for both America and the international community to address. Although the United States has attempted to shift the weight of its foreign and defense policies toward Asia, popular revolts, unrest, acts of terrorism, and full-blown civil wars in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Libya, Kenya, Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir have dominated recent national and international headlines.

There is significant common ground in policies addressing insurgencies, terrorism, and the persistent conflicts associated with the world's civil wars. Policies that work in one conflict, however, may not be applicable to others, and these policies do not necessarily address appropriate responses to the popular protests and insurrections arising in nondemocratic regimes in the Middle East

and Africa.[25] Is it appropriate for American foreign policy to be oriented toward Asia when other theaters command so much attention? What should the U.S. role in contemporary insurrections, civil wars, and interventions be? What role should international organizations and the international community play?

While the United States searches for the right formula of military, diplomatic, and financial means to affect the outcomes of these conflicts in its favor, the only certainty is that armed groups fighting national, regional, and global civil wars will continue to outmaneuver the world's traditional, established borders and boundaries. A state-centric and sovereignty-oriented approach to addressing the threats posed by these actors is, therefore, unlikely to achieve success. The United States should seek to benefit from multilateralism and the comparative advantages other states and other actors—including international organizations—can bring to the fight. Careful reflection on the nature of civil war, the factors that contribute to it, and the circumstances that allow it to increasingly transcend traditional boundaries is a good place to begin this effort.

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NOTES

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1. John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 361–63. Mearsheimer contends that the end of the Cold War has not eradicated a great-power propensity for war.

2. There are two notable works, written about a decade apart, that discuss the impact of globalization on world conflict. Thomas Friedman's *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999), 322–28, discusses how globalization has empowered angry youths to join groups that can then take action on an international scale. David Kilcullen articulates a similar argument in *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). He postulates that globalization makes angry young men more aware of cultural incursions and inequality, which then causes them to rebel against their fate.

3. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (Feb 2003): 75–77.

4. Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 330–36. Kalyvas has a telling discussion of how intimacy can lead to violence in civil wars.

5. Friedman (*Lexus*) and Kilcullen (*Accidental Guerilla*) both address how globalization has spread political ideologies and increased the awareness of inequality.

6. Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 13–16, 23. Gurr discusses how the size or amount of "relative deprivation" within a society can impact the magnitude and scope of the political violence observed.

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16. Keen, "Economic Functions of Violence," 59–61.

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18. Keen, "Economic Functions of Violence," 61.

19. *Summary of "The Responsibility to Protect": The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)* (New York: World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy, n.d.), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/R2PSummary.pdf.

20. Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics* 27, no. 2 (Jan 1975): 181–82, 184. Mack argues that "the process of political attrition of the metropolitan power's capability to continue to wage war is not the consequence of errors of generalship. . . . In a total war situation guns would get automatic priority. . . . The protagonists of a limited war have to compete for resources—human, economic, and political—with protagonists of other interests—governmental, bureaucratic, interest groups, and so forth." Although his analysis applies to great-power intervention, it is also appropriate for coalition and international-organization intervention forces.

21. Andrew J. Birtle, "Persuasion and Coercion in Counterinsurgency Warfare," *Military Review* 88, no. 4 (Jul/Aug 2008): 41–51.

22. David D. Laitin, "Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention," in *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention*, ed. Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 146–49, 160–63.

23. Edward N. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 4 (Jul/Aug 1999): 38.

24. "Going, Going . . . : The Fall of Muammar Qaddafi Will Transform Libya, the Middle East, and NATO," *Economist*, 27 Aug 2011, 11–12.

25. Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 547.

PART II / Distinguishing Regional Dynamics in U.S. Foreign Policy

The mean between the nation and the world is the region. During the Cold War there were two blocs; in nature, there are four hemispheres and seven continents; by convention, there are considerably more than seven regional security alliances and trade pacts. Each, in its own way, constitutes a *region*—a sphere of concern and intimate engagement separating some nations from others.

First and foremost, however, the region is a geographical concept—the "near abroad" that engages a nation's interest, owing ultimately, if not exclusively, to its proximity. No nation is an island, after all—even, perhaps especially, those referred to as "island nations." Each of the chapters in this part smudges national borders outward, in order to consider states not as the mathematician's monads floating in featureless space, but as communities bound by cartographers into living relationships with certain other communities.

More than any single development since the fall of the Soviet Union, China's rise has upset the system of global power. But China's growing prominence is as much an East Asian as a global phenomenon, and how China's neighbors—Japan, Korea, India—respond to this change will be as consequential as how U.S. policymakers respond. Bill Taylor and Bill Parsons suggest that U.S. strategists must see China in its regional identity in order to understand where U.S. priorities in this part of the globe lie. In the Middle East, it has seemed clear for some time that the United States had an abiding concern with access to oil and an on-again, off-again interest in human rights and perhaps even democracy. Robert Chamberlain and Luke Schumacher instead suggest that these old verities seem increasingly questionable in light of recent events. When elections usher in radicals and military coups champion secular modernity, where do U.S. priorities lie? U.S. policymakers seem to have concluded that little of enduring interest will tether them to the

ten-years' war in Afghanistan. Yet Sukhdev Purewal says that just what will happen when U.S. forces depart is anyone's guess. What strategy must U.S. policymakers pursue in order to mitigate risks while maintaining progress made in counterterrorism operations? NATO forces will soon leave Afghanistan as well, and their departure will highlight both NATO's past efforts alongside U.S. forces and the potential divergence of the United States and its oldest (and largely democratic) allies. Jordan Becker considers the strategic significance of Europe's debt, and he asks what prospect there is not only for trade between the United States and the European Union, but for ongoing security cooperation. Can the EU, having already claimed so much of its member nations' sovereignty, become not only an economic but a strategic union?

If a shared history unites Europe, hardly anything save shared human insecurity links the diverse nations of Africa. And yet, Irvin Oliver suggests, the success of the African Union has been an encouraging development in recent years. As Africa transforms from an area of humanitarian concern to a land of economic opportunity, how is the United States to balance its humanitarian and national interests, and how is it to do so while monitoring potential rivals like China? Africa still seems a world apart to many American citizens; Latin America does not. David Fagergren and Vijay Gallardo claim that this proximity is more than a fact of the map, as North and Latin American markets are intimately engaged. One of the most salient forms of engagement, however, has to do with the drug trade. Are drugs a problem of supply (i.e., a Latin American problem) or demand (i.e., a North American problem)? How do men of the Left in nations such as Bolivia contribute to or complicate U.S. efforts to control the trade in illegal drugs?

The case of the Latin and North American drug trade suggests that as nations blend into regions, regions merge into one another. Both nations and regions extend past boundaries within which they are too neatly placed. Latin America and North America are in many respects "Americas"; the Africa of the Mediterranean and the Africa beneath the Sahara are hardly an "African" whole. So in each of the following cases we must hesitate to bound too neatly the national, the regional, and the global. Each level of analysis should refract the insights offered by the others. Nevertheless, it is in the mean—the region—that the two extremes meet, and it is to the region that we turn in the chapters that follow.

7

Challenges and Opportunities in Sino-American Relations

WILLIAM TAYLOR AND WILLIAM PARSONS

China's explosion onto the world stage as a great power has been one of the most salient developments of the past few decades. Some argue that the twenty-first century will, in fact, be "China's century." Whether or not this is the case, the relationship between great powers, especially the United States and China, will shape the contours of the international system for the foreseeable future.

China today has risen from a century of humiliation and exploitation at the hands of imperial powers and from decades of internal turmoil, repression, and failed economic policies. Mao Zedong's ruthless and autocratic rule from the People's Republic of China's independence in 1949 to his death in 1976 left that nation hungry, poor, and backward.[1] Since Deng Xiaoping's economic-opening reforms began, however, China has evolved into a country with an advanced and globalized economy that is second only to the U.S. economy in size. With growth rates consistently above 9 percent, the world's largest cash reserve, and a massive export sector, China has positioned itself as a force to be reckoned with on the international stage.[2]

China's precipitous rise has been accentuated, in part, by America's stagnation. While China has emerged from the global recession relatively unscathed, the United States is concerned with possible deflation, high levels of unemployment, a languid manufacturing sector, and a trade deficit with China that has ballooned to $315 billion in 2012.[3] While China extends its spheres of influence into Africa and beyond, the United States haltingly seeks to extricate itself from its draining foreign commitments. With a view to these facts, some argue that the United States has entered an era of hegemonic decline.[4]

China's meteoric rise, coupled with America's stagnation, present multiple vexing questions to U.S. policymakers as they reconsider Sino-American relations. How much leverage, and in what areas, does the United States have? Should U.S. foreign policy toward China be shaped by realpolitik or through international institutions, norms, and ideas? Finally, will U.S.-China relations be marked by cooperation or suspicion in the years ahead?

China: Status Quo or Revisionist Power?

The current debate on Sino-American relations centers around two competing views: according to one, China is America's principal competitor; in the other, China is America's principal partner in solving increasingly complex problems that require multilateral responses. Which of these views is correct depends in large part on China, rather than the United States. In the anarchic system characterized by uncertainty among states, U.S. policymakers must craft foreign policy based on their assessment of China's aspirations and strategy. China may be content to follow a path in which they accept the West's international institutions, or it may reject the Western-dominated international system altogether. China's acceptance into the World Trade Organization, increased participation in regional organizations, deployments to neighboring states to assist with humanitarian disasters, and participation in policing the waters off the Horn of Africa are examples of the former; China's call for a new international currency to replace the dollar, its secretive military buildup, and its bellicosity in the South China Sea are examples of the latter.[5]

Will China seek regional hegemony or will it reach some mutually satisfactory power-sharing arrangement with the United States? Defining China as a status-quo or revisionist power is useful in that it may illuminate the prospects for conflict or cooperation in this relationship.[6] This, in turn, will help decisionmakers best prescribe appropriate policies to fit U.S. economic, military, and political strategies. If relations between the United States and China might spiral in a positive or negative direction, perhaps the United States should pursue *positive-sum* policies that incentivize mutual trust, transparency, and economic ties in order to minimize the likelihood of internecine conflict. On the other hand, if Sino-American relations are characterized by the need for deterrence, maybe the United States should pursue a *zero-sum* strategy that views any relative increase in Chinese power as a long-term threat to U.S. national security and economic interests.[7] A third alternative might envision a hedging strategy that is a combination of the two.

Another critical question policymakers must ask is, what drives the balancing behavior of regional states? Will they seek equilibration when there is a shift in power or a shift in threat? Moreover, will states in Southeast and Northeast Asia group together against China for security, or will they bandwagon with China for profit? Recent trends in the region provide contradictory evidence. While most states have increased their level of bilateral trade and investment with China, so, too, have certain states increased their criticism of China's predatory practices and made conciliatory overtures to the United States in order to increase U.S. military presence in the region. Presently, it seems as though most states in the region are content to hedge their bets as they wait to see which great power, the United States or China, will prevail.

International and Domestic Constraints

Both the United States and China operate under unique international and domestic imperatives that cannot be ignored in assessing the prospects for their bilateral relationship. The two-level game faced by leaders from both nations constrains their freedom of action in important ways. On the international level, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is supremely concerned with the twin goals of security and great-power status in the international arena.[8] On the first matter, China has benefited from a relatively benign environment over the last thirty years. The country has settled many of its decades-old border disputes with Russia, Vietnam, and others; it has quelled uprisings in Tibet and among other ethnic minorities; and it has pursued bilateral and multilateral relationships as well as trade with each of the actors in the region.[9] China has worried regional powers and the United States, however, regarding the Taiwan issue, China's territorial claims in the South China Sea, and China's military modernization. The second matter—securing China's status as a great power—has caused more concern for Chinese leaders. After a century of humiliation and its legacy of distrust of outside powers, the CCP is frequently unwilling to acquiesce to concessions in the international arena, for fear of being exploited.

On the domestic side, the CCP faces a volatile public and must maintain a delicate balance between the powerful thrusts of nationalism and economic growth. Nationalism is a potent force that has been manipulated by the Chinese government in the past to divert attention from domestic grievances, but nationalism has also backfired on the party in unexpected ways.[10] Examples include the May 4 Movement, the Hundred Flowers Campaign, and the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Delivering stability to the Chinese people while gently nurturing the unifying tendencies of nationalistic sentiment will be an ongoing challenge to China's leaders. At the same time, the CCP must maintain a reliable and high level of economic growth. Indeed, China's annual growth rate of 7.8 percent in 2012, the lowest since 1999, is of utmost concern to the party's leadership. Can China endure a period of stagnant economic growth without a commensurate investment in social services and political rights? Will environmental degradation, rapid urbanization, rampant income inequality, and political corruption engulf China in domestic turmoil? Given that nation's dependence on foreign consumption and the middle class's growing demands for more social and political rights, the CCP may

have difficulty sustaining China's economic growth over the decades to come. More importantly, and at the heart of this book's theme, how China responds to this *domestic* issue will undoubtedly influence its *external* relations with the United States.

The United States similarly faces a number of constraints internationally and domestically. On the international plane, the Obama administration must carefully protect U.S. influence through its security, economic, and diplomatic instruments while managing its drawdown in Afghanistan and its limited international political capital. Domestically, a high degree of unemployment, slow economic growth, and an unsustainable long-term debt overshadow foreign-policy interests, and gridlock between the administration and Congress has turned policymaking of any kind into a herculean task.

Just as important are issues that transcend (and thus complicate) traditional U.S.-China boundaries. For example, how will a resurgence of nationalism among Northeast Asian states influence Sino-American relations? Historic resentment and fierce economic competition have enflamed China, Japan, and South Korea's recent antagonism over maritime claims. In this light, America's historic alliance with Japan and South Korea further complicates U.S.-China relations. Additionally, North Korea's recent provocations (a third nuclear test, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile tests, and attacks on South Korea) add another layer of intricacy to Sino-American relations. While the United States seeks China's participation in the Six Party Talks to resolve tensions on the Korean Peninsula, China is loath to solve a problem that further drains U.S. military resources. Finally, China's insatiable appetite for natural resources has pitted it against weaker Southeast Asian neighbors over maritime claims in the South China Sea. How will the United States respond to this regional matter when multiple actors and interests are at play? As the aforementioned examples illustrate, traditional U.S.-China relations are being stretched both geographically and functionally.

Aside from these constraints, specific points of friction in Sino-American relations include the Taiwan issue and China's military modernization. Since Chiang Kai Shek and the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT) fled to Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War, the United States and the CCP have been at odds over Taiwan's status. While China views Taiwan as part of its sovereign territory (and therefore not subject to international meddling), the United States has established a series of precedents demonstrating American commitment to supporting the democratic aspirations of the people of Taiwan. The CCP,

however, views Taiwan's eventual reunification as critical to the party's legitimacy and therefore is unwilling to harbor U.S. involvement in what it sees as a domestic affair.

China's rise has also been accompanied, not surprisingly, by its increasing military might and corresponding friction with the United States. In the wake of international condemnation of the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989 and the incredible technological superiority demonstrated shortly afterward by U.S. forces during the First Gulf War, China set out to modernize its military and reduce its dependence on other powers. Deng Xiaoping's strategy in guiding the development of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) envisioned the security of China's borders and the ability to use force to prevent Taiwan's independence.[11] Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintau continued to fuel the PLA with annual double-digit budget increases; China's annual defense budget for 2011 was $129 billion, an increase of 6.7 percent from the prior year.[12] China colors its military modernization as a defensive measure designed to protect its security, but its policies have often put it at odds with the United States. China disabled a U.S. intelligence plane in 2001, harassed U.S. naval ships off its coast, and has bristled at recent U.S.–South Korean joint naval exercises.[13] China is also developing sophisticated technology to be able to attack military forces at great distances when they attempt to deploy or maneuver in the vicinity of Taiwan (plans that China-watchers call *antiaccess* and *area denial* strategies).[14] The test flight of China's J-20 stealth aircraft in January 2011 and the sea trials of its first aircraft carrier in August of that year are merely two of the more recent sources of friction between the two nations. U.S. policymakers have expressed deep concern over China's growing defense budget, lack of transparency, and assertive military posture. How should the United States assess Chinese aspirations in the near and long term, and how should it respond in the event of future military provocation?

Opportunities

While it is tempting to consider only the potential pitfalls that could stymie productive and mutually beneficial Sino-American relations, a number of opportunities beyond the boundaries of traditional diplomacy exist. First, given the tremendous power that a combined effort by the United States and China represents, there is enormous potential for this bilateral relationship to achieve what no other congruence of this type can. Because of their financial and trade interdependence, moreover, both countries have incentives to see that neither

one falters. This bilateral relationship represents over one-third of the world's economic activity and almost a quarter of the world's population; hence some have described the locus of power in this century as the "G2."

Several open questions in the international community cannot be solved without the unified efforts of both the United States and China. Chief among these is the maintenance of a functioning and stable global economy. The United States and China were key players in executing coordinated stimulus packages to cushion the economy's crash in 2008–2009. Second, climate change—and environmental protection more broadly—must be addressed by both nations, given that each has contributed to the problem and each stands to suffer from the depletion of the global commons. Third, the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council, the body charged with providing a stable international system, has been in serious doubt as China and the United States routinely block collective action within the international community. A renewed agenda involving common priorities could breathe new life into an institution that many view as the source of international law.

Policy Prescriptions

Given the uncertainty inherent in the international system, and in light of the domestic and international challenges faced by leaders on both sides of the Pacific, what policies should U.S. decisionmakers support in their engagement with China? On the strategic level, what can China and the United States hope to achieve in the arenas concerning the proliferation of nuclear weapons, climate change, energy security, trade, institutions, alliances, and cyber security? Can the United States and China find common ground on myriad complex issues which often transcend bilateral relations? How can the United States best leverage its influence in order to maintain its power in the region and the world?

In the realm of economics, the United States regularly recites a litany of Chinese sins. American policymakers accuse China of strategically depressing the value of its currency and thus gaining an unfair comparative advantage over U.S. companies; China looks the other way while American goods are pirated, leading U.S. firms to lose billions of dollars each year; China attempts to steal corporate secrets, barraging American businesses with cyber attacks. But to what degree can the United States use economic force to change these harmful economic practices? The United States might resort to tariffs and other protectionist measures, but it is not necessarily wise to employ these tools

against the chief holder of U.S. debt. American policymakers worry that China may respond to economic force applied by the United States by dumping U.S. bonds and treasury notes to devastate the American economy, although in doing so China would depreciate one of its most valuable assets and compromise its chief export market.[15]

Due to U.S. military arms and equipment sales to Taiwan, military relations between the United States and China have been spotty at best.[16] What steps can the American armed forces take to thaw military-to-military relations with China? Can the United States and China find an accommodation that avoids conflict? How should the United States respond to an increasingly assertive Chinese military?

More broadly, how can American policymakers, who tend to think in timeframes encompassing presidential terms, effectively engage with Chinese policymakers, who think in terms of dynastic cycles? Are there appropriate policies that balance between the traditionally nearsighted U.S. ones and long-term Chinese foreign-policy objectives? What alliances, nuclear postures, energy security, and regional-engagement strategies will most effectively advance U.S. interests without provoking an overreaction from China?

Managing the relationship with China is a critical task for U.S. policymakers. Americans sometimes view China's rise as a relative power loss for the United States in a zero-sum game, yet this relationship offers unprecedented potential for directing vast stores of political capital and economic resources toward the achievement of real and lasting global change. While the consequences of miscalculations and misperceptions loom large, the payoffs from a productive partnership are immense. America's unipolar moment may be over. But as the United States recalibrates its position in the world, American policymakers can have an important impact by creating strategies that go beyond the boundaries of traditional diplomacy.

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NOTES

1. People's Republic of China is the official name of China since the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949.

2. See Bijian Zheng, "China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great Power Status," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 5 (Sep/Oct 2005): 18–24.

3. U.S. Census Bureau, "Trade in Goods with China," www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html.

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6. See Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), for a discussion of spiral models and deterrent models of interstate relations.

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8. Ibid.

9. Taylor Fravel, "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation," *International Security* 30, no. 2 (fall 2005): 46–83.

10. Suisheng Zhao, "Nationalism's Double Edge," *Wilson Quarterly* 29, no.4 (autumn 2005): 77.

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12. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*, s.v. "China," http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4/.

13. See David Sanger and Elisabeth Rosenthal, "U.S. Plane in China after It Collides with Chinese Jet," *New York Times*, 2 Apr 2001; Thom Shanker and Mark Mazzetti, "China & U.S. Clash on Naval Fracas," *New York Times*, 10 March 2009; and Elisabeth Bumiller and Edward Wong, "China Warily Eyes U.S.-Korea Drills," *New York Times*, 20 Jul 2010.

14. Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter, *Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), xiii–xiv.

15. Paul Krugman, "China, Japan, America," *New York Times*, 12 Sep 2010.

16. Thom Shanker, "Pentagon Cites Concerns in China Military Growth," *New York Times*, 16 Aug 2010.

8

U.S. Policy Challenges in the Contemporary Middle East

ROBERT CHAMBERLAIN AND LUKE SCHUMACHER

As the U.S. engagement with the Middle East became less defined by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, policymakers might reasonably have expected a reprieve from crisis management in the Gulf region and the larger Arab world. Instead, the rapid collapse of the Tunisian regime led to a cascade of challenges to autocrats across the region.[1] Regimes toppled in Libya and Egypt, a civil war erupted in Syria, major civil disturbances were violently suppressed in Bahrain and Iran, and various combinations of reform and social-welfare policies were used to sooth the populace in Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.[2] Several peace initiatives in Israel came to nothing, Iran's nuclear program remained a source of concern, and sectarian fighting escalated in Iraq.[3] The U.S. strategic situation would seem to have gone from bad to worse.

On the other hand, perhaps things are not as bad as they seem. As of this writing, Iran has proved willing to negotiate its nuclear program,[4] the United States has avoided the large-scale commitment of ground forces in both Syria and Libya, radical Islamic movements have been rejected at the ballot box, democratic forces continue to operate in states across the region, Turkey has an expanding economy and has provided a stabilizing influence, and regional allies are increasingly willing to play constructive roles in support of American policy.[5] For U.S. policymakers, all of this is good news.

Then again, the entire situation in the Middle East may resemble a briar patch, with every thorny issue wrapped up in every other one. The Israeli and Palestinian peace process is stuck and requires concessions on both sides; Israel is challenged by instability on its borders; the Egyptian coup removed a

potential strategic challenge to the United States, but reinforces a legacy of supporting autocrats against popular movements;[6] the Syria conflict threatens to spill into neighboring states; the Saudi regime supported a brutal crackdown in Bahrain but also aided counterterrorism efforts in Yemen; and the Iranian state is being asked to give up its nuclear program just as a major regional client (in the form of Bashar Assad's regime in Syria) may be lost.[7] The negative externalities associated with every desirable policy initiative advanced by the United States are so significant that there seem to be no good options at all.[8]

This chapter considers the prospects for U.S. strategy in the Middle East, a region in which so many vexing challenges—and, perhaps, opportunities—spill across national and regional boundaries. In recent years, has the U.S. strategic situation in the region gone from bad to worse, improved, or merely become more complex? Does the Obama administration's push toward "rebalancing" in Asia somehow complicate its engagement in the Middle East? Do current austerity measures compromise the ability of the United States to quickly and effectively react to emergent crises in the region? How should U.S. policymakers respond to the challenges posed by today's Middle East?

The Arab Spring

The transformation of Middle Eastern domestic politics in recent years has been truly remarkable. Social-media technologies enabled protestors to coordinate

their actions with unprecedented velocity, yet these technologies were not sufficient, in and of themselves, to achieve revolutionary results.[9] While regimes collapsed in Egypt and Tunisia, the one in Iran weathered the storm, as did Bahrain's. Other protest movements became violent, resulting in Western intervention in Libya and a protracted civil conflict in Syria. Thus two key questions exist for both scholars and policymakers. Why do revolutions occur? And when does social media matter?

In earlier works on Eastern Europe and the collapse of communism, both Timur Kuran and Mark Granovetter suggest that a major contributor to regime collapse is the process of revealed preferences.[10] That is to say, in an autocracy people have an incentive to lie about their beliefs regarding the regime—doing otherwise is a quick way to find oneself imprisoned or executed. The state remains stable because even though people may intensely dislike the regime, they do not know how many other individuals feel the same way, and they cannot estimate how risky it is to go out and protest. Without more information about the true sentiments of other citizens and the potential dangers of speaking out, people stay home.

This problem can be overcome by social media. Because people have the ability to connect with like-minded individuals in pseudoanonymity through these pathways, they can develop beliefs about their level of dissatisfaction with the government that make them feel less alone and more willing to participate in politics. A crucial factor is that those communicating in this way can reduce the state's ability to target them as individuals. In observing and engaging with social-media outlets, people can now make more informed judgments concerning the scale and violence of state repression, thereby encouraging risky political action where the associated consequences are believed to be limited. Through the use of social media, protest movements become more powerful more quickly and threaten the state more significantly than ever before.

Of course, the trouble with this argument is that social-media penetration does not seem to operate independently of other factors in determining the scale or outcome of protests. Egypt's social-media apparatus proved every bit as robust during the military coup that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood as it was during the fall of Hosni Mubarak.[11] Yet despite (or because of) widespread violence on the part of the state against protestors during the more recent coup, the current military regime appears less vulnerable than Mubarak's regime.[12]

Some scholars, such as Barbara Geddes and Thomas Wickham-Crowley, suggest that either schisms within the elite or structural constraints on state

behavior explain why some regimes survive and others fall.[13] In this version of events, the Iranian regime staved off revolution yet the Mubarak regime collapsed, not because of technologies available to the protestors, but because Mubarak failed to maintain the loyalty of the Egyptian security forces, along with a large pool of elites.[14] Thus the vulnerability of wealthy states with a relatively sizeable, unified elite might be much lower than that of other states in the region, regardless of the extent of Internet penetration.[15]

The policy implications of the foregoing are quite significant. If autocratic regimes in the Middle East are living on borrowed time and can be expected to fall to a combination of youth movements, emerging technologies, and changing regional norms, it would appear important for the United States to align itself with the movements of the future, not the legacy of the past. On the other hand, if autocratic regimes are, by and large, quite secure and can be expected to survive even very noisy mass protests, America's refusal to engage with nondemocratic regimes could create significant strategic and economic vulnerabilities.

America's Allies: Changing Relationships

Since the 1980s, the U.S. security posture in the Middle East has rested on its alignment with Egypt, Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. Peace between Egypt and Israel meant, de facto, that Israel was no longer a likely target of conventional attack by other Middle Eastern states, because without Egypt, no combination of states could match Israeli military power.[16] Israel checked Soviet client states and cooperated with the United States in a variety of other ways.[17] Turkey, which had the second-largest army in NATO (behind that of the United States), tempered Soviet ambitions and provided critical support to America's security and diplomatic strategies in the region.[18] Saudi Arabia coordinated the actions of the other Gulf states, supported the domestic stability of pro-Western rulers, and exerted a stabilizing influence on global oil markets.[19] Each of these relationships, however, is now shifting.

America's engagement with the Egyptian military was a cornerstone of U.S. global strategy during the Cold War due to Egyptian control of the Suez Canal, an element of U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the contemporary era, and a vivid illustration of the power of American engagement in the region.[20] During the fall of Mubarak, the restraint shown by the Egyptian army during the protests was held up as proof of both that force's popular legitimacy and its commitment to democratic values.[21] Since then, the situation seems to have

changed. When the Egyptian military removed the popularly elected president of Egypt, Mohammed Morsi, from power, they did so by claiming that they were the true embodiment of the national will and the spirit of the democratic revolution.[22] Nondemocratic means had ousted the elected head of a state, and violence was being used to repress members of his party, which is illiberal and a challenge to U.S. policy. As a result, U.S. policymakers must now address two related questions. First, does the Egyptian military still represent a source of regional stability? Second, if so, does the stabilizing influence of the Egyptian military warrant the material and symbolic costs of continued support?[23]

Israel, with its powerful military, advanced economy, and democratic institutions, has played a key role in America's strategy in the Middle East. In the face of serious threats from its neighbors, Israel formed alliances with two other key U.S. allies, Turkey and the Shah of Iran, and signed an American-brokered peace agreement with Egypt.[24] The Israelis have continued active cooperation with U.S. military, political, and cultural initiatives and remain one of the top recipients of U.S. aid. At the same time, tensions between the United States and Israel are rising. The United States has repeatedly requested a permanent freeze on the expansion of Israeli settlements on occupied lands and the resumption of the peace process. Instead, these settlements continue to expand, leading some commentators to argue that an independent and viable Palestinian state is no longer geographically feasible, with the situation instead requiring a "one-state solution" that integrates the Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories into Israeli life.[25] Further, Israeli operations in response to rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip have included large-scale ground attacks, a naval blockade, and airstrikes. The deaths associated with these operations have spurred opposition from U.S. allies, such as Turkey, and create serious challenges for Egypt.[26] Finally, Israel has publicly expressed extreme displeasure at the U.S. approach to the Iranian nuclear program.[27] U.S. policymakers must decide how costly continuing to support Israel is and determine whether the benefits of continued cooperation outweigh the resultant disruption to other relationships and initiatives.[28]

Since its revolution in 1923, Turkey had been dominated by its military, was avowedly secular in its public orientation, and remained committed to a relationship with the West.[29] With the election of an Islamic party, the ejection of the military from politics, and a stalled application to the European Union, however, the face of Turkish politics and diplomacy is changing.[30] In particu-

lar, Turkey is beginning to engage more deeply in the politics of the Middle East, doing so with aggressively expanding economic ties and trade relationships, active participation in crisis management along its southern border, and important contributions to discussions with Iran.[31] Arguably, these are all happy developments. The question facing American policymakers is how to encourage greater Turkish engagement without jeopardizing other U.S. relationships and policies. For example, if Turkey spends political capital trying to arrange a rapprochement between Iran and the United States, what is the political cost to the U.S.-Turkey relationship if the U.S. administration at that time ignores Turkish overtures? If Turkey punishes Israel for killing Turkish citizens in a maritime raid, should the United States become engaged, and, if so, how? If Turkish businesses begin to crowd out American firms in emerging markets, should the U.S. government continue to encourage Turkish growth?

America's relationship with Saudi Arabia extends back to World War II. The Saudi government authorized construction of a U.S. airfield for use by U.S. strategic bombers; Saudi ARAMCO was the first American oil concession that challenged the dominance of British petroleum companies in the region; and the Saudi government eventually become one of the "two pillars" identified by then president Richard Nixon as key to the security of the Gulf.[32] Saudi Arabia supported the U.S. strategy of arming the mujahideen in Afghanistan, contributed funds and coalition forces during the first Gulf War, and cooperated in the enforcement of the No-Fly Zone in Iraq.[33] Historically, the Saudi regime has been considered extremely conservative, in the sense that they generally oppose revolutionary change of any type. Recent Saudi policy, however, has become more active in a number of ways, some of which demonstrate novel developments in their international interactions and foreign-policy goals. The Saudi regime provided forces to Bahrain to guard key facilities, thus freeing Bahraini security forces to suppress protests; supported insurgents in Syria and Libya; established the King Abdullah University for Science and Technology; and diversified its economy and its arms suppliers.[34] Like the Israelis, Saudi leaders would prefer the United States to take a harder line vis-à-vis Iran, and they have been critical of U.S. policy in Egypt. In an unprecedented show of frustration, the Saudis refused a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council when it was offered to them in October 2013.[35] As the Saudi government becomes more public in its efforts to create a favorable regional environment, American policymakers are again confronted with the choice between supporting managed transitions versus revolutionary change. If the Middle East

quickly becomes secular and democratic, the Saudi regime may find itself isolated, forcing the United States to make difficult decisions in short order. If, however, the Middle East becomes more chaotic and unmanageable, the value of a stable and consistent regional ally will be immense for the United States, especially if that ally's managed reforms provide a template for others to follow.

Civil Conflicts

While Muammar Gaddafi's demise in Libya may have convinced some policymakers that this was an easy and efficient way to achieve desired outcomes in civil wars, the conflict in Syria and continued violence in Iraq have put those dreams to rest. The Syrian conflict has generated massive regional refugee flows, which threaten to destabilize neighboring countries.[36] It has also generated inflows of weapons and fighters to a wide variety of opposition groups, some of which support U.S. goals in the region and many of which do not. Unsurprisingly, given the porous borders between Syria and Iraq and the large tribal organizations and smuggling networks that lie across international boundaries, violence has also increased in Sunni areas of Iraq.[37] As disturbing as this violence is on its own, it also politicizes and deepens sectarian divisions within the region. Bahraini and Iraqi Shi'a are both accused of being tools of Iran, which they vociferously deny.[38] Rates of intermarriage between sects are down across the region, one indication that people are forced to choose sides based on differences that were previously considered matters of personal preference.[39]

As terrible as these realities seem for both humanitarian and political reasons, it is not clear what the United States can do to prevent them. Should the American military intervene directly on the side of the rebels to remove Assad? Or perhaps the brutality of the civil war can be mitigated in some small way, such as limiting the use of chemical weapons, in which case the United States would use force only if "red lines" were transgressed.[40] Perhaps the United States should arm the rebels and provide support from the background. Or perhaps the best the United States can do is to provide humanitarian aid and try to alleviate the worst impacts of the war through caring for refugees, assisting regional allies, supporting nonsectarian governments, and insisting on an active peace process.

The United States faces extraordinary challenges in the Middle East, but it also has good reasons for optimism. Despite the ugliness of civil war, government repression, and sectarian fighting, there are many signs that the region is trans-

forming for the better. The renewed commitment to regional solutions, the variety of initiatives started by regional partners, and the creation of new popular voices hold enormous promise for future cooperation, prosperity, and peace. Realizing these potential gains, however, will require the United States to make difficult policy choices, based on a clear understanding of the large, transborder, regional factors that connect each policy to the next.

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NOTES

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9

Promoting Security and Prosperity after Afghanistan

SUKHDEV PUREWAL

In the past several years, the United States has repeatedly assumed crucial roles in development and democratization efforts around the world. Largely in accord with U.S. policy goals, the world's states have become increasingly interdependent. But this emerging interdependence has not simplified U.S. foreign-policy choices in South and Central Asia. Indeed, as U.S. commitments in Afghanistan draw to a close and Afghanistan's neighbors start jockeying to fill the vacuum, the dilemmas facing U.S. policymakers have become all the more vexing.

The following chapter considers how U.S. foreign policy might evolve as American involvement in Afghanistan diminishes. We will consider first the fate of Afghanistan, and then turn to how Afghanistan's neighbors might respond to the reduction of U.S. forces in the region. The following are among the questions U.S. policymakers face. Has reliance on a "modern" U.S. perspective and the application of lessons learned from Iraq hindered Americans' ability to understand Afghan culture, history, and regional relationships? Even further, has America's worldview impeded its ability to craft appropriate policies with realistic goals, expectations, and timelines? After over ten years of operations, the region's uncertain future calls for a reassessment by the United States of the challenges facing Afghanistan and its neighbors, as well as a reevaluation of the appropriate policies to tackle these challenges.

Afghanistan

With the following words to the American public in June 2011, President Barack Obama signaled the beginning of the end of the U.S. combat mission in Afghanistan:

> The goal that we seek is achievable, and can be expressed simply: No safe haven from which al-Qaeda or its affiliates can launch attacks against our homeland or our allies. We won't try to make Afghanistan a perfect place. We will not police its streets or patrol its mountains indefinitely. That is the responsibility of the Afghan government, which must step up its ability to protect its people, and move from an economy shaped by war to one that can sustain a lasting peace. What we can do, and will do, is build a partnership with the Afghan people that endures—one that ensures that we will be able to continue targeting terrorists and supporting a sovereign Afghan government.[1]

He called for the redeployment of 10,000 troops by the year's end, the redeployment of 23,000 more troops by the following summer, and the full transition of the combat mission to Afghan security forces by 2014. In so doing, the president announced that the United States had made progress on three fundamental objectives: refocusing on al-Qaeda, reversing the Taliban resurgence, and training Afghan security forces.

These claims have since become debatable, however. The killings of Abdul Ghani Baradar, Osama bin Laden, and Ilyas Kashmiri in 2011; the recent capture of Abu Anas al-Libi; and estimates indicating that there are less than a hundred full-time al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan all suggest that "al-Qaeda Central" has been severely degraded. But U.S. policymakers still must answer a host of questions about what remains of al-Qaeda. Who are "al-Qaeda and its affiliates"?[2] How will the organization continue to evolve under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri?[3] Have his decisions to welcome al-Shabaab in Somalia and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria into the al-Qaeda network demonstrated a widening and more extremist turn for al-Qaeda? Even though "al-Qaeda Central" remains in Pakistan, does the "greater threat" to the United States posed by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula warrant a shift in America's counterterrorism focus?[4] What is the evolving al-Qaeda relationship with Pakistani-based groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani network, as well as with other regional groups, and what does this mean for a post-2014 U.S. presence in Afghanistan?[5]

After the initial U.S. invasion of and successes in Afghanistan, the Taliban slowly reconsolidated and reorganized. Beginning in 2006, the Taliban began a resurgence; by the end of 2008, they controlled 164 out of 364 districts in Afghanistan (compared with just 30 districts in 2003).[6] Immediately upon entering office in 2009, President Obama added 21,000 troops to help combat this development. He augmented this number with a surge of 30,000 more troops in 2010 and, at the same time, committed to a new counterinsurgency strategy.[7] As of this writing, the future of the NATO mission in Afghanistan is uncertain. Can negotiations with the Taliban lead to national reconciliation and a peaceful Afghanistan?

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have recently fulfilled a primary role for the security of Afghanistan, leading 87 percent of conventional operations between October 2012 and February 2013.[8] According to recent reports, ANSF are nearing their March 2013 targets of 195,000 Afghan National Army and 157,000 Afghan National Police personnel.[9] In addition to the national forces, the Afghan Local Police Initiative is a key component of the Afghan security plan; it attempts to bridge the gap in local districts in which the national forces are not yet able to provide security.[10] Though the Afghan national and local security forces have demonstrated a certain number of successes, as indicated by recruitment and their participation in major operations, questions remain about their sustainability, given their high attrition rates; questionable performances in their areas of responsibility, such as Kabul; and allegations of brutality and abuse.[11] Will these national and local security forces be able to take over the mission as U.S. and coalition forces draw down?

As discussed above, U.S. policy is currently a function of three objectives: refocusing on al-Qaeda, reversing the Taliban resurgence, and training Afghan security forces. Evaluating U.S. policy requires assessing Afghanistan's present instability and its prospect for future progress. What are the internal and external variables causing stability and instability? How does the United States sustain the initiatives fostering stability, while addressing the areas of instability? Does the Obama administration's strategy and proposed timeline for withdrawal adequately account for these concerns? Can the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) accomplish its objectives by the end of 2014? Even more to the point, how should the United States define "success," and how will U.S. policymakers know when it is achieved?

Acknowledging that soldiers alone are not enough, the international community has also enhanced its development and democratization efforts in Afghanistan. Between 2001 and 2010, the United States provided nearly $52 billion in security, development, and counternarcotics reconstruction assistance.[12] The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) leads much of this effort in creating economic growth, strengthening governance, and investing in human capital. USAID works in consultation with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, which, in accordance with the 2001 Bonn Agreement, coordinates all international donor assistance and activity.[13] Has the UN approach fully integrated Afghans into the process, in order to foster ownership, or have these efforts failed to incorporate the local populace, resulting in misidentified needs, unsustainable development, and a discrediting of the Afghan government? Has the military's involvement in development assistance (e.g., provincial reconstruction teams) politicized the humanitarian space?[14] With a 306 percent increase in the price of dry opium in 2011, are the counternarcotics gains of the past in jeopardy of being reversed?[15] Or, in light of the 2010 offensive in Helmand, an area that supplies about 54 percent of Afghanistan's opium, are these counternarcotic gains sustainable?[16] What are the implications of this discussion on the financing, local support, and resolve of the Taliban and other insurgent groups?[17]

As evidenced by the 2009 presidential elections and 2010 parliamentary elections in Afghanistan, concerns over governance continue to impede prospects for future stability. Although President Karzai was deemed the winner of the 2009 presidential elections, there were numerous election irregularities. Peter Galbraith, a former UN deputy envoy to Afghanistan, was fired for his unwillingness to accept what he says was wholesale election fraud on the part of Karzai.[18] Is the current Karzai regime the reliable and effective partner that counterinsurgency literature prescribes and that ISAF requires to be successful? What are the implications of the timing of the full transition of all functions to the Afghans in 2014, with the next presidential elections in that country scheduled in March? Will Karzai respect the constitutional term limits and facilitate a peaceful transition of power? Does the registration of Abdul Rassoul Sayyaf, a conservative Islamic scholar who is considered to have been a mentor to Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, and his nominee for vice president, Ismail Khan, demonstrate that, potentially, the next Afghan government may be even more difficult for NATO to collaborate with than the current one?[19]

Amid these pressing concerns, the commitment and diverging perspectives of the NATO member states raise doubts for future success. Criticism over the unequal distribution of the fighting force and domestic pressure within the European countries to withdraw their troops continue to strain the coalition. On taking office in 2009, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen reiterated President Obama's words that "the campaign in Afghanistan was one of necessity, not choice."[20] Given the ongoing economic difficulties in Europe and the killing of Osama bin Laden, however, will NATO's resolve waiver in the face of domestic opposition to the Afghanistan war within its member nations?[21] Concurrently, in America, how will public opinion and the economy affect the commitment of resources to Afghanistan and the characterization of that country as vital to U.S. national interests?

The Neighborhood: Pakistan, India, and the Rest

In outlining a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2009, President Obama remarked:

> And finally, together with the United Nations, we will forge a new Contact Group for Afghanistan and Pakistan that brings together all who should have a stake in the security of the region—our NATO allies and other partners, but also the Central Asian states, the Gulf nations and Iran; Russia, India and China. None of these nations benefit from a base for al-Qaeda terrorists, and a region that descends into chaos. All have a stake in the promise of lasting peace and security and development.[22]

Pakistani interests in Afghanistan stem from the former's military policy of "strategic depth" in the event of war with India. Therefore, Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban remains in question, particularly in light of its close ties to that group in the past. Pakistan, for instance, was one of only three states to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan prior to 9/11. Insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan are able to seek refuge in Quetta and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan. In addition to launching cross-border attacks, these militants have steadily gained influence in Pakistan, perhaps with the support of (former) intelligence officials. After a suicide-bomb attack on an Islamabad hotel in September 2008, Pakistan's president at that time, Asif Ali Zardari, promised to rid his country of terrorism.[23] Yet in November 2008, a Pakistani-based terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, conducted a devastating assault on Mumbai in India, killing at least 172 people.[24] Post-Mumbai, Zardari became the first Pakistani head of state to admit that his country created and nurtured such organizations as Lashkar-e-Taiba for tactical objectives against India.[25]

Although, over the past several years, the Pakistani Army has increased and been more effective in operations against these militants in the country's Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Swat Valley, the presence of Osama bin Laden within a mile of the National Military Academy in Abottabad, Pakistan, raises further questions about the reliability of Pakistan as an ally, as do reports alleging Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) links with the Haqqani network.[26] Yet, from a Pakistani perspective, U.S. violations of their sovereignty during the raid on bin Laden's compound and from unannounced drone strikes raise the question of whether the United States itself is a reliable ally.[27]

Pakistan's nuclear-weapons program remains in the background of discussions regarding this deficit of trust, as well as Pakistan's relationship with India, a country with which it has fought three wars and numerous skirmishes since 1947. U.S. concerns over the safety of these nuclear weapons have resulted in a $100 million assistance program to help Pakistan safeguard them.[28] Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan's nuclear black market, growing distress over the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups, and worries of an Indo-Pakistani nuclear-arms race further accentuate these concerns.[29] Pakistan views the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement and India's accession into the Nuclear Suppliers Group as unfairly privileging India and forcing Islamabad to further develop its weapons program.[30] Though this agreement helped further Indo-American relations, it resulted in increased Pakistani security concerns. This raises larger questions on U.S. nonproliferation efforts, both in the region and throughout the world. What are the economic and security risks and benefits of improving India's civilian nuclear capabilities? How are proliferation risks weighed against future benefits of a more interdependent relationship with India? Does this strengthening Indo-American relationship place more pressure on China to solidify its relationship with Pakistan? How does Pakistan perceive these relationships, and what are the implications for continued U.S. cooperation with Pakistan in Afghanistan?

Since 2001, India has been the largest regional donor to Afghanistan, not only providing $1.3 billion in reconstruction aid, but also leading development programs that range from highways and dam power projects to a new parliament building.[31] Indians state that their interests in Afghanistan are a function of the latter's ability to serve as a gateway to Central Asia and help provide for India's energy requirements. Pakistan, however, views India's motives quite differently and remains nervous about allowing its greatest enemy to establish a presence on its other border.[32] What are India's interests in Afghanistan? How does the India-Pakistan relationship impact Afghan stability?

In addition to Pakistan and India, China, Iran, Russia, and Central Asian states continue to have vested interests in Afghanistan. These particular concerns revolve around such subjects as instability in border areas, economic relations, reductions in the drug trade, and aspirations of regional hegemony.[33] How can the United States and its NATO partners funnel these diverse interests into a coordinated effort to facilitate the stabilization of Afghanistan? What

does the 2014 withdrawal timeline indicate for a post-NATO regional scramble for influence?

Afghanistan and its neighbors continue to be at the forefront of issues that challenge the role of the United States in the world today. U.S. policymakers must determine what America's current strategy in Afghanistan entails, what it should entail, and how the gaps between normative analysis and empirical reality contribute to the future of U.S. influence in the region. Under what conditions should the United States encourage and support multilateral solutions among the countries in the area, including those discussed and others of relevance not mentioned? How might the United States demonstrate cultural sensitivity toward the region to avoid inflaming anti-American sentiment and political extremism? Lastly, what is the best possible scenario for Afghanistan and its neighbors once NATO leaves, and how close are all those involved to achieving it?

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10

Whither Europe?

Economic Crisis and the Future of NATO

JORDAN BECKER

The transatlantic relationship is America's most enduring and arguably its most important one. The sixty-three-year-old cornerstone of this relationship is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which has evolved from a collective defense arrangement into a mechanism for attaining transatlantic goals globally, as seen most recently in operations in Afghanistan and Libya. But U.S. interests in the region intersect in complex ways with Europe's grand experiment in continental economic integration, the European Union (EU). Twenty-one of the twenty-eight members of NATO are also members of the EU. Indeed, the continent's economic integration is an essential pillar of its regional-security strategy. Through the purposeful blurring of national economic boundaries, European leaders have sought to diminish the risk of interstate conflict. This deep connection between European security and the economic integration of the EU makes the formulation of U.S. foreign policy in the region a challenging venture. How does the United States define its own interests in this region, given that Europe behaves in some ways like a single state, and in other ways like a collection of states?

By 2011, the most urgent item on the transatlantic agenda had become Europe's economic crisis. Indeed, Europe faced not one crisis, but four: (1) high debt and public deficits in both peripheral and core Eurozone countries, (2) a banking crisis affecting private European banks, (3) economic recession and high unemployment in both peripheral and core Eurozone countries, and (4) persistent trade imbalances among Eurozone members.[1] These crises appeared

to threaten the viability of Europe's monetary union, the stability of one of the world's most important currencies, and the cumulative benefits of decades of hard-fought institution building.

As negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership unfold through 2013 and 2014, a successful resolution to these intertwined crises promises significant economic and political benefits for the United States. By late 2013, economic indicators both in Europe's core and its periphery began to suggest that such a resolution was within reach. A complex array of competing narratives arose to explain this improvement. Supporters of the German-backed combination of reform and austerity hailed signs of recovery as vindication;[2] critics claimed that Europe's recovery was both incipient and anemic, offering scant proof that the German approach had succeeded.[3]

While there is guarded optimism around the resolution of Europe's crises, diminished European and U.S. fiscal capacity continues to pose significant challenges for managing not just the current crisis, but broader strategic challenges. Fostering economic growth and democracy in North Africa and managing instability in the Middle East, for instance, become more difficult as the transatlantic economic recovery lags. Many NATO partners appear to be less willing to invest in the alliance's military capacity, reawakening old debates over burden sharing among member states. Leading policymakers have voiced fears of a "two-tiered" NATO, in which some countries contribute effectively to combat operations while others cannot (or will not).[4] What can U.S. policymakers do to help Europe address its crises, while not exacerbating their own domestic crisis? How can the United States influence Europe to support U.S. geostrategic interests while encouraging European states to bear more of NATO's collective security burden?

Europe's Crisis

Europe's sovereign debt crisis erupted in the spring of 2010, when Greece revealed that previous estimates of its budgetary deficit were inaccurate. New estimates for 2009, released in April and November 2010, put Greece's deficit (as a proportion of GDP) at 13.6 percent and 15.4 percent, respectively, significantly over the 3 percent level required for membership in the Eurozone and well over the 12.7 percent previously reported by Greece,[5] with the country's debt-to-GDP ratio projected to rise above 150 percent by 2012. This information led Standard & Poor's to downgrade Greece's debt to "junk" status, forcing interest rates on Greek bonds to rise to over 15 percent to compensate investors for the increased risk of holding these assets.[6] Greece found itself caught in a vicious financial cycle: the extremely high cost of borrowing undermined faith in Greece's ability to repay its bondholders, which increased the threat of a sovereign default, further causing the cost of borrowing to rise.

By late 2011, bond yields in both Italy and Spain had also climbed to rates widely seen as unsustainable.[7] Widening gaps between the interest rates on Spanish and Italian bonds and those on German bonds posed a severe risk to the credibility of the EU's single currency, its monetary union, and the fiscal solvency of EU members. While the crisis began in Europe's periphery, by the fall of 2011 it was boring into the Eurozone's core. Concerns about downgrades of core Eurozone members' credit ratings began to plague European debt markets.[8]

In early 2012, there was some optimism about Europe's ability to manage its quadruple crisis. Investors finally accepted a writedown, or *haircut*, on Greek debt; the International Monetary Fund (IMF) offered a second joint IMF-EU member-state assitance package to Greece; and the European Central Bank (ECB) injected over $1 trillion into ailing private banks. In exchange for agreement on an EU fiscal compact requiring member states to balance their budgets, hawkish member states agreed to increase the size of the rescue fund, by then referred to as the European Stability Mechanism.[9]

Despite all this activity, pressure began to mount on struggling Eurozone members in the second half of 2012. Poor growth figures, unemployment, and trade imbalances continued to bedevil policy responses to the crisis. And domestic politics within a number of European nations called past progress into question. Increased stress on the Spanish banking sector put significant pressure on Mariano Rajoy's government from the *indignado* movement of restive Spaniards, from Euro partners, and from bond markets. Additionally, the gap widened between European states favoring austerity measures and "fiscal rectitude," such as Germany and the Netherlands, and states whose leadership has been more critical of austerity. The election of François Hollande in France in May of that year, coupled with the Greek election in June, highlighted this issue. At the same time, Italy's technocratic prime minister, Mario Monti, seemed to distance himself from Europe's champion of austerity, Germany's Angela Merkel.[10]

In the fall of 2012, the EU and its member states continued to struggle with the management of Europe's quadruple crisis. Economists and policymakers even began to lift the taboo on discussing a "Grexit" (a Greek departure from the Eurozone). The main concern with such a departure was the effect that it would have on market confidence in the rest of the Eurozone, so European policymakers tended to emphasize the uniqueness of the Greek situation.

The Eurozone members aimed to replace the European Financial Stability Facility, set to expire in 2013, with a more permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The ESM's future came into question, however, as Germany's Constitutional Court prepared to consider the legality of the fund itself and the treaty establishing it.[11] As usual, there were strong arguments for a response entailing less cession of sovereignty (and, in this instance, more fiscal rectitude), but also calls for "more Europe," and for more solidarity with debtor states.[12] European policymakers faced an apparently stark choice: deepen their economic union by accepting a degree of fiscal harmonization and sacrificing

a degree of national sovereignty, or loosen their union by allowing countries to leave the Eurozone, thus opening the door to further exits that might imperil Europe's grand experiment.[13]

By late 2013 the Eurozone had made significant progress toward achieving a European banking union—the ECB was functioning as a lender of last resort,[14] and a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), granting the ECB oversight of Eurozone banks, had been approved by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union.[15] ECB President Mario Draghi lauded progress toward a Single Resolution Mechanism, which would formally create a single system, a single authority, and a single fund through which the ECB could recapitalize troubled member-state banks.[16]

After the reforms of 2013 and the resounding affirmation of the Merkel/Schäuble approach in the German elections in autumn 2013, deepening economic union and increasing political integration coexisted uneasily with growing public skepticism throughout Europe toward the European project itself.[17] In Europe, these questions are elemental, but just how meaningful are they to the United States? What outcomes should the United States seek, and what policy tools can it deploy in seeking them?

As an economic matter, the fate of Europe is arguably of great significance to the United States. The U.S.-EU economic relationship is the world's largest, and the EU is the biggest trading partner of the United States, both in merchandise and services. In merchandise, the EU accounts for $239.7 billion (18.7%) in total U.S. exports and for $319.2 billion (18.1%) in total U.S. imports. In services, the EU accounts for $170.2 billion (31%) in total U.S. services exports and $138.5 billion (34.4%) in U.S. services imports.[18] In what sense does this tremendous interdependence create vulnerability for the United States, and in what sense does it create opportunities? How and to what extent should the United States attempt to influence its European partners? Given its own fiscal and financial difficulties, does the United States even have the credibility to try?

European Security

Europe is not only the leading trade partner for the United States, but it is also America's most important security partner. Twenty-six European states (twenty-two of which are current EU members) are allied with the United States through NATO. Just as political crises in the United States cut into the resources available to the Pentagon and the American military, the ongoing

crisis in the Eurozone has made the allocation of resources by individual member-states to national defense (and collective security) an even greater challenge for European allies than it has been in the past. With austerity beginning to bite into defense budgets, the EU has initiated a policy of "pooling and sharing" in defense matters, while NATO has developed a program for "smart defense."[19] As NATO's war in Afghanistan winds down, American policymakers at the highest levels are concerned about their European allies' ability to contribute robustly to the alliance's challenging missions today and global security in the future.

Much was made of former secretary of defense Robert Gates's final address in Brussels in June 2011, in which he referenced the growing impatience in America with dwindling defense expenditures in Europe, using the phrase "dim and dismal."[20] However nuanced Gates's address may have been,[21] and however committed an Atlanticist Gates himself might be, his words prompted serious questions—are "pooling and sharing" and "smart defense" just euphemisms for unrestrained cuts in resources devoted to collective security?

At the same time that conditions of austerity have begun to strain NATO, the United States announced its "Pacific pivot," a refocusing of America's security energies toward Asia, while counting on Europe as a producer, rather than a consumer, of security.[22] Of course, the United States has always been a Pacific power, and the fact that the territorial integrity of European states is not under immediate threat might signify the success of transatlantic security cooperation since World War II, rather than a grave threat to future cooperation. But perceptions matter. And the Pacific pivot has seemed to many to be an Atlantic abandonment. In the United Kingdom, Parliament's Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy concluded that "geographical and functional shifts in U.S. policy . . . [raise] fundamental questions if our preeminent defence and security relationship is with an ally who has interests which are increasingly divergent from our own."[23] Other NATO allies are contemplating adjustments as well; Atlanticist stalwart Poland has begun to warm to stronger EU defense ties, in an attempt to "diversify its security guarantees."[24]

The historic transatlantic bargain has been renegotiated a number of times, in each instance addressing disagreements on burden sharing, but the underlying alliance has remained surprisingly stable. Much has been made recently of the precipitous decline in the percentage of NATO's overall expenditures[25] undertaken by European allies—from 40 percent in 1990 to 25 percent by 2011.[26] A quick glance at this metric over the course of NATO's history reveals a some-



Share of topline NATO military costs borne by the United States and Europe over time

what different story, however: 1990 was a bit of an outlier—one of the highest years in history for the Europeans' NATO cost share, and well above the historical average of around 27 percent. For the majority of NATO's history, the European allies' cost share has hovered between 20 percent and 30 percent, and it has been between 25 percent and 30 percent for most of the past 20 years.

The challenge for the United States, then, is to encourage its European allies to contribute more (and more efficiently) to global security, without alienating allies or exacerbating the current crisis. Can NATO allies really do more with less?

Europe continues to be the "partner of first resort" for the United States, both economically and geopolitically.[27] Ongoing economic, financial, and fiscal challenges on both sides of the Atlantic represent a risk to the security of Europe and the United States. At the same time, defense expenditures contribute to the cost side of the fiscal imbalances that have become such a challenge to many NATO members. As Europe, in particular, embraces policies of austerity that appear likely to impact defense budgets acutely, the United States finds itself struggling to determine where it can exert influence on its European allies, and how. In an era in which both material and reputational resources are

increasingly limited, U.S. policymakers are faced with problematic choices. But such difficulties are not unprecedented. The United States and its allies have had thorny conversations and made hard decisions about burden sharing in the past, and surely will do so again in the future.

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11

Aid, Development, and Human Security

IRVIN OLIVER

Recent history has seen the United States redefine its relationship with Africa from one framed by efforts to maintain political equilibrium in an international context to one shaped by growing human security interests. America's historic belief in the promotion of democracy and the development of reliable global partners and stable political systems has not been realized in Africa, as cohesive, liberal regimes have taken a secondary role to economic interests. While Africa possesses a great measure of economic potential in terms of markets and resources, there are also opportunities to improve human security and political stability across the continent. As the world grows ever more connected, the United States must seek to develop policies and strategies that advance U.S. interests while simultaneously promoting African ones—interests that are as diverse as the continent itself.

U.S. policymakers face a number of questions regarding America's policies toward Africa. What can the United States do to assist in the development of sustainable human security? What role should foreign aid play in efforts to establish sustainable development? Considering the complexities of internal conflicts in Africa, what goals should define U.S.-African relations? How should environmental concerns influence and shape U.S. foreign policy in the region? Is there a role for the United States in humanitarian intervention? What are the security concerns of the United States in Africa, and how can the United States best address them in a period of many kinds of decreasing resources?

Economic Interests

U.S. economic interests in Africa are increasing. Africa is simultaneously one of the fastest-growing regions of the world and still a largely untapped market. Much of the conversation about economic interests and Africa revolves around natural resources. This discussion misses the fact, however, that even apart from these resources, African economies have steadily improved over the last five years, despite the 2008–2009 global downturn. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the economies of sub-Saharan Africa continue to grow and control inflation, despite pockets of civil unrest that remain a weakness for some countries. The IMF projects regional growth rates to accelerate to nearly 6 percent through 2014.[1] In comparison, the IMF projects growth in

Europe to be between 1 and 3 percent in the same time frame. Much of this growth will occur because of rising domestic demand, as African nations had less exposure to global financial markets during the recession, and these countries have since become more attractive to foreign capital. Signs of increasing political stability, or at least a willingness to address many of the causes of instability, contribute to the growing attractiveness of Africa to foreign investors. One need only look at the progress the African Union has made in regional collective-security efforts in Sudan, Ethiopia, and the Ivory Coast. While violence is still all too common, the situation is much more positive than it had been a decade ago. Policymakers should consider the best ways to strengthen these encouraging economic trends. U.S. interests primarily center on energy resources, but there is opportunity elsewhere.

Regional Energy

Improving regional stability and subsequent investments have increased the projections of energy exports from the African continent.[2] The U.S. Energy Information Agency estimates that 11 percent of the world's undiscovered oil sources are in Africa, and much of that is accessible offshore. Today, Nigeria exports almost as much oil to the United States as Saudi Arabia, and that quantity could increase with greater stability in the oil-rich Niger delta region. The National Intelligence Council projects that Nigeria's share of U.S. oil consumption will reach 25 percent by 2015. The vast majority of Africa's oil exports will come from a stretch of coastline between Nigeria and Angola, along the Gulf of Guinea, where an estimated 50 billion barrels of oil reserves are located.[3] Recent finds of new oil fields from the Mauritanian coast to Equatorial Guinea are nearly certain to change the economic, social, and possibly the political situation in West and Central Africa by attracting multinational energy corporations and private industry. This new investment could help African countries to gain a firm economic footing, which may enable greater social and political stability. Alternatively, these countries may succumb to the paradox of plenty—the *resource curse*—and suffer from their newfound wealth. Declining dependence on energy imports in the United States and growing sub-Saharan African energy resources may work in tandem to change both U.S. energy policy and U.S. foreign policy toward Africa.

Other Resources

In addition to their oil resources, African countries also contain an abundance of other natural resources. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is blessed (or perhaps cursed) with plentiful quantities of diamonds, copper, cobalt, gold, and a mineral called coltan, which is vital to the electronics industry. It is estimated that 80 percent of the world's supply of coltan is in the DRC, and recent UN reports, noting that multiple international companies were willing to ignore the source and collection process for these minerals, remain valid.[4] Other states (such as Sierra Leone, Angola, and Botswana) have significant natural resources, and, as with the DRC, it is difficult to ensure that non-state actors, including multinational corporations, do not exploit them. In addition, China has increased its interactions with African states in order to secure access to oil and other natural resources there.

What policies can the United States develop that will ensure long-term U.S. access to Africa's important energy and other resources? What might be the roles and responsibilities of the private sector? How should the United States deal with other nations and their efforts to secure access to natural resources in Africa?

Political and Economic Development

The imperative of stronger political and economic development is clear. Countries that have higher levels of political stability and economic development are less prone to see conflict—both internal and international.[5] For this reason, development clearly falls within the foreign policy objectives of the United States; the 2010 *National Security Strategy* explicitly states that "development is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative."[6] This claim raises an important question: do American actions match such statements?

The issue of development in Africa is too large, however, for the United States to address unilaterally. The United Nations has identified Africa, which contains twenty-five of the world's poorest countries, as the most underdeveloped continent. On September 22, 2010, the heads of state meeting at UN headquarters signed a document pledging to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015:

> We recognize that more attention should be given to Africa, especially those countries most off track to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015.

> Progress has been made in some African countries, but the situation in others remains a concern, not least because the continent is among the hardest hit by the financial and economic crisis. We note that aid to Africa has increased in recent years; however, it still lags behind the commitments that have been made. We therefore strongly call for the delivery of those commitments.[7]

At this meeting President Barack Obama announced the first-ever U.S. global-development policy, which will involve changing how the United States defines "success" in development and leveraging the lessons of the Millennium Challenge Corporation.

The Millennium Challenge Corporation pledged to nearly double the amount of U.S. aid for development in poor countries. This program requires applicants to prove their worthiness by demonstrating a commitment to the rule of law, investment in human capital, and support for free markets. Approximately 70 percent of the over $7 billion that the Millennium Challenge Corporation has invested in programs has gone to African countries. "Country ownership" has started to replace the traditional approach to foreign aid, which generally did not plan for how aid would support economic growth. Under this new approach, nations that respect civil liberties, like Senegal and Ghana, stand to benefit considerably.

How will the new U.S. global-development policy facilitate the development of a self-sustaining, free, secure, and well-governed Africa? Is there a way to leverage U.S. power in the areas of economic and political development through means other than state intervention? Are initiatives linked to the UN's Millennium Development Goals the ideal vehicle for providing aid? Has the United States effectively used these other resources? Are there public/private partnerships available to provide assistance for those who need it the most?

Underscoring these challenges are the impacts of widespread poverty and scarcity in the region.[8] While there are several positive economic indicators, a lack of infrastructure limits the abilities of these poorer states to join in international trade in a way that would make development viable. States like Tanzania have gone from literacy rates of 90 percent following independence to current rates of around 70 percent, further limiting the economic viability of the population. Sub-Saharan African countries have the lowest primary-school completion rates in the world, while average life expectancy has declined from fifty to forty-six years since 1990, primarily due to HIV/AIDS. A history of civil war, political corruption, and a variety of both natural and man-made

catastrophes frames the future of Africa just as surely as early signs of economic prosperity do.

Regional Security Concerns

The Arab Spring that swept across North Africa generated a series of mixed outcomes. While demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt were mostly peaceful, protests in Libya turned into a civil war that quickly became internationalized, with Western forces and African mercenaries involved in the fighting.[9] The United States chose to support the removal of authoritarian regimes mainly from the background, so as not to put an American face on efforts for regime change. U.S. policymakers should consider whether the use of covert action and behind-the-scenes diplomacy were the most effective means to further U.S. foreign-policy objectives, or whether there are better methods to achieve political stability. The results of the Libyan civil war clearly illustrate the foreign-policy difficulties in the region. The removal of authoritarian regimes may serve short-term U.S. interests, but the *new* regimes may also pose challenges. Muammar Gaddafi's death at the hands of Libyan rebels and the subsequent attack against the U.S. consulate in Benghazi highlight this juxtaposition.[10] As political upheaval continues, conflicts in Darfur, the Horn of Africa, and in the DRC have, at times, seemed intractable. Yet as of this writing, in all cases the violence appears to be waning.

Much of the progress has been due to the African Union, whose development has centered on its collective-security operations across the continent. The African Union has been active in a variety of operations in Somalia, Darfur, and the DRC.[11] This illustrates the evolution of African political beliefs. Until the period of violent civil conflicts that raged across Africa through the early 2000s, the prevailing political ideology had favored absolute sovereignty and noninterference. The internationalization of internal conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, however, caused a shift from *noninterference* to *nonindifference*. Through involvement in these conflicts and reflection on their causes, the countries of sub-Saharan Africa have begun to acknowledge that states lacking effective domestic institutions may become fragile and eventually fail. In such countries, the risk of internal conflict increases, as does the risk of instability and violence spreading across their borders via refugee and migration crises.[12] Because failing states pose potential security challenges to their neighbors—and even to non-neighbors, when these failing states provide safe havens for violent non-state actors—their internal situations necessitate a multifaceted approach;

military efforts alone are inadequate. What can the United States do to facilitate greater gains in security in Africa, while not appearing to be overbearing? What security-sector reforms will benefit both Africa and the United States?

Internationalized Internal Conflict

Several recent African wars have begun as civil conflicts, only to expand to the point where neighboring states were drawn in. Wars of this sort are the largest source of instability in Central and West Africa. They also tend to create appalling human security and humanitarian issues. The DRC and Central Africa have seen conflict propagated through child soldiers, physical violence against civilians, and black-market resource exploitation. Sexual assault has been one of the primary means of terrorizing the civilian population in Central Africa, with both government forces and rebel groups responsible for such heinous behavior.[13] While international peacekeeping efforts have had some positive results lately, the weak institutions that plague many countries in sub-Saharan Africa remain a threat to stability.[14] Recent successes, like those in the DRC, contrast with terrorist attacks in East Africa.[15] Civil conflict and local grievances continue to jeopardize economic and political development in Africa.

At what point does regional instability and conflict become a security issue for the United States? Are human rights and security issues sufficient rationales to intervene in regional troubles? If it is within the purview of U.S. national interests, how does the United States project power to these areas in a way that increases the stability of the continent? Should the United States consider using organizations like the African Union to increase stability and security in ungoverned spaces? Should the United States consider intervention in civil conflicts when humanitarian concerns are the sole U.S. interest? What role does the military play in these missions, versus political tools?

Terrorism

Terrorism is a concern only in limited regions across Africa; it is not a pervasive security threat for most of the continent. U.S. efforts in security assistance have centered on counterterrorism and internal defense within African nations, in order to prevent the spread of terrorism south of the Saharan Desert.[16] These preventive-assistance measures represent current U.S. security concerns in the region, although terrorism in East Africa looms as a destabilizing problem. The growing franchise model of al-Qaeda makes groups like al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) a concern in North Africa, and they are a particular

challenge for the new regimes in that region.[17] AQIM is responsible for nearly a dozen attacks against Western interests, including sophisticated assaults employing vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and simultaneous suicide bombings. AQIM possesses the capability to threaten U.S. and Western interests in North Africa and the Sahel. As authoritarian regimes across North Africa have fallen, questions have arisen as to who will govern these states next. There is real concern that Islamist governments may radically alter the political landscape and make Africa a source for more anti-American sentiment.[18] Many in the United States worry that rebels who currently receive U.S. and NATO assistance may someday support terrorism against the United States.[19]

How should the United States engage North African states as their respective regimes evolve from authoritarianism into perhaps more democratic but yet-undetermined forms of government? Should U.S. policy seek to aid the end of authoritarianism, consistent with America's historic support for democracy? Is covert action the ideal vehicle to bolster regime transitions?

Instability in East Africa, primarily in Somalia, threatens to make that region the next safe haven for terrorists. Armed factions like al-Shabaab in Somalia are establishing closer ties to al-Qaeda and may become proxies in al-Qaeda's efforts to conduct terrorist operations against Western, U.S., and local targets. Somalia, however, shows signs of establishing a government that can control what has essentially been an ungoverned space since 1991.[20] How the United States can support this nascent effort is a real question. States with limited resources have proven unable to secure their borders and ports of entry, resulting in opportunities for illegal immigration and organized crime. In these countries, customs and immigration services are generally not well developed, barely trained, inadequately equipped, and poorly paid. As a result, transnational criminals use bribes and violence to coerce or compel concessions from the international community. While incidents of piracy have declined over the last two years, the factors that led to their earlier proliferation remain.[21] These same regional security vulnerabilities can also facilitate the activities of terrorist networks.

Is the United States doing enough to address the potential for terrorist activity in Africa? What roles and responsibilities might the U.S. Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce each have in developing and implementing an integrated policy that addresses new challenges while continuing current successes? To what degree is the present situation a byproduct of American Cold War–policies in the region, and how should those policies differ today?

Does the goal of democratization outweigh the security threats posed by the possibly weak state institutions that would result from a democratization policy?

Human Security Concerns

The concept of *human security*, which includes the root sources of security as well as mere protection from physical violence, is a growing area of emphasis for much of the world. Global entities are increasingly cognizant of the fact that inadequate access to economic opportunity, public health, food, and social stability can be an underlying cause of conflict.[22] To this end, the United States has been a proponent of several aid initiatives meant to improve the level of human development in Africa. In evaluating these initiatives, U.S. policymakers must first consider whether such aid is helping or hurting Africa, since there are good arguments on both sides of the question.[23] If aid is harming Africa, what should the United States do in terms of human security to improve the condition of people in the region? If aid is assisting Africa, what are the best practices in terms of supporting human security? Is direct or indirect aid the most effective vehicle to further human security?

HIV/AIDS

With African states facing HIV-infection rates estimated at 6 percent of the adult population, this epidemic might form one of the greatest threats to stability on the continent.[24] Nor are the effects of this high infection rate confined to the medical realm. In Africa alone, AIDS has orphaned more than 12 million children. As a direct result of AIDS, per capita economic growth in half of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa is falling by around 1 percent each year. HIV infection also increases the incidence of and mortality from other communicable diseases, such as tuberculosis and malaria.

The global response to HIV has recently undergone a significant transformation. Private organizations, such as Partners in Health and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, have increased their funding for research and treatment; these groups have also developed new treatment plans that increase the efficacy of current antiretroviral regimes. President Obama's emphasis on malaria eradication in Africa and the $15 billion HIV program in the United States suggest that the world is not ignoring these major health issues. What other programs have been successful, and how can U.S. policymakers use this information to address future challenges? Can the United States do more, and

is it in the country's national interest to do so? Is HIV/AIDS really a threat to global security and stability?

Displaced Civilian Populations

The wars across the African continent have led to refugee crises from Libya to South Sudan and beyond.[25] Those responsible for these crises across Africa include both state actors, like Sudan's president, Omar al-Bashir, and non-state actors, which complicates the pursuit of justice. The International Criminal Court (ICC) seems like a natural outlet for justice, but to date the ICC has been unable to enforce their indictments.[26] Should the international community, through the United Nations or the African Union, press for justice? What is the U.S. role in this concern, since the United States is not a member of the ICC?

While the issue of South Sudanese independence is now settled, there are still a number of unresolved problems in Sudan. The oil reserves along the still-disputed Sudan–South Sudan boundary may prevent long-term peace and stability. This could lead to yet another round of conflict in a war that has been ongoing since 1955. What would the international community do if faced with another act of de facto genocide?[27] Which actor or organization should lead the humanitarian effort in Sudan as people reorganize following the creation of South Sudan? What should the division of labor be between international and regional organizations? Should the United States stand aside from direct involvement while still supporting the efforts of the African Union to bring stability to Darfur, or is the African Union simply unable to act effectively?

Africa is a highly diverse continent—geographically, politically, economically, and demographically. In an increasingly interconnected world, there are unique challenges and opportunities for the United States in Africa, and the U.S. approach to this continent seems likely to take on more significance over the next several years. Africa presents a host of complex issues and concerns for the United States, ranging from the challenges associated with environmental problems and access to resources, to the potential for violence and instability throughout the region. While the challenges are many, the African continent also presents several opportunities for collaboration and for vast improvements in the lives of millions.

U.S. policymakers should think through these different issues and ponder how the United States can best use limited resources to support and stabilize

this diverse and dynamic region. They should also consider the issues of democratization and human rights. "The United States must support democracy, human rights and development together, as they are mutually reinforcing," according to the 2010 *National Security Strategy*.[28] How might this focus affect the way America develops its relationship with African countries? What are the most effective tools for promoting liberalization and democratization in Africa? Should the United States be more concerned with helping to build effective and legitimate states, even if such states are not immediately committed to democratic rule?

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Center for Strategic and International Studies, Africa Program, www.csis.org/africa/
Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique Centrale (CAAEC) [Economic Community of Central African States, or ECCAS], www.ceeac-eccas.org
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12

Drugs, Crime, and State Fracture

DAVID FAGERGREN AND VIJAY GALLARDO

The three largest producers of coca are countries in the Americas. Colombia, a principal supplier of cocaine and heroin to the U.S. market and the majority of other world markets, was the world's leading cultivator of coca and coca derivatives for the last twenty years.[1] The unfavorable distinction as the world's leader in coca production now belongs to Peru, and cocaine trafficking from that country to Brazil and Chile for shipment to European markets persists.[2] Bolivia, with a 2007 estimated potential of producing 120 metric tons of pure cocaine, comes in third.[3] Mexico is the transit corridor for the great majority of illicit drugs from South and Central America and is itself a major producer of heroin, ecstasy, and marijuana. In addition, it is the biggest supplier of marijuana and methamphetamines to the United States.[4]

The Americas also include the two greatest consumers of cocaine in the world. Not surprisingly, these are the two countries with the most wealth in their respective hemispheres. Brazil, the second-largest consumer of cocaine worldwide, is also a center for money laundering and illicit financial activity, especially in the tri-border region.[5] The United States is the leading global consumer of cocaine, a money-laundering center, and a producer of marijuana, stimulants, hallucinogens, and methamphetamines.[6]

The Americas, then, include both producers and consumers in the drug trade. Accordingly, there are two ways to view the general problem of drug control. First, one can focus on supply. Many in the United States, for instance, point the finger at Central and South America and ask why they cannot control drug

production in their countries. The United States has spent billions of dollars in nations such as Colombia in attempts to eradicate the source of the drugs. On the other hand, one can focus on demand. South and Central Americans point to the United States and ask why Americans cannot control the consumption of drugs in their country. Central and South Americans feel that the drug producers in their nations are merely entrepreneurs filling a demand—without that demand, there would be little interest in the business of production.

While there is merit to both sides of this argument, neither side disputes the fact that the drug trade poses a very serious threat to the Americas. In Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, more than 3,100 people died in clashes between rival drug gangs in 2010 alone;[7] since these clashes began in 2006, more than 60,000

people have died.[8] There are estimated to be between 1.8 and 3.5 million internally displaced persons in Colombia, due to conflict between the Colombian government and drug traffickers.[9] Drug consumption, production, and trafficking are destabilizing entire countries in the Americas.

The Case of Bolivia

To analyze how the drug trade affects domestic stability and international affairs, let us look at the situation in Bolivia. This Andean country's indigenous movement inspires populations across the globe, but critics accuse its socialist government of national retrogression. Bolivia shows how institutionalized discrimination can lead to enduring and severe inequality, today manifesting itself in multiple forms that threaten stability. A focus on Bolivia also calls attention to the responsibilities both drug-producing and drug-consuming nations hold, and it raises a number of environmental, human rights, and law enforcement concerns, all of which are intensified because of the drug trade.

Historical Background

Like most counties in the region, Bolivia's history includes military rule, followed by a transition to civilian leadership. Bolivia stands somewhat apart from the others, though, insofar as it developed a relatively centrist political regime, starting in 1989. Following this transition, the 1990s marked a short period of mostly peaceful transfers of presidential power. By 2000, Bolivia again followed broader regional trends, contributing to what many refer to as Latin America's "left turn."[10] That year, indigenous-left politics began gaining momentum, driven by a wave of radical mobilization, which brought down Presidents Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in 2003 and Carlos Mesa in 2005. Ultimately, Bolivia's presidential office seated six heads of state in nine years. Since 2000, other mass uprisings by the working and indigenous classes further invigorated this movement's shift of political control from the traditional elite classes to the majority: the indigenous population and the peasants.

Economic inequality contributes significantly to the tension between Bolivia's mass populations and its elite. Bolivia is one of the most unequal countries in Latin America, and Latin America is one of the most unequal regions in the world.[11] What's more, the limitations of land as a resource and the inequality of land ownership in Bolivia exacerbate the disparities in individual and family incomes.

The Indigenous-Left Movement

Today's Bolivian conflict stems from the tension between its indigenous left—poor, excluded from positions of influence, and historically without a voice in Bolivian society—and the mostly white *mestizo* and privileged classes of the right, who have traditionally monopolized political and economic power. A number of other factors contribute to this conflict as well: the legacy of the Spanish conquest; the practice of uneven land distribution; a disregard for the well-being of the indigenous population; the poor's experience of abuse through unfair labor practices; and the country's culture of near-apartheid.

In recent years, the political balance has changed. Bolivian leaders are paying attention to indigenous issues and have won popularity by promoting policies that challenge the traditional social and economic status quo. In 2005, Bolivians elected the nation's first fully indigenous president, Evo Morales. He and his party, Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), or Movement toward Socialism, prioritize indigenous issues to an extent not experienced in Bolivia since the Spanish conquest. Meanwhile, some traditional elites have responded by a separatist movement, even formulating a legislative route to regional autonomy for the eastern lowland region of the *media luna*, home to most of the country's developed businesses and productive agriculture.

Violence has broken out on several occasions, causing some Bolivians and outside experts to warn that should the situation worsen, it could lead to civil war. Short of this extreme, there is a real risk of continued or escalated violence. A defiant separatist reaction from the traditional elite, in response to what they consider a threat to their way of life, could fracture the country. Perhaps a more plausible, but equally threatening course is that Bolivia's tradition of disregard for its indigenous population could endure, albeit in a different form.

Separatists and the Autonomy Movement

In the 2002 election, the three neoliberal parties lost badly to the centrist Revolutionary Nationalist Movement and second-place MAS parties. As a result, the Bolivian elites from the lowlands felt they had a diminishing voice in their country's government. The autonomy movement formed shortly thereafter. Some extremists took this idea quite seriously. In the department of Santa Cruz, the president of the Center for Industry, Commerce, Services, and Tourism, which represents about 1,500 companies in the province, proposed "simply and smoothly" seceding from the nation in order to "protect and defend the interests

of its member companies."[12] Though the separatist movement now seems to have lost momentum, had it succeeded, it would have resulted in a Bolivia encompassing less than half of its present size.

The rise of the separatist movement and tensions between racially and economically divided classes underscore Bolivia's difficulties in unifying the country. As a leader from the city of Tarija puts it, there are "two Bolivias . . . that which wants a relationship with the wider world, which wants to improve economically, and that which wants the 500 years, the Bolivia of failure."[13] It is possible to argue, however, that statements like this perpetuate an idea that the country's indigenous inhabitants are wholly unconcerned with opportunities existing in the rest of the world. Indigenous intellectuals, in particular, are very interested in the integration of the young among their communities into a changing world—one that requires the pursuit of education. The policies of both the newer Bolivian political establishment and the traditional elite may impede this goal.

Bolivia and the Contentious Issue of Coca Cultivation

President Morales argues that, rather than focusing on the Bolivian supply of cocaine, the U.S. government should devote more of its energies to reducing Americans' demand for the drug. To those who question whether he is genuinely interested in supporting a tough drug policy, Morales often refers to his own past and his support for coca itself: "I am a coca grower, I cultivate coca leaf, which is a natural product, I do not refine [it into] cocaine."[14] He unabashedly claims that "coca is not cocaine." Public opinion campaigns targeted at the UN, the United States, and regional neighbors say "*coca sí, cocaine no*" ("coca yes, cocaine no"), while promising "zero cocaine and zero narco-trafficking."[15] Morales emphasizes that coca is distinctly separate from cocaine, and that the former can be used for traditional health treatments, as fillers for household products such as toothpaste and shampoos, and for traditional household staples like teas.

Morales's critics, however, argue that the leaf's byproducts are too challenging to control, and that the Bolivian government has yet to determine what quantities of coca meet the licit and illicit demands for it. In a 2005 article, Johann Hari claims that Bolivians he encounters "want to be allowed to grow coca without American interference, including—yes—for the huge global market in recreational drugs."[16]

The drug trade's influence over Bolivian national politics is so strong that some scholars have labeled Bolivia a "narcocracy."[17] Bolivia, its neighbors, and

other countries driving the demand for cocaine in Europe and North America all dedicate enormous resources to counterdrug efforts, with mixed reviews regarding their effectiveness. In counterdrug programs and policy decisions, coca growers are normally regarded as criminals.[18] Coca eradication is conducted by Bolivia's Mobile Police Unit for Rural Areas (UMOPAR), whose forces were trained and assisted by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration until the latter's expulsion by the Bolivian government in 2009.

Farmers are drawn to coca not only for its financial return, but also for the characteristics that make it such a convenient crop to tend: coca provides up to four harvests per year, and it requires little attention relative to alternative crops, such as bananas and pineapple. As a result, those with limited farming experience view coca as a sensible choice. On the other hand, *cocaleros* (coca farmers) live under the shadow of the legal system and UMOPAR, which constantly threaten to interrupt their livelihood. They become entangled in drug trafficking and its related crimes. Growing coca is lucrative but dangerous.[19]

Coca eradication is a highly contentious issue. Not only is it, at best, a short-term fix, but many also argue that in practice, eradication promotes human rights violations. Complete eradication of illegal coca crops is immensely challenging, because of the creative strategies used by growers to hide their coca crops. For example, authorities would previously find coca plantations via satellite, but now they must search within fields dedicated to alternative ventures to locate coca bushes, which have been camouflaged to hide them from satellite observation.

The very same coca-eradication programs that the United States has sponsored set the stage in many ways for the migration of Morales's family, his eventual involvement in local politics, and, ultimately, his association with MAS. A number of other drug-related incidents shaped Morales's career as well: violence toward farmers, their loss of income by having no alternative crops, and beatings of protestors. In fact, Evo Morales himself was thrashed several times in the 1990s while trying to protect farmers' rights. Human Rights Watch reported in 1997 that though human rights violations appeared to diminish during the 1990s, they continued in the Chapare region (where most of Bolivian coca is grown) via the eradication efforts, which were frequently associated with police impunity.[20]

Eradication missions also push the *cocaleros* into national parks—remote locations where growers are less susceptible to attention from law enforcement but more of a threat to the environment. Many have suggested promoting

alternatives to coca, but few crops could provide a competitive wage. According to Bolivian counterdrug law enforcement officials, the transition to alternative crops is particularly difficult, because coca cultivation negatively affects soil quality. Farmers must give the soil time to recover, sometimes for years, before it can support other, legal crops. Though there is land available for alternative crops, many potential palm and banana farmers, for instance, do not shift from coca production, because these alternatives sell at a low price and are more seasonal than coca.[21]

There are also other negative ecological effects of cocaine manufacturing. As a former UMOPAR commander explains:

> The manufacturing of cocaine is very damaging because they use up to 100 square meters to make the wells where they mix the leaf with sulfuric acid, lime, baking soda, and diesel fuel. And this leaks into other lands because the laboratory is always alongside a river or riverbank. Once we find a laboratory, unfortunately, we also have to pollute the environment to destroy it: we have to burn everything that is there, and so there is pollution. The coca growers are also deforesting the rainforest.[22]

Thus Bolivian coca production poses not only political and sociological problems, but environmental challenges as well.

While neighboring countries and other regions in the Americas differ in many respects, Bolivia offers a paradigmatic and instructive instance of how drugs, crime, and state fracture relate to one another. U.S. policymakers must ask how, in light of challenges as multifaceted and seemingly intractable as Bolivia's, they can promote peace and prosperity in the Americas. How should U.S. drug policy balance attempts to reduce the demand for drugs and attempts to eradicate the supply? Can the United States and other international forces reduce the influence of drug traffickers on Latin American politicians and citizens?

Prudent U.S. policy also requires thoughtful engagement with the particular countries that this policy affects. The situation in Bolivia presents a number of unique dilemmas. How are contemporary Bolivian national politics transforming the access the country's indigenous population has to land ownership, labor rights, and educational and economic opportunities? How can the multifaceted drug-related threats to Bolivian stability—political, environmental, and social—be addressed simultaneously? Can Evo Morales deliver on his policy goals, and to what extent do U.S. interests coincide with those goals? There

are regional issues at stake as well. How does the Bolivian case compare with those of its neighbors, such as Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru?

The drug trade presents numerous challenges to the Americas, and these challenges are all the more daunting because few are contained within existing state borders. As U.S. policymakers reflect on these problems, they must be careful to see these issues from many angles: not only from the perspective of the states in question and of the United States itself, but also from the regional, global, and cultural views that open up once one starts to think beyond boundaries.

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PART III / Turning Global Challenges into Foreign-Policy Opportunities

Do global threats erode or reinforce national boundaries? It would seem that nations would work together to address challenges that are too large for any of them to handle alone. Countries might band together to maintain the freedom of the Internet, for instance, since it has proven, in such a short time, to be an invaluable resource. Heidi Brockman and Scott Handler suggest that many nations are currently doing this, bringing norms into an until-now largely unregulated domain. Just as Americans tamed the Wild West, so perhaps can the United States lead these efforts to civilize cyberspace. To craft nuanced policy to address these sorts of novel threats requires the participation of civilian as well as military experts. As Raven Bukowski notes, however, America's military has outweighed its diplomatic instrument during the past decade and more of war. Figuring out how to restore some balance between the Departments of State and Defense is critical to future attempts at democratization. It is also important for ongoing U.S. efforts to rein in the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Paul Larson and Andrew Gallo observe that with the fall of the Soviet Union, uncertainties regarding who has access to nuclear weapons, and in what quantities, have only grown. Now the United States must worry not only about near-peer competitors like the Soviet Union, but also about rogue regimes, irresponsible international actors, and nuclear-armed terrorist groups. It is enough to make one pine for the brutal clarity of the Cold War; it has also been enough (so far) to spur productive international nonproliferation efforts.

Should the United States expect similar collaboration in confronting the challenges of economic globalization and climate change? Todd Hertling claims that the recent economic downturn has empowered globalization's skeptics and emboldened statesmen to consider protectionist measures to bolster national industries. How can the United States secure the gains of recent trade liberalization while acknowledging the legitimate concerns of

countries that have suffered from economic uncertainty? Global cooperation on climate change has proven even more elusive than coordinating global trade policy. John Hagen notes that even apparently straightforward projects like the Keystone XL oil pipeline cause passionate protests on both sides of the issue. In such an atmosphere, more extensive forms of collective action on balancing energy and environmental concerns appear to be distant prospects. And it is not simply a matter of oil scarcity, claims Anne Pope, since other resources—just as vital, in their own way, to modern societies as oil—seem likely to become sparse soon. What will become of global development—and whatever stability there is in the developing world—once inadequate supplies of phosphorous-based fertilizers have caused the price of food to spike?

Whenever there are incentives for collaboration, there are also motivations for self-interested, beggar-thy-neighbor behavior. Individual nations can exploit many areas to satisfy their own interests: the cyber commons, networks of nuclear proliferation, scarce oil, and soon-to-be-scarce resources other than oil. To find, amid these global challenges, the perspective and policy options that transform them into opportunities is the goal of the chapters that follow.

13

Governing the Electronic Commons

HEIDI BROCKMAN AND SCOTT HANDLER

To date, cyberspace is a domain where individuals, governments, the public sector, the private sector, and civil society interact beyond traditional boundaries. Information, data, commerce, and ideas flow freely between physical locations at the speed of light. Many take the fact that cyberspace is a global commons, or *open-access resource*, for granted.[1] Like the American Wild West, risk-taking entrepreneurs—businessmen, thought leaders, and innovators—helped build this newly discovered space. And, just as in the Wild West, where weak governance over nascent territories empowered cattle rustlers and outlaws, the bad flourish alongside the good in cyberspace. High-tech criminals steal from individuals and large businesses, hacktivists vandalize cyberspace or disrupt the flow of information, and states lay claim to areas of cyber terrain that may lead to conflicts in cyberspace as well as terrestrially.

To ensure that cyberspace continues to promote cooperation, communication, and prosperity among people of all nationalities, races, faiths, and ideologies, the United States has an interest in building international support for cyberspace governance.[2] But what does governing cyberspace mean, and what role should the United States play? So far, efforts to achieve global consensus on regulating, taxing, and securing access to the Internet have proven unsuccessful. What, if anything, might make international consensus more achievable?

Defining Norms

Before discussing the three focus areas of communication, security, and prosperity in the U.S. strategy regarding international cyberspace, it is necessary

to understand what norms are. In general terms, *norms* are accepted standards of appropriate behavior. This definition can further include expectations of behavior for "actors with a given identity," which allows for the existence of multiple norms—different norms for certain groups, such as governments, militaries, businesses, or individuals.[3]

Although norms establish accepted standards, they do not institutionalize behavior. That occurs though legalization, especially within the realm of international law. The strength of international law lies along a continuum from *soft law*, which seeks to facilitate compromise and cooperation, to *hard law*, which enshrines pre- and proscripted behavior into precise, legally binding obligations.[4] One can measure this strength according to three dimensions: (1) *precision*, or the level of ambiguity in the definition of prescribed or proscribed behavior; (2) *obligation*, or the variations in boundedness to a rule or commitment; and (3) *delegation*, or the level of authority granted to third parties to "implement, interpret, and apply rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules."[5] This institutionalization process starts with the existence of norms of accepted behavior.

The development of norms generally precedes the development of international law. Norms, however, emerge at different rates. Norms evolve quickly when they are clear, useful, and doable,[6] and they spread most rapidly when they are simple and straightforward. Second, actors must see that following these norms yields benefits that outweigh the costs. Finally, enabling actors to comply with new norms increases the likelihood that they will follow the desired pre- or proscribed behavior.[7] Even norms that have all three of these winning characteristics are not immediately accepted; instead, they follow an evolutionary adoption process that generally involves three stages of development:

1. *norm emergence*—norm entrepreneurs lead an organized movement, taking advantage of existing institutions when possible;
2. *norm cascade*—norm entrepreneurs embark on an international socialization process to persuade or coerce those not following the norms to do so; and
3. *internalization*—mainstreaming to ensure compliance with the norm.[8]

Given this background, policymakers must consider what the ideal norm-evolution process should look like for governing cyberspace. What can the United States do to encourage norm emergence and cascade? How will other

actors perceive a U.S. effort to lead this process? And at what point should the international community focus on developing international legal standards, as opposed to norms, for governing cyberspace?

Communication

Individuals, governments, the private sector, and civil society recognize the benefits of the interactions that cyberspace enables, so each of these groups has a stake in maintaining an interoperable and open network. The issue of communication within the realm of cyber governance has two domains: technical (*interoperability*, or the ability to work with other systems) and interpersonal.

What role do states have in ensuring global interoperability? This capacity is promoted by developing technical standards that allow multiple users and systems to interact across platforms and boundaries. A further component of interoperability is network stability, respecting and enabling the free flow of information between internationally interconnected infrastructures to travel across domestic networks.[9] How should responsibility be shared between the public and private sectors to develop and promulgate technical standards that ensure the security and resiliency of the global infrastructure? And how can the United States promote the development of global standards?

In addition to ensuring interoperability and the technical flow of information across networks, supporting interpersonal openness maintains the freedom of cyberspace. Cyberspace enables people to share information, express opinions, expose malfeasance, and organize social and political movements, on- and offline. At the same time, current weaknesses in cyber security do not guarantee the protection of individual privacy, which may undermine the trust needed to sustain social and political, as well as economic, activity on the Internet.[10] What can the United States do to promote norms that support fundamental freedoms, such as those of expression and association, as well as privacy? How can the United States work with civil society to develop safeguards that protect individuals from arbitrary state interference in their activities on the Internet or from deprivation of access to it? Extending existing human-rights law, as described in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in order to protect fundamental freedoms and privacy is another potential extension of U.S. efforts in cyber governance.[11] How will other nations, such as China and Russia, react toward an expanding U.S. role promoting interoperability and openness in cyberspace?

Security

Security is another multifaceted realm related to cyberspace governance. The technical aspects of security encourage interoperability and openness, but safeguards are also necessary to promote commerce and protect national security. Again, the public and private sectors should work together to develop technical standards to safeguard networks, ensuring their security, reliability, and resilience.

Strategically, cyberspace has joined land, sea, air, and space as the newest domain of warfare. The recognition of cyberspace as an operational domain allows the U.S. Department of Defense to organize, train, and equip the nation's armed forces to support national-security interests that are specific to their missions and to challenges in cyberspace. The military now has clear strategic guidance to prevent adversaries from exploiting, disrupting, denying, or degrading the networks and systems on which this department relies.[12] The Department of Defense's cyber strategy supports the White House's effort to develop a norm of cyber security—namely, that nations have a responsibility "to protect information infrastructures and secure national systems from damage and misuse."[13]

While countries still maintain their right of self-defense in response to aggressive acts by others, consistent with article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the rules for how to apply this principle to twenty-first-century cyber security challenges are not clear.[14] The White House's strategy for national defense is based on the principles of dissuasion and deterrence. The United States can dissuade adversaries from attacking by creating robust defenses, as well as mitigation plans to isolate and limit the damage from successful attacks. Deterrence demands that the United States elevate the cost associated with executing an attack beyond the perceived benefit any adversary hopes to achieve.[15] One challenge with cyber attacks, however, is *attribution*, or the ability to verify the source of an attack. Further, with ubiquitous information technology, it is challenging and expensive for defenders to increase an attacker's cost beyond any perceived benefit.[16] What would the United States need to do to overcome these challenges to deterrence? How can the United States promote norms that create taboos for certain behaviors by state or non-state actors in cyberspace?[17] Are there alternative national-security strategies the United States can pursue besides dissuasion and deterrence, whether through diplomacy or by strengthening public and private partnerships?

Prosperity

Cyberspace has enabled the generation of vast wealth. The existing openness and interoperability of the Internet have facilitated commerce at all levels: from small businesses to multinational corporations, and between individuals. Cyberspace is thus a potential tool to promote domestic and international economic development. Long-term investment in cyber infrastructure can provide access to new markets for goods and services. Should the United States sustain and expand the current free-trade environment, institutionalized in the form of the World Trade Organization, so as to allow governance over economic activity in cyberspace? What responsibility does the United States have to share technology with others, in order to empower less-advantaged populations?

While ventures within cyberspace have created enormous wealth, due to innovation, investments in intellectual capital have also become the target of cyber theft, leading to unprecedented volumes of illegal wealth transfer.[18] How can the United States promulgate norms or international laws that guarantee respect for property? What incentives will induce nations to protect and enforce intellectual-property rights—patents, trade secrets, trademarks, and copyrights—through their domestic laws and judicial systems?

Sustaining open and interoperable communications while providing security and spreading prosperity requires states and non-state actors to think about how to govern cyberspace. So far the White House has addressed this contemporary challenge to U.S. foreign policy by promoting norms. Yet while norms developed in each of the issue areas discussed in this chapter can be mutually supportive, those evolving in one area might also threaten effectiveness or efficiency in another. One of the major challenges in crafting governance norms for cyberspace is determining how to balance competing interests. What are the necessary security compromises that must be made to ensure that citizens are protected from unfettered surveillance? What necessary compromises in America's civil liberties must be made to protect its citizens from multifaceted threats, both criminal and national-security related? What is the balance between encouraging private-sector-driven prosperity and keeping the Internet open and secure? To address these vexing and still-emerging questions requires policymakers to think beyond the boundaries that divide norms from laws, the private from the public sectors, and nations from one another.

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14

Foreign-Policy Challenges in 3D

Diplomacy, Democracy, and Development

RAVEN BUKOWSKI

Since the successful execution of the Marshall Plan after World War II, foreign aid has become a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. Whether financial, economic, developmental, or security focused, U.S. foreign aid combats the real enemies of democracy: hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.[1] And it does so for a fraction of the cost of military intervention. President Harry Truman, who formalized foreign aid as a component of U.S. foreign policy in 1948, understood the power of this form of assistance to shape the economies and institutions of recipient states. Truman also recognized that underdeveloped and impoverished states can quickly destabilize and fail, threatening both the freedom of local populations and, by extension, the security of the United States. But material assistance, coupled with American leadership to create legitimate political institutions, can mitigate the conditions that weaken peace and stability. In many cases, foreign aid was instrumental in stemming the influence of Communism in developing nations.

Although the free world no longer faces the Communist menace that challenged Truman, many impoverished and underdeveloped areas are still susceptible to a host of security concerns and threats to democratic ideals. Illiberal ideologies and illicit economic activities are more likely to take root where governance is weak, access to education and health care is limited, and economic productivity is low. Not only is human security in these regions endangered, but more direct threats to U.S. national security—such as terrorism and weapons proliferation—can emerge. Historically, the United States has maintained nearly unlimited capabilities to address these threats and shape the

environments where they develop. A robust and resource-rich U.S. interagency policy apparatus has used a mixture of hard and soft power to influence global actors and address threats to national security, with hard power playing a leading role in the last decade.

As the United States confronts transnational threats in an era of greater fiscal austerity, however, it can no longer rely on cost-intensive hard power to establish its policy aims worldwide. Although the U.S. military possesses an impressive operational capacity, the recent practice of turning to the Pentagon to implement American policy goals abroad has created the image of an overmilitarized U.S. foreign policy and has hollowed out civilian institutions in the process.[2] Decisions about where to assume risk must be made. To what extent can soft forms of democratization take the place of hard ones? At what level should the soft weapons in the U.S. arsenal be funded, relative to the inherently more costly and capital-intensive tools of hard power? In order for the United States to maintain a hold on the reins of global order, it must answer these questions and determine a more appropriate, cost-effective balance of hard and soft policy-implementation tools.

Elements of U.S. Power: Inextricable Linkages?

Theorists of international relations understand *power* as the ability to influence outcomes. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the United States has demonstrated a remarkable ability to do so worldwide by employing a combination of strategies, both enticing and compelling other states into accordance with its policies. Joseph Nye makes a distinction between these strategies by describing the power to entice or attract as *soft power*, and the power to coerce as *hard power*. Both types of power can influence outcomes, but an excessive reliance on either approach will fail to produce an effective foreign policy.[3] Traditionally, the application of hard power is the business of the military; soft power, on the other hand, can be applied by the military or by civil society, but it is most clearly identified with the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).[4] Other tools of soft power take the form of economic incentives or sanctions. When executed successfully, both diplomacy and development initiatives use soft power to change the incentive structures of foreign leaders and populations, either diminishing the allure of communism and terrorism or challenging the expansion of these forces.[5]

In the past decade, however, the United States has come to rely on the tools of hard rather than soft power to achieve its policy aims worldwide. Not only

has the U.S. military used force against threats to American security in unstable regions, but it has also initiated development projects, helped organize and monitor elections, provided humanitarian relief and medical care, and even promoted cultural events to encourage democratic values and social change. In most cases, civilian experts from the Department of State or USAID work alongside the military to enable the successful use of soft power, but this has not prevented the U.S. military from becoming the most visible means of delivering foreign assistance. Mark Duffield describes this phenomenon as "the new wars," or conflicts which blur conventional boundaries between people, the army, and government.[6] The troops involved find themselves working with civilians from the mission (government/international institutions), on the fringes of the mission (nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs), and outside the mission (the local population). Given the cultural differences between military and civilian aid agencies, cooperation can be difficult. Aid workers often regard the military as out of touch, bureaucratic, and, in many cases, misplaced, while some in the military see aid workers as undisciplined, disorganized, and resistant to military coordination.[7]

This instance of the civil-military divide can be witnessed not just in theaters of war, but also in the expansion of U.S. military intervention in Africa.[8] The U.S. Africa Command has become the first combatant command to have an increased soft-power mandate to pursue a broader interagency approach to security.[9] The mission of the Africa Command now focuses on preconflict operations, to "prevent problems from becoming crises and crises from becoming conflicts."[10] Despite this attempt to mitigate the conditions that lead to failed states, the ways and means of this strategy have further blurred the lines between the roles and responsibilities of civilian and military branches of the U.S. government abroad—one of the major concerns raised by aid and development organizations.[11]

Many criticize the U.S. military for wielding tools of soft power traditionally used only by civilian agencies. Military-led development overseas, these critics claim, leads to imperial overextension and tries the patience of America's longtime European and Asian allies.[12] These critiques, combined with Nye's claim that the Iraq War dealt a major blow to the potential reach of American soft power, call into question the long-term utility of relying on hard-power capabilities to achieve soft-power effects. "There are limits to what hard power can achieve on its own," Nye writes. "Democracy, human rights, and civil society are not best promoted with the barrel of a gun."[13] Even former secretary of defense Robert

Gates has noted this imbalance in the execution of foreign policy. Given the "decisive role reconstruction, development, and governance plays in any meaningful, long-term success," he pointed out in a 2007 speech, "field artillerymen and tankers building schools and mentoring city councils" are "no replacement for the real thing—civilian involvement and expertise."[14] Amid calls to expand civilian capacity, Gates also highlighted the disproportionate amount of governmental funding for nonmilitary U.S. foreign-affairs programs, identifying the need for "a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security—diplomacy, strategic communication, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development."[15]

In response to the trend toward an increased use of hard power, the U.S. Department of State proposed a plan to institute sweeping reforms to its own size, structure, and core missions. In 2010, the department published the first *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, a comprehensive blueprint elevating American "civilian power" so as to better advance national interests and complement the U.S. military.[16] While then secretary of state Hillary Rodham Clinton moved quickly to increase the size of the State Department's budget following the publication of the review, spending on soft-power tools failed to reach even $50 billion, a mere fraction of the defense budget of roughly $700 billion. Former diplomat Peter van Buren has noted that "the whole of the Foreign Service is smaller than the complement aboard one aircraft carrier."[17] Clearly, three Ds characterize U.S. foreign policy: diplomacy, development, and defense. In America, a democratic nation founded on the principle of civilian control of the military, one might worry that the third D has come to overshadow the other two. Would it be better for the United States to reconceive the third D altogether, so that it represents the policy objective of promoting democracy, rather than defense?

The Challenge of the Third D: Replacing Defense with Democracy

Although leaders have identified the need for a shift from hard- to soft-power instruments of U.S. foreign policy, the transition faces four principal challenges. First, direct threats to national security will always require the use of hard power along with soft power. Because security is a precondition for development, the higher the level of instability in a region, the lower the degree of interchangeability between the tools of hard and soft power.[18]

Second, the transition from hard- to soft-power tools requires a more robust soft-power bureaucracy, equipped not only with the organizational reach, but also with the legitimacy to take on a more prominent role in U.S. foreign-policy missions worldwide. Although the Department of State is attempting reform, many official instruments of soft power—such as public diplomacy, broadcasting, exchange programs, development assistance, disaster relief, and foreign military sales—are scattered throughout the government, with no overarching strategy to integrate them.[19]

Third, funding the transition from hard- to soft-power tools will be costly; advocates of soft-power expansion will have to battle the Department of Defense for resources that may appear to be spent more efficiently on military units conducting soft-power missions. In order to win additional resources, a more capable bureaucracy must be established. But which will come first—the funding, or the new, robust bureaucracy?

Fourth, the U.S. Army's new land-power strategy of regional alignment plans to use combat troops for the soft-power purpose of engagement and relationship building with military partners around the globe. While military partnership activities and foreign-military sales programs are proven ways to extend U.S. soft power and promote civil-military relations, engagement missions by the American military that overshadow civilian endeavors run the risk of empowering foreign military institutions at the expense of civil society, as is the case with Egypt.[20] According to a recent Pew Research Center poll, Egypt's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has enjoyed higher approval ratings than other Egyptian political parties.[21]

The U.S. Departments of State and Defense both realize that security and development missions are inextricably linked and are mutually reinforcing in volatile areas; it is for this reason that each agency has developed capabilities to prevent and to respond to crisis and conflict. One of the many goals the State Department outlines in its *Quadrennial Review* is to take the lead in operations responding to political and security crises, while USAID spearheads those responding to humanitarian crises. Yet the State Department has been slow to build capabilities that have sufficient resources to deal with these crises effectively. In 2004, the department created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to manage postconflict stabilization operations. Problems with staffing and funding, however, combined with mission creep into the operational capacity already provided by the Department of Defense,

marginalized this office and relegated it to the fringes of the State Department's bureaucracy.[22]

To address this outcome, the State Department recently reorganized the Reconstruction and Stabilization office and created the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations to provide a single, integrated strategy for the U.S. government and to identify priorities that offer direction for all. Fully enabling the mission of this office, however, will require increased integration between Washington, D.C., and diplomatic country teams in conflict zones, as well as the empowerment of Chiefs of Mission by the National Security Council. This may subordinate the military component of a given operation to the discretion of the Chief of Mission, who is intended to perform the role of the chief executive officer of a multiagency mission.[23] Ideally, an earnest reconfiguration of the primacy of effort in this domain will not only streamline U.S. foreign-policy goals in volatile areas, but showcase U.S. civilian agencies as leading the charge in stabilization and democratization.

As the U.S. government continues to tighten its belt, it faces something of a paradox in managing its hard- and soft-power capacities: in many cases soft power seems to be more cost-effective than hard power, yet transitioning from hard to soft power requires funding that is increasingly difficult to find. Decisionmakers who are protective of ongoing defense initiatives will attempt to safeguard American military responses to diplomacy and development missions, arguing that hard-power tools can achieve the same effects of soft-power tools, as well as doing so in more areas and more efficiently. This approach, however, may weaken the long-term effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy. Over the past several years, Congress has demonstrated slow progress in favoring the State Department over the Department of Defense in funding stability operations. Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act authorized the Department of Defense to transfer to the State Department "up to $100 million per fiscal year in defense articles, training, or other support for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries."[24] Originally set to expire at the end of 2012, this Global Security Contingency Fund made State Department stabilization missions a function of the Department of Defense's military operations. The Senate Armed Services Committee's intent was to provide "early civilian resources to avert a crisis that could otherwise subsequently require U.S. military forces to assist or intervene."[25] When extending these funds beyond 2010, congressional appropriators sensed that the State Department should have responsibility for stabilization and re-

construction dollars, but they attributed the allocation of existing funding under the Department of Defense to the State Department's lack of capacity to "handle" it. At that point, Congress was "disappointed that the Department of State has not yet achieved the capacity to fulfill its statutory requirements." In order for the State Department to assume responsibility for most, if not all, of this funding, the appropriators recommended that USAID and the State Department should "continue to establish and bolster crisis prevention and response capabilities."[26] This language indicates that augmented future funding will come with increased capacity, yet the State Department first needs a greater amount of funding so it can expand its capacity.

Meanwhile, in order to avoid the swing of the budget cutters' axe, instruments of hard power are becoming increasingly all-purpose. They are outpacing the performance of soft-power instruments in delivering foreign assistance. If the mission of the State Department continues to take a back seat to that of the Department of Defense in terms of soft-power delivery, then the most important U.S. foreign-policy vehicle may break down. In a world fraught with uncertainty and instability, is America really in need of a one-dimensional foreign policy brandishing the bumper sticker "Democracy and Development by Defense?"

Finding the Most Intelligent Mix of Smart Power

Hillary Rodham Clinton began her tenure as secretary of state by stressing the need to elevate civilian power alongside military power through an integrated smart-power approach to solving global problems.[27] *Smart power*, a term originally coined by Joseph Nye in 2004, is a combination of the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction. Clearly, both forms of power are necessary to accomplish U.S. policy aims worldwide, but positive results from policy implementation depend on combining hard and soft power into successful strategies in varying contexts.[28] Today, the State Department and USAID operate on limited funding, often being overshadowed by the Department of Defense in areas requiring a military presence. Although the presence of hard power can boost the legitimacy of soft power in certain situations, the generally marginal role of U.S. civilian agencies with respect to the Department of Defense presents a serious risk in America's ability to attract, shape, and influence relationships abroad. Should U.S. policymakers fund and empower civilian agencies, placing them in the lead on all foreign-policy initiatives, while incrementally reducing the presence of hard-power

mechanisms delivering soft-power effects? Or should they continue to invest in military capabilities that have a dual use, delivering both soft and hard power?

Intelligently applied smart power increases the opportunities to rely on soft power rather than hard. As the United States influences alliances, builds coalitions and partnerships, and reinforces existing networks and institutions, other countries will become more willing to share global responsibility. Successful smart power will attract partner nations that can share the burden, enabling the United States to further streamline its security and foreign-policy missions and become a more efficient global leader. While a concerted effort to achieve this transition will certainly require greater expenditures in the next decade, it may save the United States billions of dollars in the long run and renew the image of American foreign policy abroad—a benefit which, even in lean times, cannot easily be measured in dollars.

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1. "A Brief History of US Foreign Aid," www.bcps.org/offices/lis/models/foreignaid/history.html.

2. Joseph S. Nye, "The War on Soft Power," *Foreign Policy* (12 Apr 2001): 4.

3. Joseph S. Nye defines soft power as "the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes." Nye developed the term "smart power" to counter the misperception that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy. See Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 20–22.

4. Hard-power resources can be used to fight and destroy, back up threats in coercive diplomacy, promise protection, and provide many forms of assistance. See Nye, *Future of Smart Power*, 41.

5. Carol Lancaster, *Foreign Aid* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 3.

6. Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security* (London: Zed Books, 2001). This lack of distinction between actors can be damaging to the mission of NGO aid agencies, as impartiality and neutrality are important humanitarian ethics. Close work with government agents, such as diplomats or military members, can violate these principles.

7. Ibid., 58–60.

8. John Feffer, "Dumb and Dumber: Obama's 'Smart Power' Foreign Policy Not Smart at All," *World Post*, 6 Sep 2012, www.huffingtonpost.com/john-feffer/obama-foreign-policy_b_1860816.html.

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14. Robert M. Gates, "Landon Lecture," lecture at Kansas State University, 26 Nov 2007, www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199/.

15. Ibid.

16. U.S. Department of State, *The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading through Civilian Power* (U.S. Department of State, 2010).

17. Feffer, "Dumb and Dumber."

18. McFate, "U.S. Africa Command," 4.

19. Nye, "War on Soft Power," 4.

20. As of this writing, Egypt is the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid, after Israel. For many years Egypt has enjoyed a high level of foreign-military financing and foreign-military sales, as well as the benefit of joint military exercises and access to U.S. military-training programs. The close partnership between the U.S. and Egyptian militaries enhances the power and prestige of Egyptian military leaders within its own society, often above that country's civilian leaders. This power is illustrated in Egypt's 2013 constitution, which empowers the military to appoint its own leaders and try civilians in military courts.

21. Richard Wike, "Egyptian Military Gets Higher Ratings than Most Political Parties," *FactTank*, Pew Research Center, 1 Jul 2013: www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/07/01/egyptian-military-gets-higher-ratings-than-most-political-parties/.

22. Heather Price, "The Future of S/CRS—What's in a Name?" *Journal of International Peace Operations* 6, no. 5 (Mar–Apr 2011): 31.

23. Edward Marks and Christopher Lamb note that "the S/CRS never really had the advantages of an 'S' or Secretary-level office designation. . . . S/CRS was designed to address interagency collaboration issues on behalf of the Secretary; however, unlike other coordination offices (e.g., counterterrorism), it is buried where its mandate will not be as clear." See Marks and Lamb, "Implementing the QDDR," *Interagency Journal* 3, no. 1 (winter 2012): 9–12.

24. Nina M. Serafino, *Department of Defense "Section 1207" Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 28 Jan 2010).

25. Ibid., 4.

26. Ibid., 5–6.

27. U.S. Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, 2.

28. Nye, *Future of Power*, xiii–xiv.

15

Securing Peace and Stability

PAUL LARSON AND ANDREW GALLO

No nuclear war was fought between the United States and the Soviet Union, but generations lived with the knowledge that their world could be erased in a single flash of light. . . . Now, understand, this matters to people everywhere. One nuclear weapon exploded in one city—be it New York or Moscow, Islamabad or Mumbai, Tokyo or Tel Aviv, Paris or Prague—could kill hundreds of thousands of people. . . . So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. I'm not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime. PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA

The challenge that nuclear weapons pose to the United States and its allies is more complex today than ever before. To be sure, with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Americans relaxed their fear of immanent annihilation. Yet this does not mean that the threat of nuclear weapons has completely dissipated. Rogue regimes such as Iran and North Korea are, arguably, set on acquiring nuclear-weapons technologies and would use them to deter the United States and threaten U.S. allies. Terrorist groups such as al Qaeda have also been interested in acquiring fissile material in order to attack targets in the United States and other Western countries. How should U.S. policymakers manage the risks these threats pose?

Nuclear Deterrence in Theory and Practice

Nuclear arms are the world's most deadly weapons. The destructive power that the United States unleashed on Japan in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II was so immense that U.S. policymakers were immediately concerned with how to prevent the proliferation of this technology to America's adversaries. The United States was not able to keep its nuclear advantage for long, however; Russia acquired nuclear weapons in 1949, and China in 1964. Shortly

thereafter, the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in an arms race against each other—each acquiring additional, and more deadly, nuclear weapons and aiming them toward each other. At the height of the arms race, the United States and the Soviet Union had tens of thousands of nuclear weapons pointed at each other.

From a strategic and theoretical perspective, the concept of deterrence underpinned this arms race. According to this logic, in order to prevent an adversary from initiating an attack against America or its allies, the United States must be capable and willing to inflict unacceptable damage on that adversary. Thus, during the Cold War, if the Soviet Union were to have struck the United States, they would have known that the United States would retaliate using overwhelming destructive force. Because both sides would ultimately lose in such an exchange, each side was deterred from taking the offensive against the other.

The full development of the theory of nuclear deterrence took time, however. Donald Snow claims that the Soviet Union's possession of nuclear weapons, rather than the development of the weapons themselves, was the proximate cause of deterrence theory:

> Before Soviet acquisition of a delivery capability against the United States, nuclear deterrence was no more than U.S. self-restraint. The weapons even seemed to be useful for purposes of coercive diplomacy, to gain Soviet compliance with American demands. American vulnerability to nuclear attack changed all that, and resulted in the emergence of a large, sophisticated body of thought on nuclear deterrence.[1]

Thomas Schelling offers an explanation for the utility of threatening to use force to achieve desired diplomatic or national-security outcomes:

> The only purpose [of violence], must be to influence somebody's behavior, to coerce his decision or choice. To be coercive, violence has to be anticipated. And it has to be avoidable by accommodation. The power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy—vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy.[2]

Schelling goes on to argue that "deterrence rests today on the threat of pain and extinction, not just on the threat of military defeat."[3]

Agreement or disagreement with a given deterrence theory largely (although not always) corresponded to one's beliefs about what constituted "unacceptable" damage to the aggressor state. For example, scholars and national-

security practitioners vigorously debated whether the Soviet Union would have been more readily deterred if the United States targeted Soviet military installations or its population centers instead. They were basically asking a fundamental question regarding an adversary's mindset: which did the Soviet leadership value more—its people or its military forces? There were many answers, and each had implications for the size, posture, and character of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

An essential factor in the deterrence calculation—both in the past and today—is the concept of credibility. In order for U.S. forces (nuclear or otherwise) to have their intended deterrent impact, adversaries must believe that the United States is both politically and technically capable of attacking targets of value. Further, adversaries need to believe that the United States has credible retaliatory options in the event of being attacked, and that America would prove resilient in the event of a nuclear exchange.[4] U.S. policymakers therefore spent considerable efforts determining what balance of forces, capabilities, exercises, and nuclear tests would make U.S. nuclear forces most credible.

Over time, the decisions emerging from those debates (which were held in both Moscow and Washington, D.C.) resulted in the nuclear postures taken by the United States and the Soviet Union. These postures were designed to underscore the "mutually assured destruction" that each could inflict on the other. The tens of thousands of nuclear warheads possessed by these two nations were placed on a variety of delivery systems that could be used both for an initial attack and as part of a retaliatory strike. Thus the nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers became the method of ensuring that the United States could respond to a Soviet strike no matter what. Indeed, mutually assured destruction (MAD) became the dominant logic of deterrence for a considerable period during the Cold War. The acronym MAD may even have been an intentional reference to the absurdity of the national-security paradox it represents.

Yet debates on credibility and MAD were at odds with an emerging nuclear taboo. Early in the post–World War II period, U.S. leaders, including President Harry Truman, began questioning whether nuclear weapons should be used at all.[5] The vast destructive power of nukes made them truly extraordinary, which, in turn, separated them from other types of military munitions in the eyes of leadership in the United States (and eventually in other nations). This "separateness" contributed to a strong preference not to use these weapons in warfare—despite the fact that occasions arose when they might have

proven useful, such as during wars in Korea or Vietnam.[6] Over time, this turned into a norm of nuclear nonuse; as Nina Tannenwald argues, the notion of nuclear use became "contrary to Americans' perceptions of themselves."[7] Eventually, scholars and leaders alike began to question whether the United States was, in fact, self-deterred from using nuclear weapons, thus undermining the credibility of the nuclear arsenal—and eroding its utility for deterrence.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Let us return to the early days of the nuclear era. Almost immediately after detonating its nuclear weapons in Japan, the United States sought ways to put the genie back in the bottle. For example, the Baruch Plan was developed at the request of President Truman in 1946, wherein the United States would surrender its nuclear weapons in exchange for assurances that no other nation would acquire them. The Soviet Union, already on the path to gaining its own nuclear weapons, rejected the plan.

Complicating matters, many nations sought nuclear technology as a source of "clean" energy. It was in this context that President Dwight Eisenhower delivered his "Atoms for Peace" speech in 1953, which led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA was designed to promote the peaceful use of atomic technology, providing inspectors and support to nations seeking to understand peaceful nuclear applications. Scientists around the world began learning about the dynamics of nuclear energy. Yet as the U.S.-Soviet arms race began to crescendo, nations across the globe became increasingly concerned with a further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The deadly struggle between the two powers already possessing these weapons was increasingly perilous. How much more dangerous would the world be if still more nations acquired this type of nuclear technology?

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was born of these concerns, and it has served as the foundation for global nuclear-arms control for decades. The treaty gives the right to maintain arsenals to those nations that had acquired nuclear weapons prior to 1968: the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France. Other signatory nations foreswore nuclear-weapons technology in exchange for continued assistance with their own nuclear-energy programs and assurances that the nuclear-weapons states would disarm as soon as possible. As a result, the IAEA's role was recalibrated to help ensure that the nonnuclear-weapons states were using nuclear technology for exclusively peaceful purposes.

So far so good. Not all nations became NPT signatories, however, which eventually led to questions regarding the efficacy of the treaty itself. Israel, Pakistan, and India never signed the NPT; all of these nations have, or are presumed to have, nuclear-weapons programs. Complicating matters, regime changes have caused some nations to revisit their decision to foreswear nuclear-weapons technology. Iran is a notable example, as it appears to have been conducting its own covert nuclear-weapons program for the better part of two decades.

In addition to these serious policy disagreements regarding the NPT, technical complications also exist. While nations around the world have the right to nuclear-energy technology, as the case of Iran demonstrates, many of the methods and materials used to produce nuclear energy can be diverted for use in weapons programs. As a result, the international community has sought to place ever-more-stringent safeguards on nuclear materials. Yet NPT enforcement remains a pernicious challenge.

Finally, the barriers to acquiring nuclear weapons have lessened, particularly since the end of the Cold War. The large Soviet arsenal—and the infrastructure surrounding it—has suffered considerable disrepair since the end of the Cold War, and post–Soviet Russia simply has not had the financial resources to maintain its Cold War standards. This has led many policymakers to become deeply concerned about "loose nukes"—that is, the ability of Russia to properly maintain and account for its nuclear weapons and associated fissile materials.

Beyond the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Chemical and Biological Weapons

Chemical and biological weapons are usually included alongside nuclear weapons under the familiar label "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD). Chemical and biological weapons, however, are regulated by their own treaties, which in many cases operate differently than the NPT. One must therefore consider the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons apart from the question of nuclear proliferation.

The chemical-weapons regime was formally established by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997.[8] The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established to implement the treaty and monitor and verify state compliance. Under the CWC, seven countries agreed to eliminate the chemical weapons in their possession, and 190 states-parties

accepted inspections by the OPCW of facilities that could produce or contain chemical weapons, Syria being the most recent (in October 2013). The CWC bans the following activities: developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, or retaining chemical weapons; transferring chemical weapons, whether directly or indirectly; using or preparing the military to use chemical weapons; assisting, encouraging, or inducing other states-parties to engage in CWC-prohibited activities; and using riot-control agents "as a method of warfare."

The CWC's verification system differs from the NPT/IAEA system in several respects.[9] Since the CWC requires each of the states-parties to declare all of their chemical-weapons stockpiles and chemical-weapons production facilities, the inspections regime must verify (1) the cessation of chemical-weapons programs, (2) nondiversion of relevant materials from the chemical industry, and (3) the absence of clandestine activities. This means that the OPCW must evaluate two types of state declarations during its inspections: assurances of progress on the dissolution of chemical-weapons programs and the destruction of such facilities, and attestations regarding commercial and industrial activity related to dual-use chemicals.

The Chemical Weapons Convention called on signatory countries to destroy their stockpiles of chemical weapons. The OPCW confirmed in July 2007 that Albania had become the first country to have done so with its declared chemical weapons, and since that time other countries have followed suit. Observers. however, have expressed doubts that all nations that agreed to the CWC will be able to eliminate their chemical weapons, owing to technical and legal challenges. It is suspected that some signatories (such as Iran and China) and several countries that have not ratified the CWC (like Egypt, Israel, and North Korea) may still be developing or producing chemical weapons.

The nonproliferation regime for biological weapons is based on two multilateral treaties. The Geneva Protocol, signed in 1925, prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which was opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975, establishes international norms against the possession or development of biological weapons and represents the first multilateral treaty banning an entire category of weapons. The BWC currently has 155 participating states-parties that are prohibited from developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring, or retaining biological agents, toxins, or weapons or the means of their delivery. Signatories are further obligated not to transfer these items to any recipient, group of states, or international organization. The BWC is supplemented by

an *export-control regime*, the Australia Group, created in 1985. This regime involves a voluntary political agreement that seeks to coordinate the national-transfer policies and licensing procedures of participants; ideally, it ensures that trade in certain materials and dual-use equipment by industries will not lead to a proliferation of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.

While no nation publicly acknowledges either a biological-weapons program or stockpile, several nations are considered, with varying degrees of certainty, to have some biological-weapons capability: China, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Russia, and Taiwan.[10] The covert development of biological weapons, especially in states that have not signed the BWC, remains hard to detect.

According to a February 2008 report to Congress, the Central Intelligence Agency has identified several dangerous trends regarding the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.[11] Advances in biotechnology, including genetic engineering, may produce a wide variety of live agents and toxins that are difficult to detect and counter; in addition, new chemical-weapons agents and mixtures of chemical and biological agents are being developed. Some countries once dependent on imports are becoming self-sufficient in producing such agents. Some nations are also using the natural overlap between military and civilian applications of chemical and biological materials to conceal the production of chemical and biological weapons. Thus controlling the exportation of dual-use technologies grows ever more difficult. Not only the weapons themselves, but also their designers have started to proliferate. Scientists with experience in the production of chemical and biological weapons continue to leave countries that were part of the former Soviet Union. Both these scientists and such weapons are attractive to non-state actors as well as nation-states. About a dozen terrorist groups have sought chemical, biological, and nuclear materials or expressed interest in them; several countries with chemical- and biological-weapons capabilities have sponsored terrorists. For all of these reasons, countering the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons is a daunting challenge.

As these types of weapons proliferate, systems for delivering them, including cruise and ballistic missiles, have become more sophisticated and widespread. Dozens of countries have or are developing short-range ballistic missiles, and even more nations are likely to buy them. Over eighty countries have cruise missiles, and about forty nations manufacture or have the ability to manufacture them. The United States is the most prolific exporter of cruise-missile systems,

while North Korea is the world's leading exporter of ballistic missiles and related technologies.

Non-State Actors

The most obvious shortcoming of nonproliferation regimes is that the treaties are designed to regulate, monitor, and verify the actions of state-to-state proliferation—not to curb the activities of non-state actors.[12] Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, attention focused on terrorists' use of WMD, reflected in a new U.S. doctrine derived from former vice president Dick Cheney's reported statement that "if there's a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response."[13] Bruce Hoffman summarizes the threat that non-state actors pose:

> We face a two-fold challenge from both al Qaeda, given its longstanding and documented ambitions to develop capabilities spanning all four weapons categories—chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear—as well as from associated and affiliated jihadis, who are attracted to these weapons not necessarily because of their putative killing potential, but because of the profoundly corrosive and unsettling psychological effects that even a limited, discrete attack using a chemical, biological, or radiological weapon could have on a targeted society and nation.[14]

The prospect of terrorist groups acquiring weapons of mass destruction is thus a matter of great concern for policymakers and national-security experts in the United States and elsewhere.

Of all the types of WMD that terrorists may attempt to employ, nuclear weapons have the greatest potential to cause mass casualties, physical devastation over a large area, and widespread panic. Fortunately, the materials required to construct nuclear weapons are still difficult to obtain, making a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon far less likely than an attack by more conventional means (and explaining, to a large degree, why no terrorist group to date has used a nuclear weapon in any attack). Nonetheless, the potential consequences of a nuclear terrorist attack demand that considerable effort be focused on ensuring that its likelihood remains low.

Radiological weapons, however, are much easier for terrorists to acquire than nuclear ones. The most common type of radiological weapon (generally

referred to as a radiological dispersal device [RDD], or dirty bomb) would simply be a conventional explosive device designed to spread radiological contamination. The explosive power of this type of RDD would most likely be on the order of hundreds of *pounds* of TNT and be solely due to the conventional explosives it contains—there would be no nuclear yield. In contrast, a nuclear weapon is defined as "a device that releases nuclear energy in an explosive manner as a result of nuclear chain reactions involving the fission or fusion, or both, of atomic nuclei."[15] The explosive force of nuclear weapons is typically measured in thousands of *tons* of TNT. Thus the casualties caused by an RDD will almost exclusively be due to the force of the conventional explosives used to disperse the radioactive material. The main effects of the radioactive contamination from an RDD would be to spread fear among the population and to cause the target nation to expend a large amount of capital and effort to decontaminate the affected area. To construct an RDD, terrorists simply have to find a radioactive source and conventional explosives. Since radioactive materials are commonly used in medical facilities, universities, and certain industries, it would not be overly difficult for a terrorist group to obtain what they need either legally or illegally. Compounding the problem is the fact that many of these sources of radioactive materials are not under the strictest security, especially those outside the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. Currently, a terrorist RDD attack is more likely to occur than a terrorist attack using a nuclear weapon. While a terrorist RDD attack would induce panic, a terrorist attack on a major city with a nuclear weapon would be a disaster of unparalleled proportions.

The main limiting factor—to date—preventing terrorists from constructing a nuclear weapon is their inability to obtain sufficient quantities (typically tens of kilograms) of either highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Neither of these substances occurs naturally, and producing them in the quantities needed for a nuclear weapon probably is beyond the capability of any present-day terrorist organization. To obtain highly enriched uranium or plutonium for a nuclear weapon, terrorists would either have to steal it or acquire it from a sponsor state with production capabilities. Despite the difficulties involved, compelling evidence exists that terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda, are actively trying to obtain the means and materials needed to construct a nuclear device. The best way to prevent nuclear terrorism from happening, then, is to keep terrorists from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon. If terrorists were

to do so, the United States and Europe would have difficulty relying merely on border security and detection efforts to ensure that the weapon does enter any of their countries.

A host of difficult questions confront policymakers in this area. Are current U.S. efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism enough? Given the relatively low probability of nuclear terrorism, is the United States doing too much, diverting money that could be better spent elsewhere for more pressing immediate needs? Since ensuring that terrorists do not obtain highly enriched uranium or plutonium is generally regarded as the key to preventing nuclear terrorism, is the United States putting too much effort into border security and detection measures? More generally, what should the main U.S. focus be in ensuring that it is never the victim of nuclear terrorism? And how should efforts to avoid nuclear terrorism complement or coincide with plans to avoid chemical and biological terrorist attacks?

Contemporary Challenges

Despite the fact that U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals are at historic lows (resulting from several rounds of arms-control and arms-reduction talks and treaties), the global nuclear landscape is more complicated than ever. Policymakers must grapple with at least four different kinds of nuclear threats.

1. *Near-Peer Competitors*: It is arguably less likely now than ever before that nations such as Russia or China will be interested in waging nuclear warfare. That said, strategic calculations among nations could change, as could the way these countries choose to employ their nuclear weapons. For example, while China currently has a "minimum deterrent" policy, will it maintain this policy in the future? And what does that mean for U.S. interests? It would be a mistake to dismiss these nations—and their arsenals—out of hand.
2. *Rogue Regimes*: Despite intensive prevention efforts by the international community, both Iran and North Korea are acquiring (or have acquired) nuclear weapons. Furthermore, both nations appear to be attempting to marry their weapons with delivery systems capable of hitting targets in the territory of U.S. allies, if not in the United States itself. These two nations' acquisition of nuclear weapons jeopardizes the ability of the United States to pursue its interests in the Middle East and Asia, respectively, and it places U.S. allies in these regions directly

at risk. Indeed, many argue that countries in these areas will be inclined to acquire their own nuclear weapons in the event of rogue-regime proliferation, making global nuclear dynamics exponentially more complicated.

3. *Irresponsible Nuclear Actors*: During the Cold War era, the United States and the Soviet Union created elaborate systems for commanding and controlling their nuclear forces in order to prevent accidental launches or detonation. Yet it is questionable whether some of the new nuclear powers—notably Pakistan—are developing comparable controls. Pakistan has a particularly worrying track record, because the father of its nuclear program, A.Q. Khan, was caught selling nuclear technologies to other nations.
4. *Nuclear-Armed Terrorist Groups*: Terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda have publicly expressed their interest in acquiring and using a nuclear weapon. The likelihood that they could actually acquire such a weapon remains somewhat low. That said, fewer hurdles exist to obtaining "loose" fissile material that can be used to create a dirty bomb. U.S. and other policymakers must grapple with ways to manage this threat.

The proliferation of nuclear-weapons technology remains a critical threat to the United States and its allies. How should the United States deal with the multifaceted nature of today's nuclear threats? What is the right balance between the prevention and deterrence of nuclear proliferation? What should U.S. policy be toward unstable, nuclear-armed states and non-state actors eager to gain access to weapons of mass destruction?

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Center for Strategic and International Studies, Project on Nuclear Issues Reference Desk, http://csis.org/program/reference-desk/
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16

Trade, Globalization, and the International Economy

TODD HERTLING

In his "Report on Manufactures" in 1791, Alexander Hamilton argued for U.S. governmental protection of infant industries until they gained market entry and sustained their competitiveness in the country's young economy. He believed that from a national perspective, "a temporary enhancement of price must always be well compensated by a permanent reduction of it."[1] The new U.S. government was, in effect, to subsidize this temporary price increase until the untested industry could stand assuredly on its own.[2] Fifteen years before Hamilton's "Report," Adam Smith had published his formidable critique of zero-sum mercantilism and rousing defense of free markets, international as well as domestic.[3] Hamilton was no stranger to Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, yet his position as the young republic's leading economic policymaker led him to favor protectionism and import substitution instead of premature trade liberalization.[4]

In a sense, these two approaches to trade policy presaged what has become a centuries-long debate over the nation-state and its appropriate role in the economy. On the one hand, neoclassical liberals argue (in the spirit of Smith) that government should get out of the way and let free trade work its magic.[5] On the other, Keynesians make a Hamiltonian case for stimulating domestic demand, when necessary, to ensure economic growth and correct market failure.[6] If Smith and the liberals have had the advantage since the early 1990s, the Great Recession of 2008 has seemed to turn the tables once again.

Just how much should national boundaries matter in the international economy? Fiscal austerity has made questions about the "correct" approach to

trade policy all the more pressing. Have lean times increased the temptation to subsidize certain industries at the expense of others, despite the generally agreed upon benefits of free trade?[7] Or has the lesson of the economic downturn of 2008 been that a neoclassical approach to global trade ignores potential market failures, and thus some return to robust government regulations (and perhaps even to renewed protectionism) is warranted?

"Competitiveness": Just Another Catchphrase?

An appreciation of trends in world trade helps U.S. policymakers gauge America's true international economic standing. From 2000 to 2011, the United States ran an average trade deficit of $601.4 billion in goods. In contrast, emerging economies, such as those in China and Brazil, saw average trade surpluses of $125.8 billion and $25.2 billion, respectively.[8] Many Americans note this as cause for concern, perhaps because they see exports as the key to job growth. The U.S. economy's slow growth after the 2008 recession and high unemployment rate (7% as of November 2013) help support this notion. For example, GDP growth averaged just below 2 percent for the United States in the 2000s, a decline from about 4 percent in the 1970s and around 3 percent in the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, growth averaged just below 4 percent for Brazil, 5 percent for India, and above an impressive 10 percent for China.[9] Elected leaders in the United States have proven as sensitive to these worrying trends as American voters. In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama urged Americans to "win the future" and to "out-innovate, out-educate, and out-build the rest of the world," particularly China and India.[10] Similarly, 2012 Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney bemoaned an "America [that] has sat on the sidelines while our major trading competitors have been moving forward aggressively."[11] American politics seems increasingly afflicted by pervasive worries over the U.S. trade deficit.

While this sentiment might help politicians capture votes, it does not paint an accurate picture of the U.S. economy, however. For example, the United States actually leads the world in its trade surplus for services, which averaged $98.6 billion in the decade ending with 2011 and $124.1 billion over those last five years. In contrast, Brazil's services sector saw an average trade deficit of $14.4 billion, and China's (until 2009), $10.9 billion.[12] So while the United States maintains an overall trade deficit, this reflects the relative strength of the services sector in America vis-à-vis manufacturing, which has not grown as quickly as other sectors of the economy. Nonetheless, U.S. manufacturing

has expanded in absolute terms, and the United States still maintains the largest manufacturing output in the world, with China a distant second. The United States does this, however, by being more productive with improved technology requiring fewer jobs.[13] A booming services sector and increased productivity in manufacturing ought to create as much optimism as low employment and persistent trade deficits cause pessimism.

Most importantly, the U.S. overall trade deficit—despite calls by Americans to increase exports as a means to job creation—is not necessarily grounds for concern. Americans trade goods *and* assets with other countries, "so when America is running a trade deficit, it is almost always running a capital account surplus."[14] Likewise, "in both theory and practice a trade surplus may be a sign of national weakness, [and] a deficit a sign of strength."[15] For example, despite seeing trade deficits in every year between 1976 and 2005 and importing $5 trillion worth of goods, the United States nevertheless added 50 million jobs in the process.[16] And the dollar is still seen as a good investment by the rest of the world. This suggests that exporting more goods is far from being a panacea for the struggling U.S. economy. Paul Krugman has gone so far as to call the competitiveness rhetoric downright dangerous. Not only are domestic factors more important to countries with little international trade, but living standards are determined overwhelmingly by domestic production. As such, national economies often help each other grow—national economic competition is not zero sum, as it is among corporate rivals like Pepsi and Coca-Cola. In fact, some scholars argue for lowering tariffs and opening domestic markets even when liberalizing policies are not reciprocated by other countries.[17] "It is simply not the case that the world's leading nations are to any important degree in economic competition with each other," says Krugman, "or that any of their major economic problems can be attributed to failures to compete on world markets."[18] Indeed, thinking in such terms can lead to wasteful governmental spending, trade protectionism, and trade wars—in short, to potentially disastrous policies.

Might U.S. policymakers then look elsewhere to solve the apparent problems in the nation's economic growth? Is the relative decline in manufacturing, compared with the finance and service sectors, a sign of weakness or an indication of a robust, resilient U.S. economy? Does the American labor force have the skills it needs to forge growth in new sectors? Does the rhetoric of competitiveness do damage to the cause, or is it an effective instrument that challenges Americans to innovate and acquire new skills?

Globalization: Liberalized Markets and Inequality for All?

Globalization, by most measures, has been quite successful. From 1989 to 2013, world annual GDP grew from $29.6 trillion to $55.3 trillion, an increase of 87 percent.[19] If the market mechanism and free-trade transactions have a role in economic development, and therefore freedom, as Amartya Sen posits, then the trend in emerging democracies during that same period is encouraging.[20] In 1989, Freedom House counted only 69 electoral democracies, totaling 41 percent of the countries in the world; in 2012, it recognized 118, accounting for 61 percent.[21] There are other indicators that globalized markets and growth may have important positive, aggregate effects. The number of people living in extreme poverty in the world fell by nearly a billion between 1990 and 2010, and this figure already has met the UN's Millennium Development Goal of halving global poverty by 2015. East Asia alone saw a 97 percent reduction, with China being responsible for three-quarters of that improvement. Infant and maternal mortality rates are also dropping, though not as quickly.[22]

But there have been and will be losers in the trade-liberalization process, and they are often more concentrated and vocal than the winners. Existing and increasing income inequalities between developed and developing countries suggest an absence of growth convergence—though this convergence is happening in advanced industrial economies. Uneven core–periphery economic development is potentially problematic when assessing freedom in the world.[23] Income inequality may be tied to health and social problems, political instability, and social inequality, particularly among children.[24] Robert Gilpin observes that "the low capacity of the societies in less developed countries to absorb the knowledge required for economic development has proved to be a particularly significant deficiency," since "human capital and the ability to use knowledge are the most important determinants of economic development."[25] The problem of income disparity thus lies in stark contrast to the rosy picture of globalization painted by free-market liberals.

What's more, tensions persist in trade negotiations between interest groups and international organizations. Keeping trade issues separate from the contentious debate raging among the "unholy alliance" of environmentalists, human-rights activists, ultraconservatives who wish to retreat into isolationism, and protectionist trade unions—all of whom have little in common beyond a common enemy in the World Trade Organization—is a difficult task.[26] Other international organizations face similar challenges related to management of

the liberal international economic order. For example, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) often become pariahs for providing continual loans to governments that are too corrupt to keep money in the proper domestic-restructuring channels.[27] The IMF has been criticized for failing to prevent the Russian financial collapse in 1998.[28] Consider also Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orben, who "unfriended" the IMF on Facebook because its loan conditions (pension cuts, among others) were too tough.[29] Yet hope persists that loan conditions will yield results in countries such as Egypt, where the IMF had entertained the possibility of lending that nation $4.8 billion until its president, Mohamed Morsi, was overthrown in a military coup (the IMF may consider restarting negotiations, however, once the transitional government gains global recognition).[30] Similarly, efforts by the IMF, the European Central Bank, and the EU (together known as the "troika") have thus far saved the Eurozone from certain collapse by rescuing Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain and—most recently—Cyprus.[31] But these issues are by no means resolved.

What can the United States do to ensure that labor and environmental concerns and other objections to globalization are heard in the appropriate forums? What should the role of international organizations charged with managing the liberal economic order be when temptations for protectionism or saving popular social-welfare programs are greater? Can international organizations be a positive force for development and globalization in lesser-developed and emerging economies facing fiscal difficulties of their own?

Defense and Other Public Goods: The Water's Edge of Free Markets?

Another important challenge to globalization arises from concerns over national security. On this point, perhaps surprisingly, Adam Smith and Alexander Hamilton saw eye to eye. Smith argued that when free trade weakens national security, liberalization is undesirable.[32] Hamilton, for his part, argued in "Federalist No. 8" that "safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct."[33] Both favored more state involvement in the economy than contemporary liberals would welcome. Maybe, then, the free market's limits become most visible as it touches on public goods, such as policing, environmental protection—and national defense.[34]

To account for the often-criticized neglect of the state's role in the liberal tradition, a trade policy that incorporates elements of what is known as *strategic*

trade theory (STT) may be desirable. This theory holds that there are situations when imperfect market competition exists, economies of scale are possible, and state intervention is necessary (and even desirable) in seizing the dynamic nature of economies and addressing uncertainty.[35] Perhaps the most appealing aspect of considering STT as a potential economic policy involves its dual-use potential. By directing attention to certain sectors of the economy—biochemical, aerospace, information technology, and computers—the government can attempt to manipulate advances in the defense industry while also contributing to a dynamic and vibrant private-sector economy with technological spillover. The Internet, which was driven by U.S. research and development intended to counter the Soviet military threat, is the most obvious example of a government-driven sector that has revolutionized how nations conduct international business. Furthermore, STT argues that protecting defense industries—especially those contributing to the production of sensitive technology, such as the classified depleted-uranium armor of an M1A2 Abrams main battle tank or the secret instruments panel on a B-2 stealth bomber—is actually natural, prudent, and important to the survival of a country. STT puts faith in the ability of governmental assistance—aid that may not have come otherwise, since firms tend to underinvest in human capital—to spark innovation. By sustaining a lead in this sector through preemptive investment, the United States may establish a decisive advantage in defense technology and maintain what is currently the most advanced military in the world.

Certainly, a nation's government is not always adept at deciding economic winners and losers (as Japan's initial reluctance to endorse Honda or the recent U.S. outrage over the federally subsidized Solyndra company would suggest). With no counterfactual case in place, it is impossible to determine definitively whether industrial policy actually works. If the United States downsizes its defense budget in the near future, the stakes for setting industrial policy correctly will rise. Every industry would have a major incentive to portray itself as providing goods or services that are vital to the country's national security, whether these arguments are grounded or not. These are considerable shortcomings of STT. Another criticism is the reasonable assertion that efforts to fund research and development in specific sectors of the economy can too easily lead to national protectionist tendencies. Such protectionist subsidies may result in foreign retaliation and downplay the potential benefits of technology from external sources that may reach the private sector. One prime example is

global positioning system (GPS) technology, initially developed but restricted by the U.S. Department of Defense. Some GPS signals are still protected in encrypted form for military purposes, but others have also reached a huge global civilian market in recent years with the demand for navigational tools in automobiles and location apps in various smart devices.

How much stock should the United States put in strategic trade theory in difficult fiscal times, and will it lead to greater economic growth? How can the United States avoid the potential drawbacks of managing the defense market while increasing the chances of positive spillover into the private sector? Is STT too risky in a resource-constrained military, or could it lead to greater accountability in the Defense Department's acquisition process?

Lean times up the ante for making effective trade policy choices. The financial crisis of 2008 and the slow speed of a U.S. recovery may, however, cause the nation's policymakers to defer to an impatient, frustrated American electorate in passing and implementing bold measures that do more harm than good. In these cases, polarized U.S. factions may resist opportunities to combine economic schools of thought in the formulation of sound political-economic policy. Strategic trade theory may be one example of a Keynesian strain complementing a more laissez-faire approach, which can place the United States on the path to continued, reliable growth. But it also may not. The challenge, then, is to demonstrate wisdom, judgment, and patience. How might the American electorate challenge the country's policymakers to craft analyses reaching beyond simple sound bites? How might U.S. policymakers consider in earnest what trade policies will obtain the greatest public good—both domestically and abroad? There needs to be courage from both the governed and those governing to confront conventional wisdom and find a true balance again.

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17

Resources and Energy

JOHN HAGEN

In late summer and early autumn 2012, over a thousand demonstrators were arrested outside of the White House for protesting a proposed 1,661-mile pipeline that would move Canadian oil to American refineries and then on to American port facilities along the Gulf of Mexico.[1] More than a year later this opposition continues as protestors and environmental groups argue that the construction of this pipeline will have immediate environmental hazards, and increased U.S. reliance on oil produced from the tar sands of Alberta presents longer-term climatic hazards.[2] Countering these arguments, proponents of the pipeline contend that building it would create tens of thousands of jobs and reduce U.S. reliance on unstable and unfriendly oil-exporting countries. Due to the international nature of the project, the final determination on whether to allow pipeline construction resides with the Obama administration, which has struggled to balance the anticipated environmental costs against the potential economic benefits. This extended decisionmaking process, along with the countervailing arguments of opponents and supporters of the pipeline, highlight the growing tension between the long-term necessity of an environmentally sustainable energy policy and the more immediate demands for secure and reliable energy resources.

In order to balance these two priorities, U.S. policymakers must look beyond strategies for the best means of acquiring and using fossil fuels to consider how subsequent energy policy can be modified to ensure environmental sustainability. This chapter's focus on oil obtained from the tar sands of Alberta reflects the unique impact that oil, along with coal and natural gas, has on the

environment and the dominant role these fuels will have on global energy policies for the foreseeable future. Despite current efforts to develop alternative fuels and energy sources, national and global demands for fossil fuels will increase over the next twenty-five years as countries strive to meet their stated development goals.[3] At the same time, there is broad concern that the pollution generated by the cycle of extracting, processing, and burning fossil fuels presents an enduring threat to a sustainable and healthy global environment.

The fossil-fuel cycle has its most significant impact on the environment through the release of multiple gases and particulates into the atmosphere. Bill McKibben distinguishes the avoidable pollutants emitted through fuel-extraction and power-production processes from the unavoidable production of carbon dioxide (CO_2) that results from burning fossil fuels.[4] Among the problems linked to avoidable emissions are water pollution and airborne pollutants, such as escaped methane, particulates, ozone, sulfur dioxide, and mercury. While energy companies might resist the costs of the technology or modifications needed to reduce these contaminants, a potential solution nonetheless exists. Even as energy production continues or increases, the release of these substances can be substantially diminished, provided that there is the political will to implement the required technical and procedural modifications. With respect to avoidable pollutants, balancing energy demands and environmental sustainability requires reexamining efficiencies in the fossil-fuel cycle and reconsidering what is included in the cost of energy. While policy changes might not be able to mitigate the most extreme ecological damage, and residual contaminants might be extremely costly to remove, environmental degradation from previous energy practices can be mostly reversed. Consequently, environmental-policy decisions can address the needs and desires of the current generation without imposing a permanently changed environment on future generations.

The emission of CO_2, however, presents a different set of environmental considerations. McKibben points out that, unlike harmful substances that are avoidable byproducts of burning fossil fuels, CO_2 is always created when fossils fuels are burned.[5] As the global demand for energy increases, so does the consumption of coal, oil, and natural gas, and—inevitably—atmospheric CO_2 levels. In many respects, the rise in atmospheric CO_2 is benign. Increased concentrations of carbon dioxide generally have no toxic effects on humans or animals, nor do increased CO_2 levels impact ecosystems directly (with the exception of increasing carbonic acid levels in seawater); some vegetation can

actually thrive in higher concentrations of CO_2. Yet, as a greenhouse gas, higher concentrations of CO_2 in the atmosphere threaten to increase average global temperatures more than 4° Celsius in the next century, thus causing disruptive climatic changes and rises in sea levels of more than half a meter.[6]

Historically, the natural level of atmospheric CO_2 has been continually changing, and so, consequently, has the global climate. These natural fluctuations, however, normally occur at a rate that does not disrupt most ecosystems or societies. When regional climatic changes have exceeded a society's ability to adapt, the collapse of that society becomes highly probable.[7] Thus processes and practices can be considered environmentally sustainable when they do not alter environmental systems at a rate that exceeds the ecosystem's (or a society's) ability to adapt and still thrive. The dramatic rise in CO_2 levels over the last century threatens to cause climatic changes so significant as to make many species extinct and impose great costs on society.[8] Nor is this damage temporary in nature, as climatic changes caused by heightened CO_2 levels will outlast a single generation. CO_2 dwells in the atmosphere for up to a thousand years; as a result, concentrations of CO_2 will continue climbing even if emission rates were reduced immediately.[9] Climatic changes are already occurring, and they will continue to increase in the future.

What, then, can policymakers do to reduce CO_2 levels before they trigger greater climatic disruptions? And how can this be done at a time when the global demand for fossil fuels grows by the day and seems destined to continue to increase for the foreseeable future?

The Keystone XL Pipeline Case

The proposed Keystone XL pipeline, and the Canadian oil it is meant to carry, presents a case for considering how to balance demands for energy and environmentally sustainable practices. This pipeline is projected to extend 1,661 miles from Hardisty, Alberta, to Nederland, Texas. The 36-inch-diameter pipe will move bitumen, a synthetic oil, down to refineries in the American south and then on to oil terminals in Texas. TransCanada, a Canadian pipeline company, is responsible for the project and has been seeking final approval from the U.S. Department of State to run this pipeline across the international border. The company claims that the pipeline will provide significant economic benefits to the United States. The improvement in U.S. energy security alone is valued at $20 billion. Pipeline construction is estimated to create 20,000 high-paying (albeit temporary) jobs for U.S. workers. When the pipeline is completed,

it is projected to produce over $5 billion in property taxes for the states through which it runs.[10] Perhaps most importantly, the pipeline should ensure that the United States has continued access to Canadian oil, a secure and nearby source that has the potential to be the world's third-largest reserve.

Oil is a global commodity. From an international perspective, there is little difference between drawing Canadian oil from one end of the "global bathtub" and obtaining oil from Russia or the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries from the other end of the tub. Dependence on Canadian oil is more politically palatable to policymakers in Washington, D.C., however, than dependence on the oil of less-liberal and more-distant nations. Through this national affinity as well as proximity, Canada has become the primary foreign source of oil for the United States; and the Canadian province of Alberta, with a proven reserve of 175 billion barrels, has the potential to further increase its imports to the United States. The recent development of the Alberta tar sands and the subsequent rise of Canada as a major oil exporter confirm oil companies' belief that market forces and technological advances will ensure sufficient oil reserves to meet global demands. From this perspective, impeding access to this Canadian oil would only constrain the market and needlessly increase energy costs.

Those protesting the Keystone XL pipeline have a very different perspective. While oil pipelines are generally considered secure, they occasionally leak. In May 2011, TransCanada, the company building the Keystone XL pipeline, had a reported 40-barrel leak in the original Keystone pipeline running through Kansas, and a year earlier there had been an 840,000-gallon spill of bitumen in Michigan's Kalamazoo watershed, which discharges into Lake Michigan. Consequently, protesters are apprehensive about the pipeline's proposed path through the Ogallala aquifer, located beneath eight U.S. Great Plains states; and the fact that the bitumen the pipeline carries is more acidic than traditional crude oil only amplifies these concerns. Since getting bitumen to flow through pipelines requires mixing it with natural-gas condensates, protestors worry that bitumen might prove corrosive inside of standard pipelines. Additionally, bitumen is pumped through the pipes at a higher pressure than is used for moving regular crude oil.[11] All of which raise concerns about leaks and the lasting damage they might cause.

Beyond the potential harmful effects from the pipeline's construction and then its operation, Canadian oil from Alberta also represents everything the protestors see as wrong about how the United States aims to secure its energy

future. Instead of seeking alternatives to fossil fuels, America is increasing its dependence on costly and environmentally burdensome forms of energy production. The Canadian tar sands are exactly what the name implies: a sandy soil impregnated with tar. Oil production from this source involves removing all the topsoil and then digging up the underlying sand. This sand is then dumped in giant vats of boiling water, at which point the bitumen rises to the top as an oily froth and is then skimmed off for processing and further refining to produce synthetic oil. The overall procedure is environmentally costly, since it requires two-and-a-half barrels of water and two tons of excavated sand for every barrel of oil produced. Consequently, holding ponds containing toxic wastewater and scarred landscapes readily identify the mining areas for tar sands. There is an alternative method of accessing deeper reserves of bitumen, by injecting steam into the ground and then pumping out the melted bitumen, but, regardless of the method, the recovery and processing of tar sands requires significant amounts of energy, currently provided by Canadian natural-gas reserves. Operations in the tar sands region also produce increased levels of carbon dioxide. Consequently, despite the rest of Canada's commitment to reduce its greenhouse-gas emissions, increased emissions by Alberta alone prevented Canada from meeting its international commitments on CO_2 reduction.[12]

The Keystone XL pipeline is also a harbinger of another set of impending policy considerations as traditional oil reserves are depleted and demand increases. Due to its extraction and production methods, obtaining oil from the tar sands of Alberta is only profitable when the cost of oil rises above $50 per barrel.[13] Only in the past decade has the increased demand and uncertainty of supply made the use of this type of oil economically feasible. Basic economics says that as the demand for a good increases, the price of that commodity will rise to reflect the additional costs needed to maintain the desired supply. It is becoming evident with the Alberta tar sands that these costs are not just monetary; they are also environmental. If consumers are willing to bear the additional financial burden for these increasingly pricey extraction processes, then policymakers will be under greater pressure to justify implementing protective measures to counter the ecological costs. More and more, these measures will be viewed as excessively expensive constraints on much-needed energy production. In short, access to energy is currently often the first policy priority; to the extent that environmental policy can influence energy policy, for now it remains only at the margins. As energy production at these margins become increasingly valuable, environmental concerns risk becoming even more irrelevant.

An analysis of the competing positions regarding the Keystone XL pipeline and Canadian bitumen raises several questions about the balance between plentiful and secure energy, on the one hand, and environmental sustainability on the other. How are existing environmental costs measured and calculated? As global prices for oil continue to rise, should energy companies devote an increasing amount of their profits to mitigating environmental damages, or does the decrease in traditional oil reserves require that all excess profits be channeled into further exploration and better extraction techniques? If the trend in fossil fuels is toward sources that produce even more greenhouse gases, are there policy tools available to help nations control the degree of their emissions and stabilize CO_2 levels at tolerable amounts?

Options to Consider

Richard Wolfson presents four approaches that can be used to address greenhouse-gas emissions resulting from the burning of fossil fuels. While his scenarios focus on reducing the amount of CO_2, they will also serve as a useful guide for analyzing both the Keystone XL pipeline case and the question of how countries might balance energy production and environmental sustainability in an era of global warming. Wolfson states that all efforts to address the environmental impacts of burning fossil fuels can be categorized under the following scenarios: mitigating symptoms as they develop, capturing and storing pollutants at the source of their emission, switching to alternate fuels, and reducing energy use.[14] Each can help explore the relationship between energy and the environment.

Mitigate

The mitigation of environmental problems resulting from the use of fossil fuels is the approach most consistent with how the United States has historically addressed such problems. With an emphasis on maximum permissiveness, in order to support individual progress and development, the United States allows an activity to continue until the damage caused by it becomes manifest, at which point the nation seeks responses try to alleviate those ill effects in the most cost-effective manner. Potential solutions include letting the condition persist but compensating those inconvenienced by it. This approach is reactionary, in that the damage must be evident and quantifiable. If its cost cannot be identified, nothing will occur to mitigate the problem until some value is placed on the continuing harm. Consequently, when this damage is finally rec-

ognized, it can be quite advanced, and mitigating it can be far more costly than preventative measures would have been.

This method might work for many traditional pollutants, though substances like mercury are notoriously difficult to remove from the environment, once they are released through the burning of coal, for example. Often mitigation involves major governmental cleanups, which in turn need funding, and therefore first require political will. For climatic changes, broad mitigation measures to address species extinction or increased temperatures are not realistic. Countries increasingly will have to consider how to respond to problems caused by severe droughts or the flooding of coastal regions, so any mitigation of climatic changes is likely to assume the form of crisis response.

Remove Pollutants at the Source

For air and water pollution from substances other than CO_2, technologies already exist for capturing and trapping most of them. The stumbling block to implementing these capabilities has been the difficulty of deciding who will bear the costs. Scrubbing techniques are costly to implement, and they reduce the efficiency of energy production. Businesses do not want to bear this expense alone, and they vigorously resist any federal regulation mandating pollutant reductions. A cap-and-trade system has decreased sulfur dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants, but air-borne mercury released from these same plants has yet to be restricted. Capturing these pollutants at their source is the most economical solution when compared with the environmental and health damages that they cause, but industry's resistance has limited the use of this response.

With regards to CO_2, there has been much discussion of carbon capture and sequestration as being promising "clean coal" technologies, but no operational process has yet been developed for capturing CO_2 on a scale that could affect advancing climatic changes. Ironically, countries with extensive forests, which naturally capture CO_2, continue to reduce the size of those forests, in order to meet demands for timber and grazing land.

Switch to Alternate Fuels

Several alternative-energy sources show promise for the future. Nuclear power is likely to continue to supply 20 percent of the world's electricity, even as the demand for it grows. Solar-panel technology and wind power continue to develop, but they will not provide more than marginal contributions for the

foreseeable future. Hydrogen power requires the production of hydrogen, an energy-intensive process in its own right.

These alternate fuels still have to compete in an energy market where fossil fuels set the baseline cost of energy. The same rise in fossil-fuel costs that makes these other energy sources economical *simultaneously* increases the profitability of more exotic and environmentally disruptive methods for extracting fossil fuels. (This is why extracting oil from the Canadian tar sands has only recently become so lucrative.) Conversely, should these other sources capture a large sector of the energy market, the subsequently depressed demand for fossil fuels would drive their price back down, thus making fossil fuels competitive with their alternatives. The economics of energy, therefore, seem almost to conspire to maintain a dependence on fossil fuels.

Consequently, alternate fuels cannot come on line quickly enough, and in sufficient quantity, to reduce fossil-fuel demands in such a way that CO_2 levels would fall below the generally accepted threshold of 570 ppm. Without governmental intervention in the form of taxes or rebates, it is not possible for alternative sources to significantly compete in an energy market that has been built around the extraction, processing, and global use of fossil fuels.

Reduce Energy Demand

Reducing energy demands should decrease both the amount of fossil fuels being burned and the subsequent pollutants from them. Since the early 1970s, progress in energy efficiency has allowed the United States to continuously drop the energy intensity of the nation's growth. Further technological and policy advances could potentially enable an additional doubling in oil efficiency.[15] While reducing energy demand in the United States might be technologically possible and, given the rising cost of oil, economically feasible, the real challenge will be reducing global demand. As emergent countries like China and India continue to develop, their populations have begun to seek the same energy-intensive lifestyles enjoyed in the West. Consequently, it might be possible to double or even triple global energy efficiency, but nonetheless still have an overall rise in energy demand. What the global steady-state energy requirement will be has yet to be determined, but it is certain to be higher than the current worldwide demand for energy.

For the foreseeable future, global development is bound to the energy produced from fossil fuels. At the same time, the increasing use of these fossil fuels is

driving climatic changes that will have dramatic effects on the environment, endangering the very societies that development is meant to benefit. The pursuit of business-as-usual would be a reckless approach, but exactly how to ensure access to needed energy in an environmentally sustainable manner is and will become an even more predominant and pressing policy concern. Those who were protesting the XL pipeline by demonstrating in front of the White House might not have had all of the answers, but they were at least calling policymakers' attention to the right questions.

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NOTES

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18

Thinking beyond Oil

ANNE POPE

The United States is on the verge of, if not already well within the beginning years of a new kind of war—between those who are seeking oil and are increasingly willing to go out and secure it, and those determined to disrupt its flow to promote their own agendas. As demand for oil increases, as global oil production continues to lag behind demand, as terrorists increasingly target oil production and infrastructure, and as producers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Nigeria grow more unstable, the struggle to maintain access to adequate energy supplies—always a critical mission for any nation—will become even more challenging and uncertain and will require more resources, political attention, and military intervention to secure. DAVID A. ANDERSON

Over the course of the past thirty years, emerging oil scarcity has led to a paradigm shift in the U.S. approach to security.[1] The realization has come that securing the flow of oil is not just an economic issue; it also involves complex political, military, and diplomatic calculations. Oil is a source of wealth and influence for the countries that have this resource, and it can cause conflict between nations that have it and those that do not. Unfortunately, oil is not the only resource that has the potential to create these situations. In today's world, any resource that is both scarce and valuable is a political and strategic concern for the United States.

There are a number of resources that meet this description—including rare-earth metals, copper, lithium, and graphite—but in this chapter I will focus on a relatively unnoticed one that may nevertheless prove critical in the near future: phosphate rock. Chemical fertilizers, made with phosphorus derived from phosphate rock, support modern agricultural yields in the United States and around the world. Consequently, phosphate rock scarcity will have a large impact on productivity in agricultural regions, and thus on global food supplies and the farmers whose livelihood depends on the success of their crops.

The case of phosphate rock will serve as a paradigm for thinking about strategic resources other than oil.

This chapter will examine global phosphate rock availability, in order to predict U.S. future interests abroad. It will address the following questions:

- How deep are current supplies of phosphate rock? When will they run out?
- Where do global supplies of phosphate rock exist? What are America's relations like with these countries?
- Are there other countries that will compete with the United States for these resources?
- What are the domestic conflicts in the countries in which phosphate rock is found? Could their internal problems disrupt U.S. supplies?
- In light of the previous questions, which regions will be of importance to the United States in its efforts to secure a phosphate rock supply?

The first section of this chapter discusses what phosphate rock is and where it can be found. The second examines scenarios for phosphate rock depletion around the world. The third discusses the potential for resource conflicts over phosphate rock. The conclusion considers the types of conflicts that can arise from resources other than oil in broader terms, and explores how much potential there is to reduce U.S. dependence on strategic resources such as phosphate rock.

What Is Phosphate Rock?

Phosphate rock is an important input for fertilizers. Global production of phosphate rock recently reached 191 million metric tons annually, with 80–90 percent of this product being used in the manufacture of fertilizer.[2] The rest is used in animal feed, detergents, and the production of other chemicals. Fertilizers are crucial in supporting crop yields and, in turn, sustaining the growth of human populations. Agricultural land took up fully 37 percent of the earth's surface in 2011, at least one-third of which was used to produce food for direct human consumption; almost all of this land is fertilized.[3] Recent data suggest that 40–60 percent (or even higher) of current crop yields may be attributable to chemical fertilizers.[4] This magnified yield is not attributable to phosphorus alone, since chemical fertilizers include other nutrients necessary for plant growth, such as nitrogen and potassium. We certainly would not see comparable crop yields, however, if fertilizers did not contain phosphorus at all.

Demand for phosphate fertilizers, and consequently for phosphate rock, is expected to increase in coming years. According to the International Water Management Institute, global food production must increase by about 70 percent from its 2007 levels by 2050, due to population growth, the increased use of biofuel crops (which also must be fertilized), and a rise in the consumption of meat and dairy products in developing countries, such as India and China.[5] The upsurge in demand is projected to slow over time, however, as the global population stabilizes, fertilizer application becomes more efficient, and plant-management practices improve.[6]

There is no replacement for phosphorus in sustaining high crop yields.[7] Although phosphate rock is not the only available source of phosphorus, to date there are no alternatives on the market that could replace the volume of phosphate rock used annually. Present world fertilizer production is dependent on phosphate rock for phosphorus, and if societies are unable to switch to alternative sources of this mineral, phosphate rock scarcity will have grave consequences for the world's food supply.

Where Is Phosphate Rock?

Currently, high-quality phosphate reserves are concentrated in only a few countries, the most important of which is Morocco. This nation holds nearly 75 percent of the world's phosphate rock reserves, as well as most of the global reserve base. It is the world's third-largest producer of phosphate rock and a major exporter of this raw material.

China also holds significant phosphate rock reserves and, according to the U.S. Geological Survey's reserve-base estimates from 2009, has the second-largest reserve base in the world. Since 2006, China has been the biggest producer of phosphate rock.[8] It is also the greatest consumer of phosphorus fertilizers in the world, with nearly 13 million metric tons of fertilizer used annually.[9] It only exports phosphate that is processed into fertilizer, however, and that in comparatively small quantities. China has recently been setting export quotas to protect its resources, and it may lower these quotas further in the future.[10]

Historically, the United States has been the largest producer of phosphate rock, although it now holds second place to China.[11] In comparison with Morocco, the United States has a relatively small proportion of the world's phosphate rock reserves, although its reserve base is among the top five globally. The United States is the third-largest consumer of fertilizer in the world, using 3 million tons annually, but it is nevertheless a net exporter of phosphorus,

since it exports more phosphorus fertilizer than it imports phosphate rock.[12] Iraq, Syria, and Algeria also hold significant reserves of phosphate rock. Jordan and South Africa rank fourth and fifth among the world's reserve bases. Jordan is the fifth-largest producer of phosphate rock globally, and a large exporter as well. Brazil is among the world's top five producers, but it does not have significant reserves; it is a net importer of phosphate rock, which it obtains mainly from Morocco. Brazil is the fourth-largest consumer of phosphate rock, using 2.8 million tons annually. Russia is also among the world's top producers, and an important exporter as well.

India is the second-largest consumer of phosphate rock in the world, using over 7 million tons annually, and it is the biggest importer globally. Pakistan, also a net importer, is the fifth-largest consumer, with an annual use of nearly 1 million tons.[13] Neither of these countries has significant phosphate rock resources, which puts them at high risk for adverse impacts from phosphate rock depletion or price increases and makes them dependent on other countries to ensure their supply.

In predicting security concerns associated with scarce resources like phosphate rock, it is crucial to know where the infrastructures associated with the processing of a scarce resource are distributed, since processing and manufacturing plants can be the targets of competition or predation in resource conflicts. Although a complete analysis of phosphate- and fertilizer-processing infrastructures is beyond the scope of the present chapter, the bulk of these infrastructures exist in the countries that manufacture the largest amounts of fertilizer, including China, the United States, and India.

Phosphate Rock Depletion

Global reserves of phosphate rock will almost certainly be depleted by the end of this century, and many scientists are predicting a scenario in which today's global phosphate rock reserves will be exhausted in as few as fifty to a hundred years, if not sooner. Generally speaking, *reserves* are the mineral resources that are known to exist and are economical to extract under present-day conditions with current technology. This excludes the *reserve base*, which encompasses reserves as well as the deposits that, at this point, are not profitable (or possible, with current technology) to extract, or for which the extent or quality of the deposits are less certain. There is no worldwide standard for classifying reserves, however, so estimates depend on what is considered to be economically extractable. Quantities attributed to reserves also change with the value of the mineral:

if phosphate rock becomes scarcer or demand increases, the price will increase, and more of what is now the reserve base will then become economically extractable reserves. Thus, when scientists argue that current reserves will be depleted in fifty to a hundred years, this does not involve the complete exhaustion of phosphate rock supplies.

Although there is some disagreement about these estimates, close attention should be paid to the possibility of reserve depletion. In the long term, phosphate rock, like other strategic minerals, represents a finite resource; when phosphate rock is depleted, it will be of grave concern for the global food supply. Although low-quality or less-accessible deposits can continue providing phosphorus rock for a short time, the corresponding price increases from obtaining and processing these resources will have serious negative effects on small farmers and the world's poor. Extracting low-quality deposits will also have greater environmental costs and use more energy, which will make continued dependence on these deposits unattractive.

Complicating the issue further, different areas of the world are expected to run out of phosphorus at varying times. The United States is estimated to exhaust its current reserves by 2035,[14] and to become a net importer of phosphorus within the next century.[15] China may have around fifty years of its reserves left.[16] Western Europe and India, two other large consumers of phosphate rock, are already dependent on imports and have no appreciable reserves of their own.[17] By 2050, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria will dominate the phosphate rock market, providing more than 50 percent of the global supply.[18] By the end of the twenty-first century, the production of phosphate rock is likely to be concentrated in fewer countries than historically has been the case for oil.[19] What are the probable consequences of so few countries dominating the phosphate rock market?

Potential for Resource Conflict

Throughout history, scarce yet valuable resources have been a source of conflict. Today, they have the potential to influence U.S. security calculations in a number of different ways. Generally speaking, these conflicts are referred to as *resource wars*. Resource wars manifest themselves in a number of different ways. They can consist of conflicts within a state that either result from abundant natural resources or are worsened by a scarcity of natural resources. Resource wars can stem from aggressive actions on the part of states with natural resource abundance, known as *resource-backed aggression*.[20] They can also take the form of conflicts between states that are competing for scarce natural resources,

termed *resource competition*. Will phosphate rock extraction and depletion give rise to these kinds of resource wars in the years to come?

Resource-Backed Aggression

Jeff Colgan finds that the main cause of conflicts between oil states and non-oil states is resource-backed aggression—that is, conflicts over oil occur not because states without oil prey on states with oil (as is often believed), but rather because states with oil resources and revolutionary governments act more aggressively in the foreign-policy arena.[21] Assuming for the moment that phosphate rock mining is easily controlled by the state and is a large, high-profile source of revenue, it is possible to assess which countries might be at risk for aggressive behavior by mapping locations of phosphate deposits in relation to revolutionary states or those with low levels of civil liberties. Using this approach, one prediction is that China, Turkmenistan, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and western Africa may exhibit resource-backed aggression in the future. How can the United States shape its foreign policy to prepare for this possibility?

Conflict Minerals

Conflict minerals are those that are mined in conditions of armed conflict and, often, human-rights abuses. The funds from mineral sales support at least one side in the conflict and thus can perpetuate and worsen the violence. Mines and processing infrastructures may frequently become strategic targets as the warring parties attempt to destroy or control them for their own use. The most notable example is in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the Congolese National Army and rebel groups have traded control of the mining sector for more than twelve years.[22]

A side-by-side comparison of *Global Peace Index* rankings of nations with potentially profitable deposits of phosphate rock points toward Colombia, Venezuela, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Iraq, Sri Lanka, and Russia as particular areas of concern for conflict minerals.[23] While not necessarily involved in violent resource warfare at the moment, these countries are at risk for generating conflict minerals in the future.

Resource Curse

A *resource curse* is the phenomenon in which countries that have abundant natural resources tend to have worse development outcomes: poor economic

growth, authoritarian governments, and more civil wars. Several studies have found that natural-resource abundance and civil war are correlated; that certain valuable resources, such as gemstones and drugs, prolong civil wars; that the presence of minerals in a conflict zone tends to increase the geographic scope of the conflict; and that civil wars are harder to end in countries that depend on raw-material exports.[24]

There is disagreement, however, over whether resource wealth and conflict are causally linked. Some experts have found that natural-resource wealth does engender civil conflict, for two reasons: resource wealth may increase the danger that an outside power will intervene on behalf of a budding rebel group, and governments are more likely to act harshly and preemptively against rebel groups that appear to threaten governmental control of resource wealth.[25] Other experts have not found this to be the case.[26] They claim that the standard variable used for resource wealth (primary exports divided by national income) is flawed, since it measures the dependency of the economy on resource wealth—not the resource wealth itself.[27] Thus such studies should be interpreted in a different fashion: either conflicts are caused by bad economic policies that lead to dependence on resource exports, or other sectors of the economy exit the country when conflicts are imminent. Therefore, while resource abundance itself may not cause conflicts, nations that manage these resources poorly, or whose economies depend on resource exports, may still be at risk.

Resource Competition

Countries compete globally for scarce resources. Strategic angling for access to resources can take the form of conflict, or it can unintentionally provoke conflict. Dependence on oil has increased the strategic vulnerability of the United States, and thus constrains its ability to pursue a wide array of foreign-policy and national-security objectives.[28] Competition over minerals can also make relationships between importing countries tense, as they struggle for control over scarce mineral flows. In light of these concerns, how will U.S. relations with other significant consumers of phosphate rock change?[29]

Food Security

Food security, at its most basic level, refers to the adequate availability of nutritious food and the ability to access it.[30] This concept is encoded in the UN's *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, which asserts that "everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself

and his family, including food."[31] Food security is impacted by a number of different factors, including population growth, migration toward cities, changes in price levels, global or state-level economic crises, changing food-consumption patterns (e.g., eating more meat), water shortages, energy shortages, and climate change.

Phosphate rock depletion will contribute to food insecurity. Without fertilizers, agricultural lands produce less food, potentially causing global food shortages in the long term. The combination of an increased demand for food to feed the world's future populations and falling crop yields could limit access to food. In the short term, price increases alone could cause localized food shortages if small farmers cannot afford to buy fertilizers and thus do not apply them to their fields. This could entail a significant drop in productivity, which would be particularly destabilizing in developing countries, where poor infrastructure and budget limitations might also prevent sufficient imports of food supplies. Alternatively, higher fertilizer prices could be passed on to the consumer in the form of rising food prices. In recent years, greatly elevated food prices have caused unrest in many parts of the world and swelled the proportion of the world's population that cannot buy adequate amounts of food.[32] Thus price increases, in and of themselves, are a security concern.

Case Study: Morocco

Morocco, with nearly 75 percent of the world's phosphate rock reserves, will be the most important country for the phosphate rock trade in the future. The problems that Morocco faces domestically, and the possibilities for disruptions in the supply of this crucial resource, are therefore of interest to the rest of the world.

Phosphate rock mining is a state-owned industry, with the raw material currently representing 24 percent of Morocco's exports and providing the Moroccan government with over $4 million in exports annually.[33] As the price of phosphate rock increases, this revenue will become an even more significant source of income for the Moroccan government. This revenue—and the strategic importance of Morocco's resources—will raise its profile internationally, but these factors will also put Morocco at risk for some of the resource conflicts discussed earlier, including resource curses and resource competition.

Morocco extracts around 2.5 percent of its phosphates from Western Sahara, a territory it has occupied illegally since 1975.[34] Although Western Sahara's reserves represent only a small fraction of Morocco's production, they are easily

accessible and of high quality, which makes them a valuable resource for Morocco.[35] The Western Saharan phosphate deposits have already been targets of conflict. When Morocco invaded Western Sahara, opposition attacks on a mine in Bukra' and a conveyor belt connecting it to the port forced production to stop.[36]

Although Western Sahara's phosphate mines initially did not provide a profit for Morocco, revenues from the Bukra' mine alone now account for somewhere between $80 and $150 million annually. United Nations Environment Programme satellite imagery has shown Morocco expanding the size of the Bukra' mine, and, as the price of phosphate rock rises, Morocco's interest in Western Sahara's phosphate rock mines will only grow.[37] The political cost of holding on to the mines, however, will also rise: the UN's legal counsel holds that extractions of natural resources from a non-self-governing territory without the approval of the population is illegal under international law.[38]

Western Sahara has been mostly stable since the 1990s, with some exceptions. In May 2005, proindependence protests spread in Western Sahara (and in areas of southern Morocco populated by the Sahrawi), but they were quickly repressed by the Moroccan government.[39] In fall 2010, the Western Saharan city of Laayoune erupted in riots after Moroccan police officers attempted to quell a Sahrawi protest that had turned violent.[40] Although the opposition movement in Western Sahara is unlikely to succeed on a large scale, continued protests in that region could spell disruptions in the supply of phosphate rock or prompt attacks on the production infrastructure. As discussed above, governments are more likely to use force to preempt rebel groups who threaten governmental control over resources. If an opposition group (such as the Polisario Front) were seen as threatening Morocco's control over phosphates, the Moroccan government might respond with harsh or repressive policies. If any large-scale conflict were to start in Western Sahara, the existence of valuable phosphate rock resources could extend the conflict in geographic scope and temporal length.

Morocco might also face domestic instability in the future. Morocco's monarchy survived the Arab Spring by quickly instituting a new constitution that gave some powers to the country's parliament.[41] King Mohammed VI is still praised domestically and internationally for the reforms he has instituted since ascending the throne.[42] Pent-up resentments remain, however, and the conditions that occasioned regime change in Tunisia and Egypt also apply in Morocco, including mounting frustrations with corruption and joblessness.[43]

Additionally, Morocco's economic system benefits a only very small group of people: members of the royal family and their retinue have all amassed large fortunes and have a sizeable presence in the business community. Thus, although Morocco has co-opted many of the protests and is likely to remain more-or-less stable in the future, the country still holds the potential for disturbances from continued grievances. It is worth noting that the Arab Spring came as a surprise to the international community, and there is no guarantee that it will not be surprised again.

In the future, America may have mixed success in securing a flow of phosphate rock from Morocco. On the plus side, the United States signed a comprehensive free-trade agreement with Morocco, which went into effect in 2006.[44] It also has a history of supporting the Moroccan regime, as it did during the war with Western Sahara.[45] Public opinion in Morocco toward America is tepid, however. In 2007, 92 percent of Moroccans were worried that the United States could become a military threat to their nation; 72 percent supported the removal of U.S. troops from all Islamic countries; and 78 percent believed the United States wants to "weaken and divide the Islamic world."[46] These attitudes may well have changed under the Obama administration and in the wake of NATO support for Libya's revolution, but they do indicate that Moroccans are critical of U.S. governmental policies. How should U.S. foreign policy reflect Morocco's strategic importance in terms of phosphate rock? Would rehabilitation of the image of the United States in Morocco and improvement of its relations with that country secure the U.S. phosphate rock supply?

Case Study: India

India is the largest importer in the world of both phosphate rock and phosphate fertilizer, making it highly dependent on outside sources of phosphates. India is the second-largest consumer of phosphate fertilizers, so phosphate depletion or price increases will be of especial relevance to its population, 65 percent of whom work in the agricultural sector.[47] Price increases or phosphate scarcity will affect both small farmers in that country and the large number of Indians sensitive to the price of food.

India is already in the midst of an agricultural crisis, a situation that is no longer a matter of debate among that country's policymakers, farmers, and academics. Between 1994 and 2005, agricultural growth rates sank to an all-time low of 0.6 percent per year. The proportion of Indian farmers who own

less than 1 hectare of land, and thus must support themselves with additional sources of income, has recently grown to 70 percent, rising from only 39 percent in 1960. Poor environmental practices have resulted in land degradation and falling water tables, causing decreased crop yields and greater irrigation costs for many small farmers. Governmental loans to farmers have decreased, forcing them to rely on private moneylenders, who frequently charge usurious interest rates.[48]

The results are dramatic. In years of drought or bad crop yields, India has experienced spates of suicide by impoverished farmers.[49] In 2008, fertilizer shortages caused a stampede at a governmental distribution center, killing a man; farmers also went on hunger strikes that year and blocked roads in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh.[50] Food-security specialists believe that small-scale agriculture in India is no longer viable, as a result of the burgeoning cost of inputs such as seeds, electricity, water, and fertilizers.[51]

Increases in the price of phosphorus would be disastrous for small, already-beleaguered farmers in India. The upsurge in global food prices, which is likely to result from an increase in the price of fertilizers, will be equally disastrous for the rest of India's low-income population. A high portion of India's inhabitants already lives in a constant state of hunger and malnutrition; the most well-fed state in that nation still has nearly 40 percent of its population consuming less than 2,400 calories per day, India's official minimum daily recommendation for rural areas.[52] In 2007, 2008, and again in 2010, India experienced riots and strikes precipitated by the global rise in food prices. Higher food prices are associated with conflict, so India should expect to see more unrest as its population struggles to feed itself.[53]

India's dependence on phosphate rock puts it at risk for unrest within the country—both on the production side and the consumption side. It will also affect India's relationships with phosphate-producing countries, as well as with those who compete with India for phosphate resources. Which countries, then, are most likely to be affected by India's dependence on phosphate rock? And how will U.S.-Indian cooperation on security issues be influenced by this emerging challenge?

What Are the Alternatives?

Regardless of measures taken to secure its supply, the United States should prepare to face phosphate rock price increases within fifty years, and complete

depletion in a century or two. Price increases and depletion could both have significant implications for modern industrial agriculture.

There is some possibility of discovering or utilizing other deposits. Over the course of the past century, the discovery of various phosphate rock reserves has outpaced consumption,[54] so further exploration may lead to previously unknown reserves. Many of the coastal basins where sedimentary deposits of phosphate rock are likely to occur, however, have already been thoroughly searched during explorations for oil.[55] Another source of phosphate rock is offshore deposits, but these will probably not become profitable until land-based deposits become depleted.[56] These deposits occur along the southeastern coast of the United States; on the Peru-Chile shelf; and off the coasts of Namibia, New Zealand, Baja California, and the Congo River delta.[57]

Fertilizer recovery and reuse is an alternative that would decrease U.S. dependence on phosphate rock. After fertilizers are applied to crops, there are several points along the chain from food production to consumption where nutrients could be recovered. Crop residues can be plowed back into the fields or burned and then reapplied as fertilizer. Human excreta, which have been used as fertilizer for thousands of years,[58] have a high phosphorus content, and large sources of this mineral are available from urban areas. Treated wastewater from sewage plants could be recovered and applied to agricultural land.[59] The options for both crop residues and treated wastewater have the benefit of decreasing the amount of phosphorus in waste streams, which can cause eutrophication upon reaching surface waters, but implementing them would require huge changes in infrastructure, farming practices, and cultural attitudes across the United States.

America could also decrease its phosphate dependence by switching to nitrogen-limited crops. Different species of plants need different proportions of essential nutrients. Switching grain production to crops that require proportionally more nitrogen than phosphorus could be an option for poor farmers seeking to avoid increases in the cost of inputs, although in a phosphorus-depletion scenario, this approach would not be effective on its own.

An important step in any of the above instances is to increase efficiency. The current U.S. agricultural system is highly inefficient in its phosphorus use.[60] In Europe and throughout North America, there is an increasing awareness of the dangers of overfertilization, mainly as a result of toxic algal blooms—including the "dead zone" in the Gulf of Mexico—caused by nutrient-heavy agricultural runoff.[61] While not a sufficient solution for the problem of phosphorus security

on its own, a more efficient use of phosphorus fertilizers may help slow the expected increase in demand.

Nonrenewable resources like phosphate rock will be increasingly important in the next century. As resources such as phosphate rock, lithium, and graphite become scarcer, and thus more valuable, they will present important political and strategic questions. Which resources are most important to the American way of life? Where are those resources found? What kinds of conflict are these resources likely to provoke? Are there alternatives to reduce U.S. dependence on these resources? It is in America's best interest to confront these questions and examine the changes these resources may cause in the geographic range of U.S. security interests in the years to come. In the long term, however, reaching security in the face of resource depletion may require the United States to make drastic changes to the way Americans use and reuse resources they have previously taken for granted.

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25. See Ross, "Natural Resources," 61, 63.

26. See, for example, C. N. Brunnschweiler, "Linking Natural Resources to Slow Growth and More Conflict," *Science* 320, no. 5876 (2 May 2008): 617.

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Conclusion

HUGH LIEBERT, JOHN GRISWOLD, AND ISAIAH WILSON III

This generation of Americans has been tested by crises that steeled our resolve and proved our resilience. A decade of war is now ending. An economic recovery has begun. America's possibilities are limitless, for we possess all the qualities that this world without boundaries demands: youth and drive; diversity and openness; an endless capacity for risk and a gift for reinvention. My fellow Americans, we are made for this moment, and we will seize it—so long as we seize it together.

PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA

Is clarity not the cardinal virtue of both the scholar and the student? Does clarity not entail the discovery of simple and straight lines in the noisy data of everyday experience? Are not these straight lines so many boundaries between the known and the unknown, between intelligent speech and dumb stupefaction? After all, chaos knows no boundaries, and there is nothing to know about chaos. Perhaps thinking beyond boundaries, whatever else it is, is simply not to think.

Thinking within inadequate boundaries, however, is nearly as bad as thinking with no boundaries at all. When the categories one has at hand no longer seem to capture the world's reality, one can either distort reality or move out past the bounds that one has hitherto used to interpret it. In the latter case, one thinks not *without* boundaries but *beyond* them—in search of new, better boundaries.

This volume is a first foray in this direction. The chapters collected here have not distilled the complex challenges facing U.S. policymakers into pithy prescriptions. This mode of speech, in its varied forms—the sound bite, the neologism, the clever acronym—is often popular with policymakers, but it ultimately does them a disservice. Policymakers ought to be presented not with a range of pat answers, but with a set of probing questions. The best policy—and

the best analysis—emerge from the interaction of the questioning advisor or author and the active and attentive policymaker. The best reflection on policy is necessarily a dialogue between theory and practice.

This volume has cast its readers as policymakers and challenged them to think beyond the boundaries that policymakers (and scholars) typically place around complex policy problems. It has approached policy problems from domestic, regional, and topical perspectives. It has encouraged readers to consider the linkages between disparate topics, connections that may not be readily apparent. Often, when viewed from a broader perspective, the relationships among what were once isolated problems become abundantly clear.

Thinking beyond boundaries is about making small problems bigger, in an effort to gain insights regarding their interdependence. Increasingly, the world witnesses not only security dilemmas, but *compound* security dilemmas. The notion of a "security dilemma" traditionally describes a paradox of international relations: when states enhance their own security by investing in military capabilities, they simultaneously make other states less secure and thus fuel a vicious cycle of security competition. This dilemma still exists, of course, but it has become considerably more complex. What were once separable, individual, one-dimensional security threats have become increasingly interrelated. Nonmilitary threats to human security, such as famine, disease, and natural disasters, frequently give rise to crises that call for military intervention; contemporary military interventions, on the other hand, have vast implications along axes of human security that once seemed distinct from the military realm. Going forward from this volume, scholars and students should not only recognize the complexity and interconnectedness of the challenges facing U.S. policymakers; they should also begin to see paths toward new solutions.

This volume closes not with a summary, but with a rallying cry offered to scholars and policy practitioners alike. After seeing the ways in which domestic, foreign, regional, and topical issues intersect and interact, how can policymakers affect these boundary-spanning policy problems? What strategic innovations can move from the realm of thought to the arena of action?

NOTE

Epigraph. Barack Obama, "[Second] Inaugural Address," 21 Jan 2013, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inaugural-address-president-barack-obama/.

Epilogue

The Student Conference for United States Affairs

For over fifty years, present and future leaders of the United States have gathered on the campus of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, to discuss the most pressing strategic challenges facing the nation. The occasion for their gathering, the Student Conference for United States Affairs (SCUSA), is the largest, oldest, and most prestigious conference of its type in the world. The chapters collected in this volume originated at this conference, where they served as the baseline—and spur—for small-group discussions.

Since 1949, SCUSA has involved thousands of the most promising college students in the United States, including future senators (Arlen Specter and Jeff Bingaman), prize-winning authors (Richard Bushman, Paul Starr), and media personalities (George Stephanopoulos). SCUSA offers these students the opportunity to learn from masters of American policymaking. Over the years distinguished speakers at SCUSA have included Dean Acheson, Henry Kissinger, George H. W. Bush, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Madeleine Albright, and Fareed Zakaria. For four days each fall, SCUSA brings these esteemed leaders into contact with the nation's best students, putting present American strategy into dialogue with its future.

SCUSA bridges the gap dividing not only present and future U.S. policymakers, but civilians and their military. The conference is organized by cadets at the United States Military Academy, who serve during SCUSA in roles ranging from panel moderators to tour guides. Delegates from civilian universities get a unique glimpse into daily life at West Point as they bunk with cadets in their barracks and dine with them in the cadet mess hall. SCUSA joins the U.S.

Army's future officers and the nation's future civilian leaders in a formative, shared educational experience.

At present, roughly two hundred undergraduate students from over a hundred colleges and universities worldwide participate as delegates at SCUSA. These students attend panel discussions, keynote addresses, and roundtable sessions focused on specific challenges facing American domestic and foreign policy. They are also assigned to small groups, each of which examines a particular policy area (such as regulating cyberspace, or Sino-American relations). Informed by chapters such as the ones collected here, each table produces a policy recommendation paper.

Having seen all of this in action first hand, the authors hope, with this volume, to extend the boundaries of the SCUSA experience beyond the conference itself.

Index

Afghanistan: civil war and, 73; security forces in, 106; USAID and, xviii–xix; U.S. alignment with mujahideen and, 95; U.S. war in, 1, 6–7, 55, 57, 65, 83, 90, 104–8, 115, 120
Africa, 67, 125–35, 159
African Union, 127, 130–31, 134
agenda setting, 17
agriculture, fertilizers and, 202, 208, 212, 215n29; in India, 210–211; in the United States, 212
airstrikes, and Gaza Strip, 94
Alberta, 191, 193, 195
Algeria, phosphate rock and, 204–6
alliances, in Middle East, 90, 94, 96
Allison, Graham, 25
al Qaeda, 68, 105–6; in Africa, 131–32; nuclear weapons and, 167, 174, 177
al-Shabaab, 68, 105, 132
American society, 56, 59–61
Anderson, David A., 201
Angola, 128
AQI/ISIL (al Qaida in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), 68–69
AQIM (al Qaeda in the Maghreb), 68, 131–32
Arab Spring, 4, 130, 208, 209
ARAMCO (Arabian-American Oil Company), 95
Arizona SB 1070, 43, 46, 49
Arizona v. United States, 43, 49
arms race, 168
Army (U.S.), 59
ARRA (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act), 34
Asia: immigration to United States from, 48; pivot to, 66, 120; poverty and East, 184
Assad, Bashar al, 69, 91, 96
AVF (all-volunteer force), 55–56, 59–61

Bahrain: Iran and, 96; regime survival and, 92; violent suppression in, 90, 91, 95, 98
Baja California, 212
Baradar, Abdul Ghani, 105
Bardach, Eugene, 25
Baruch Plan, 170
Bashir, Omar al-, 134
Biden, Joseph, 60
bin Laden, Osama, 6, 105, 109
biological weapons, 171–73
bitumen, 193, 194, 195
Bolivia, 138, 140–45
Bonn Agreement, 107
Bosnia, 72
Botswana, 128
boundary-spanning problems, 3–6, 8, 26
Brazil: drugs and, 138; GDP growth of, 182; phosphate rock and, 204; trade surplus and, 182
Brown v. Board of Education, 31, 40n18
Bukra' phosphate mines, 209
bureaucracy, 15
Burkina Faso, conflict minerals and, 206
Bush, George W., administration of, 34, 48, 59–60
BWC (Biological Weapons Convention), 171–72

Canadian oil, 191, 193–94
cap-and-trade system, 197
capital account surplus, 183. *See also* trade surplus
carbon dioxide, 193, 195, 197
CCP (Chinese Communist Party), 82–83
censorship, 100
Central Africa, 131
chemical weapons, 171–72; in Syria, 96
Cheney, Dick, 174
Chile, 138
China: Afghanistan and, 6, 109–10; Africa and, 5, 79–80, 128; civil unrest and, 70; consumption patterns of, 203; cyberspace and, 151; economy of, 29; GDP growth of, 182; military modernization and, 84; nuclear weapons and, 167, 170, 172–73, 176; phosphate rock and, 203, 205; poverty and, 184; resource-backed aggression and, 83, 206; WTO and, 80
Christensen, Tom, 24
civilian contractors, 55q
civilian control of military, 55
civil liberties, 55, 58
civil-military relations, 8, 55, 58, 61, 161; civilian supremacists and, 60; gap and, 58–61; professional supremacists and, 60
civil war, 65–74; in Libya, 96, 98; role of natural resources in, 207; ;in Syria, 90, 91, 96
"clean coal" technologies, 197
client states, in Middle East, 91, 93
climate change, 3, 85, 193, 208
Clinton, William J., administration of, 59–60
coca: eradication of, 143; production of, 138, 142–44
Cold War, 23, 36, 55–56, 58, 167–70, 177
Colgan, Jeff, 206
Collier, Paul, xviii
Colombia, 68, 71; conflict minerals and, 206; drug production and, 138–40, 145
coltan, 128
communism, 157–58; collapse of, 92
competition, economic, 183
concessions, between Israel and Palestine. *See* peace process
conflict minerals, 67, 206
Congolese National Army, 206
Congo River, 212
Congress (U.S.), 15, 57, 163
congressional funding, 16
Constitution (U.S.): education and, 31, 33, 39n10; immigration and, 49–50; military and, 56; political institutions and, 23
constitutional authority, 14, 16, 18
containment, 23
counterinsurgency, 106
counterterrorism, 90, 93
crop residues, 212
Cuba, 173
Cuban Missile Crisis, 25
CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention), 65, 73, 171–72
cyberspace, 67, 149–53; unrest in Syria and, 70
Cyprus, Eurozone and, 185

Darfur, 130
defense industry, 55, 186; innovation and, 55
de Lozada, Gonzalo Sánchez, 140
democracy, in Middle East, 90, 93, 95, 99
democratization, 104, 107, 132, 135, 158
Deng Xiaoping, 79, 84
Department of Defense, 7, 161–63
Department of State (U.S.), 1, 158–63
deterrence: cyberspace and, 152; nuclear, 168–69
developed countries, convergence among, 184
developing countries: income inequality, 184; agriculture in, 208
Diamond, Jared, 200n7
diplomacy, coercive, 98
domestic political process, 13
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 59
draft, military, 61
Draghi, Mario, 119
DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 72–73, 128, 130–31, 206
drones, 71
drug trade: Americas and, 138–40, 144–45; Bolivia and, 140–45; civil wars and, 67
Duffield, Mark, 159

economic development, xvii–xx, 184; in Afghanistan, xviii–xix, 104, 107; in Africa, 125–30; cyberspace and, 153; freedom and, 184
economic policy, 186. *See also* trade policy

economy: European, 115–22; international, 85, 181; sectors of, 182–83, 186; state intervention in, 186
Ecuador, 145
education: Constitution (U.S.) and, 31, 33; international rankings of, 29; national decline and, 29–31; reform of, 30; spending and, 32–33; teachers and, 35
Egypt: biological weapons and, 172; chemical weapons and, 171; Israel and, 93, 99; military in, 90, 92–94, 99; phosphate rock and, 206; regime overthrow and, 65, 70, 73, 90, 92, 93, 130, 209; social media and, 92, 100; Suez Canal and, 93; Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, 161; U.S. alignment with, 93
Eikenberry, Karl, 60
Eisenhower, Dwight D., administration of, 36; atomic energy and, 170; military-industrial complex and, 55–58, 61
electoral process, 18
elites, influence of, 93
employment, 183. *See also* unemployment
energy: in Africa, 127–28; efficiency and, 198; resource security and, 191, 193; shortages, 208
environmental sustainability, 191, 192, 193
ESEA (Elementary and Secondary Education Act), 32, 40n18, 42n35
Ethiopia, 127
EU (European Union), 5–6, 115–20, 185; Turkey and, 94
Euphrates River, 2
Europe, 115–22
European Central Bank, 185
Eurozone, 5–6, 115, 117–20, 185
eutrophication, 212, 215n29
externalities, negative, 91

Facebook: civil war and, 70; IMF and, 185
farming. *See* agriculture
federalism: education policy and, 29–35, 37–38; immigration policy and, 48–50; liberal, 39n9
"Federalist No. 8" (Publius), 185
fertilizers: agricultural yields and, 201; alternatives to industrial, 212, 218n59; demand for, 203, 208, 215n5; efficiency of use, 212, 215n29; Indian shortages of, 211; phosphate rock and, 202; price increases of, 208
filibuster, 16
fiscal austerity, 181; Department of Defense and, 91, 187
food production, global, 203, 207
food security, 207, 211
Fordham, Benjamin O., 23
foreign aid, 46, 94, 96, 101
foreign policy (U.S.), 55, 157–64
fossil fuels, 191
France, 170; Mali and, 71–73
freedom, economic development and, 184
Freedom House, 184
free trade, 181–82; globalization and, 184; national security and, 185; U.S. agreement with Morocco, 210
Friedberg, Aaron, 23

Gaddafi, Muammar, 96, 98, 130
Galbraith, Peter, 107
Gates, Robert, 1, 7, 65–66, 68, 120, 160
gays and lesbians, 59
Gaza Strip, 94
GDP growth and, 184
Geddes, Barbara, 92, 101
Germany, 118
Ghana, 129
Gilpin, Robert, 184
globalization, 45; civil war and, 66, 70; national security and, 185; objections to, 185
Global Peace Index, 206
Gourevitch, Peter, 21
GPS (global positioning system), 187. *See also* technological spillover
Granovetter, Mark, 92
Great Recession of 2008, 181–82, 187
Greece, Eurozone and, 117–18, 185
growth convergence, 184
Gulf of Mexico, 212
Gulf War, first, 95
Gurr, Ted Robert, 67

Hamilton, Alexander: on national security, 185; on political economy, 181; "Report on Manufactures," 181
Hamiltonianism, 18
Haqqani network, 105, 109

Hari, Johann, 142
HIV/AIDS, 133–34
Hoffman, Bruce, 174
Hollande, François, 118
homeland security, 48–49
Homeland Security, Department of, 17
Hu Jintao, 84
human capital, 184, 186
humanitarianism, 46, 50
human security, 125, 131, 133–35
Huntington, Samuel, 47–48, 58

IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), 170, 172
ICC (International Criminal Court), 134
illegal, 50
IMF (International Monetary Fund), 118, 126, 185
immigration: definition of, 44; economic impact of, 44, 46–47, 51; humanitarianism and, 46, 50
India: agriculture in, 210–11; consumption patterns of, 203; food prices and unrest in, 211; growth of, 182; nuclear weapons and, 109–10, 171; Pakistan and, 6, 109–10; phosphate rock and, 204–5, 210–11; terrorism and, 68
inequality: economic, 32, 140; racial, 31–32; income, 184
insurgency: in Syria, 95; in Libya, 95, 96, 98
intermestic issues, 19
international institutions, 3–4
international organizations: civil wars and, 74; liberal economic order and, 185; trade negotiations and, 184
innovation: economic growth and, 183; governmental assistance and, 186
international trade, 183
International Water Management Institute, 203
Internet, 186
interoperability, 151, 153
intervention, western: in Libya, 92, 98; in Syria, 96, 99
Iran: Aghanistan and, 109–10; civil unrest in, 70; nuclear weapons and, 1, 167, 171–73, 176
Iraq: Iran and, 96, 103; phosphate rock reserves of, 204, 206; sectarian violence in, 90, 96, 98; U.S. war in, 1, 55, 57, 65, 71, 90, 98, 103–4, 159
Ireland, Eurozone and, 185
ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), 106–7
Israel: biological weapons and, 173; chemical weapons and, 172; Cold War and, 93; democratic institutions and, 94; economy and, 94; Egypt and, 93, 94; Iran and, 94; military power and, 93; nuclear weapons and, 171; peace initiatives in, 90, 94; settlements and, 94; Turkey and, 94, 95; U.S. alignment with, 93, 94; wastewater reuse in, 218n59
Italy, 117

Jacksonianism, 18
Janowitz, Morris, 58
Japan: China and, 83; Honda and, 186; nuclear weapons and, 167, 170, 175
Jeffersonianism, 18
Jiang Zemin, 84
Jochim, Ashley, 25
Johnson, Lyndon, administration of, 32
Jordan, and Arab Spring, 90

Kalamazoo watershed, 194
Kaplan, Robert, 6
Karzai, Hamid, 107
Kashmir, 73
Kasmiri, Ilyas, 105
Kennedy, Anthony, 49
Kennedy, John F., xx
Kenya, 73
Keohane, Robert, 3
Keynesian economics, 181, 186
Keystone pipeline, 191, 193–94
Khan, A. Q., 110, 177
Khan, Ismail, 107
King Abdullah University for Science and Technology, 95, 102
Kobach, Kris, 49
Korea, and nuclear proliferation, 1
Korean War, 59, 170
Kosovo, 72
Krugman, Paul, 183
Kuran, Timur, 92
Kuwait, Arab Spring and, 90

Laayoune, 209
Laegreid, Per, 24
Lashkar-e-Taiba, 105, 109
Latin America: drug trade in, 138–45; immigration to United States from, 48
legitimacy, 44–46
liberal international economic order, 185
liberalism, 44
Libi, Abu Anas al-, 105
Libya: regime toppled in, 70–72, 73, 90, 96, 98, 115, 130, 134, 210; resource-backed aggression and, 206
Lindsay, James, 16, 17
Lovins, Amory, 200n9

Madison, James, 23, 48
malaria, 133
Mali, 71–73
manufacturing, 182; United States and, 183; China and, 183. *See also* economy, sectors of
Marcella, Gabriel, 24
market failures, 182, 186
Marshall Plan, 157
MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo), 141–43
May, Peter, 25
McChrystal, Stanley, 60
McKibben, Bill, 192, 200n4
McRaven, William, xix
Mead, Walter Russell, 18
Merkel, Angela, 118–19
Mesa, Carlos, 140
Mexico, 67, 138–39
military: defense spending and, 57–58; defense technology and U.S., 186; deployments and, 57; effectiveness and, 58; militia system and, 56; professionalism and, 56, 58, 60; recruitment and 58
military-industrial complex, 55–57, 61; arms corporations and, 57
Millennium Development Goals, 128–29
mineral reserves and reserve bases, 204
mining, 204, 206
mitigation of environmental problems, 196
monarchical resiliency theory, 98, 101
Monti, Mario, 118
Morales, Evo, 141–44
Morocco: Arab Spring and, 90, 209; monarchy of, 209–10; phosphate reserves of, 203, 205, 208–10; 2005 protests in, 209; U.S. relations with, 210
Morsi, Mohamed, 94, 99, 185
mortality rates, 184
Mubarak, Hosni, 92, 93
Muhammad, Khalid Sheikh, 107
mujahideen, in Afghanistan, 95
Mullen, Michael, 8
Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian, 92
mutually assured destruction (MAD), 169

Namibia, 212
national budget, 16
National Defense Authorization Act, 162
national identity, 30, 44, 47–48
National Security Council, 162
nationalism, 44, 82
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 72, 93, 106–8, 110–11, 117, 120, 122, 132, 210
natural resources: conflict and, 67, 205–7; economic dependence on, 207; extraction from non-self-governing territories, 209; mining and infrastructure, 204, 206, 209; U.S. strategic concerns and, 201, 213
naval blockade, in Gaza Strip, 94
NCLB (No Child Left Behind), 34–35, 41n27, 41n29
NDEA (National Defense Education Act), 36–37, 42n35
neoclassical economics, 181–82
Netherlands, 118
New Deal, 31, 40n15
New Zealand, 212
NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), 69–70, 159
Nigeria, 72–73, 127
nitrogen limitation, 212
Nixon, Richard, relations with Saudi Arabia, 95
No-Fly-Zone, in Iraq, 95
norms: cyberspace and, 149–51; regional, 93
North Korea: China and, 83; nuclear weapons and, 167, 173–74, 176
NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), 170–71
nuclear proliferation, 6
nuclear war, 56; power and, 197; stockpiles and, 57

nuclear weapons, 167–71, 174–77
Nusra, Jabhat al-, 68–69, 105
Nye, Joseph, 158

Obama, Barack, administration of, 182, 219; Afghanistan and, 105–6, 108–9; Africa and, 129, 133; educational policy of, 34; foreign policy of, 21; immigration policy of, 43, 46–48; international public opinion and, 210; Keystone pipeline and, 191; military deployments and, 59; nuclear weapons and, 167; rebalancing in Asia, 91; red line in Syria and, 96, 99, 103; relations with Turkey, 95
Occupy Wall Street, 31
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 161–62
officer corps (U.S.), 58–59, 61
oil: as global commodity, 194; in Middle East, 93, 95; revolutionary governments and, 205; scarcity and, 201, 215n1; U.S. dependence on, 207
OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons), 171–72
Orben, Viktor, 185

Pakistan: nuclear weapons and, 109–10, 171, 177; phosphate rock and, 204; use of drones in, 65; terrorism and, 68, 73
Palestine, 90, 94
peace process: between Israel and Palestine, 90, 94; in Syria, 96
Pentagon, 158
Persian Gulf: monarchical resiliency and, 101; United States and, 90, 95, 100
Peru, 68, 138, 145
Peru-Chile shelf, 212
Pfaff, William, 57
Philippines, xvii, 68, 71
phosphate rock: depletion of, 201, 205; discovery of, 212; global reserve, distribution of, 203–4; global trade, 202–5; price increases in, 203–4, 211; use in fertilizers, 201–2
PLA (People's Liberation Army), 84
pluralism, 23
policy entrepreneurs, 3
Polisario Front, 209
political instability, 184
pollution, 192, 215n29
Portugal, Eurozone and, 185
power: hard, 158–64; presidential, 14; purse, 16; smart, 163–64; soft, 158–64
poverty: in Africa, 129–30; global, xviii, 184
private military contractors, 69–70
public opinion, 17–18

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, 160

radical Islamic movements, election results and, 90, 94, 99
Rajoy, Mariano, 118
Rasmussen, Anders Fogh, 108
recession. *See* Great Recession of 2008
red line, in Syria, 96, 103
refugees, in Middle East, 96
regime: collapse of, 90, 92, 95, 96; sentiments and beliefs on, 92
remittances, 46
"Report on Manufactures" (Hamilton), 181
Republican Party, 59
research and development, 186
resource: competition, 206–7, 208; curse, 127–28, 206–7, 208; wars, 205
resource-backed aggression, 205
Responsibility to Protect, 65, 71
revolution, in Middle East, 91, 94–95, 99, 101; natural resources and, 206
Rittel, Horst, 24
Romney, Mitt, 182
ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps), 60
RTT (Race to the Top), 34–35
Russia: Afghanistan and, 109–10; China and, 82; cyberspace and, 151; financial collapse of, 185; nuclear weapons and, 167, 170, 173, 176; phosphate rock and, 204, 206; Syria and, 73
Rwanda, 72

Sahrawi, 209
Saudi Arabia: Arab Spring and, 90–91, 95, 100; Bahrain and, 95; economic and arms diversification, 95, 102; Egypt and, 95;

insurgency in Middle East and, 95; Iran and, 95; university and, 95; U.S. alignment with, 93, 95
Sayyaf, Abdul Rassoul, 107
Schelling, Thomas, 168
sea level rise, 193
sectarian violence, in Iraq, 90, 96
Security Council. *See* United Nations Security Council
Sen, Amartya, 184
Senate Armed Services Committee, 162
Senegal, 129
September 11 (2001), 17, 48–49, 57, 65, 68, 73, 174
services, 182; United States and, 183
settlements, Israeli, 94
Sierra Leone, 128
Sinai Peninsula, 99
smart power, 163–64
Smith, Adam: on political economy, 181; on national security, 185
smuggling, illicit drugs, 96
Snow, Donald, 168
social media: Arab Spring and, 91–92, 100; civil war and, 70
social welfare, Arab Spring and, 90, 92
soft power, 44, 46
solar power, 197
Solyndra, 186
Somalia, 71–73, 105, 130, 132
South Africa, 204
South Korea, 83–84
South Sudan, 134
sovereignty, 44
Soviet Union, 36; military threat and, 186; nuclear weapons and, 167–71, 177
Spain: Eurozone and, 117, 185; terrorism and, 68
spillover: Egyptian-Israeli border and, 100; Syrian civil war and, 91, 96
Sputnik, 36–37
Sri Lanka, conflict minerals and, 206
Stavridis, James, xix
Stevens, Christopher, 73
Stoker, Robert, 24
strategic bombers, in Middle East, 95
strategic trade theory (STT), 186–87
subsystems, 25
Sudan, 127
Suez Canal, 93
suppression, of popular protest in Middle East, 90–92, 95, 96, 98
Supreme Court (U.S.), 43
Syria: civil war in, 65, 68–69, 70, 72–73, 90, 96, 98, 105; phosphate rock reserves of, 204
Syrian Electronic Army, 70

Taiwan, 82–84, 86, 173
Taliban, 105–6, 109
Tannenwald, Nina, 170
Tanzania, 129
tar sands, 191, 195, 198
tariffs, 183. *See also* trade protectionism
Tea Party, 30
technological spillover, 186–87
terrorism, 48–49, 57, 65–66, 68–70, 132, 157–58, 174–77
Tiannanmen Square Massacre, 82, 84
Tibet, 82
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 39n7
trade deficit, 182–83; United States and, 79, 182–83
trade liberalization, 181–85
trade policy, 182, 185; Africa and, 126; American electorate and, 187; public good and, 187
trade protectionism, 181, 184; defense industry and, 186–87. *See also* tariffs
trade surplus, 182; Brazil and, 182; China and, 79–80, 182
TransCanada pipeline, 193–94
transnational, 2
Transportation Security Agency, 17
tribalism, in Middle East, 96
Truman, Harry, 157, 169–70
TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), 116
Tunisia, 90, 92; Arab Spring and, 70, 73, 130, 209; phosphate rock resources and, 205–6
Turkey: expanding economy and, 90, 95, 99; Israel and, 94–95; military and, 94; NATO and, 93; U.S. alignment with, 93–95; water-rights and, 2
Turkmenistan, 206
Twitter, 70

unemployment, U.S., 182
"unholy alliance," 184
United Kingdom, 68, 120, 170
United Nations: Africa and, 128, 134; civil wars and, 72; position on natural resource extractions, 209; "Responsibility to Protect" and, 71
United Nations Environment Programme, 209
United Nations Millenium Development Goal, 184. *See also* poverty
United Nations Security Council: China and, 85; Saudi Arabia and, 95
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 207
United States v. Curtiss Wright Corps, 14
U. S. Africa Command, 159
USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development), xvii–xx, 107, 158, 159, 163
U. S. Army, 161
U. S. Coast Guard, 17
U. S. Geological Survey, 203

Van Buren, Peter, 160
Venezuela: conflict minerals and, 206; drug policy and, 145
Victor, David, 3
Vietnam, 82
Vietnam War, 59, 71, 170
vulnerability, strategic and economic, 93

Waltz, Kenneth, 99
water: nutrient overload and, 215n29; rights issues, 2; shortages of, 208
Wealth of Nations, The (Smith), 181
Webber, Melvin, 24
Western Africa, 206
Western Europe, 205
Western Sahara, 208–10
Westphalian order, 44
Whole-of-Government, 22, 24
wicked problems, 24–25
Wickham-Crowley, Thomas, 92
Wilson, James Q., 25
Wilsonianism, 18
wind power, 197
Wolfson, Richard, 196, 200n9
World Bank, 185
World Trade Organization (WTO), 153, 184
World War I, 59
World War II, 56–57, 59, 95, 167

Yemen: Saudi Arabia and, 100; terrorism in, 65, 91; use of drones in, 65

Zardari, Asif Ali, 109
Zawahiri, Ayman al-, 105
Zedong, Mao, 79
Zelizer, Julian E., 23
Zimbabwe, conflict minerals and, 206